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Case No. 20150840-SC 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Peli tioner, 
V. 
MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Brief of Petitioner 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 (Addendum A). The Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
Kendall Oney couldn't sleep and was sitting in the driver's seat of his 
car at 3:30 in the morning when Defendant opened the door and squatted 
down, putting his exposed face mere inches away from Oney's face. 
Defendant looked directly at Oney and said, "Why you following me?" The 
dome light and the dashboard lights illuminated the pair as they looked at 
each other. After several seconds, Defendant stood and reached toward 
what Oney believed to be a weapon tucked in his waistband. Oney slowly 
stood, putting the two once again face-to-face for several more seconds in 
an area lit by two street lights, a porch light, a flood light, and the car's 
headlights. Oney spoke calmly and watched Defendant while at the same 
time moving slowly around both Defendant and the car before bolting for 
his house. Defendant then stole Oney' s car. Oney immediately called 
police with a description of Defendant: a Hispanic male, about 5'10", 180 
pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black leather jacket and a black 
beanie. 
Within 20 minutes of Oney' s early 1norning call, officers had: 
followed a leak from Oney' s driveway to the stolen car parked next to a 
walkway that led to an ele1nentary school; established a containment area 
and a visible police presence; followed a canine from the car near the school; 
discovered Defendant curled up inside a component of the school's exterior 
air conditioning unit; and obtained Oney' s positive identification of 
Defendant. Defendant matched the description Oney gave police, including 
height, weight, build, coloring, ethnicity, and clothing. He had a "scraggly" 
salt and pepper goatee that had not been 1nentioned, and he had no hair 
sticking out from under his beanie. When asked why he was there at the 
school, Defendant stated, "[S]omebody is following me." Oney thereafter 
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w. 
identified Defendant as one of two familiar individuals at a lineup, then 
positively identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues: 
1. "Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred 
in reversing the district court's denial of Respondent's motion to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony." 
2. "Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding the State was required to demonstrate that any error in 
admission of the eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and whether it erred in concluding the admission of that 
testimony was not harmless." 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the 
court of appeals for correctness. RalwfiJ v. Steadman, 2012 UT 70, ,I7, 289 
P.3d 534. 
B: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is reproduced in Addendum 
Utah Const. art. I § 12. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 
Defendant's encounter with the victim - "Why you following me?" 
Forty-year-old Kendall Oney was an amateur astronomer, familiar 
with late-night and early-morning stargazing and used to getting up in the 
very early morning. R357:15-18. So when he found him.self unable to sleep 
around 3:30 a.m. on November 25, 2012, he got out of bed. R357:15-18, 65. 
The night was overcast, so he decided to use the time to get his car ready for 
its annual inspection. R357:16-18, 22, 65. 
As he sat in the driver's seat in his driveway checking the starter, 
gauges, and lights, he came face-to-face with Defendant, who opened the 
driver's door and squatted next to the seat looking directly at Oney. 
R357:16-18, 29, 34-35, 74-77. His face was about ten inches from Oney's face, 
was not obscured by any covering, and was lit by the car's ''[f]airly bright" 
interior lighting, which included both the dome and dashboard lights. 
R357:17-18, 26, 35, 77. As Oney stared at Defendant's face, Defendant asked, 
"Why you following me? Why you following me?" R357:18, 35, 77. 
Oney initially thought Defendant might want a drink or a ride. 
R357:18. But after about ten seconds, Defendant stood up, opened his jacket 
and reached for the handle of something tucked into his waistband. 
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R357:18, 35-36, 39, 77. The movement left Oney looking directly at 
Defendant's torso and hands, and upwards at his face. R357:37-38, 78. 
Oney's surprise turned to fear, and he decided to get back to the house. 
R357:18-19, 35, 41, 78, 81. He stood up, putting himself face-to-face with an 
equally-tall Defendant and so close that the men were "almost touching." 
R357:37-38, 49-50, 101. At the same time, Oney started talking calmly to 
Defendant, asking what was going on and if he was all right. R357:18-19, 
35. For about five seconds, Oney moved slowly around Defendant and the 
car as he talked, paying special attention to Defendant's face and hands and 
never losing sight of him. R357:36-38, 40-41, 82. Defendant moved with 
Oney, ultimately moving into the car's headlights. R357:36, 41, 51. 
Oney saw Defendant as he stood up because of illumination from 
multiple sources: 
• the car's headlights (R357:27); 
e the porch light by the back door of the house about twenty feet away 
(R357:29, 67-68; State's Exh. 19); 
0 a street light at the front of Oney' s house about thirty yards away 
(R357:32-35; State's Exh. 9, 18); 
a a street light in the front yard of the house behind Oney' s car about 
thirty-five feet away (R357:33, 69-72; State's Exh. 17); 
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• a flood light on the house next door to the driveway about forty feet 
away, which shown on Defendant from behind (R357:30-34; State's 
Exh. 16); and 
• the reflection of the sh·eet lights and other lighting off the clouds 
(R357:18, 26). 
The trees were bare, allowing the multiple lighting sources to leave the area 
"fairly well illuminated." R357:22-23, 26. In fact, the circumstances 
provided "pretty bright" lighting, allowing Oney to see Defendant and to 
judge his movements. R357:19, 22, 25-26. 
After about five seconds of maneuvering, Oney turned and ran for his 
house. R357:19, 40-41. He immediately turned on the flood lights on the 
back of his house, woke up his brother, and stepped back outside in time to 
watch Defendant squeal away in his car to the end of the driveway before 
turning north and speeding away. R357:19, 29-30, 42-43, 67-69, 90-91; State's 
Exh. 13, 14. 
Defendant's capture by police- "[S]omebody is following me." 
Oney called the police and gave a description of the car thief- a 
Hispanic male, about 5'10", 180 pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black 
leather jacket and a black beanie. R357:42-44, 50, 83-87, 91; R359:10-12. 
Officer Shawn Bias responded frmn nearby within a 1ninute of getting the 
dispatch. R357:110, 117. While talking with Oney, Bias noticed a trail of 
liquid on the ground leading from where the car had been parked to the end 
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of the driveway, then turning north the way Oney's car had gone. R357:45, 
119-20. The officer immediately left to follow the trail, which led directly to 
Oney's abandoned car a few blocks away. R357:46-48, 119-20, 125-32; 
R359:13; State's Exh. 1. It was stopped at a curb a few blocks from Oney's 
house in front of a fenced concrete pathway leading to the schoolyard of an 
elementary school. R357:120-21; State's Exh. 21, 23, 24. 
Because no more than ten minutes had passed since Oney's call to 
police, Bias believed that the suspect could still be nearby. R357:122-23. 
The location and the officer's years of experience led him to believe that the 
suspect may have seen the police, abandoned the car, and hid. R357:124. 
Consequently, the officer called for a K-9 unit to help locate the suspect and 
for additional officers to set up a containment barrier to prevent his escape. 
R357:122-23. 
Officer Swazo and his dog arrived shortly after, and the dog wasted 
no time picking up a scent and leading the officers "very strongly" from 
Oney' s car to the nearby pathway, then down the pathway and across the 
schoolyard toward the school. R357:125-29, 143-44; R359:17. Officer Swazo 
handled the dog while Officer Bias followed behind him with his flashlight 
on and gun drawn. R357:128-29. Officer Bias was 1nere feet into the 
schoolyard when he heard a noise coming from the direction the dog was 
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tracking. R357:129, 145; R359:17. It sounded to him like a person jumping a 
chain link fence. Id. 
Several portable classrooms-each an individual building-were 
clustered next to the school building on the path the dog was tracking. 
R357:128-30, 147; State's Exh. 27 (showing where classrooms stood before 
being removed). While Officer Suazo stopped the dog to do a routine safety 
sweep around the classrooms to ensure no one was hiding there who might 
ambush them, Officer Bias continued toward the school to follow the noise 
he had heard, constantly looking around to ensure no one approached them 
from the school. R357:129, 132-33; R359:17, 26-27. Near the building just 
beyond the classrooms, he tracked a rustling noise to the heating/ air 
conditioning unit that was against the school wall and surrounded by a 9-
foot high chain link fence. R357:129; R359:17; State's Exhs. 27 & 28 (in 
Addendum C). He did not yell for help because he did not want to 
broadcast his location before he was ready. R357:130. Instead, believing 
someone or something was inside the heating unit,_ he neared the unit, 
identified himself, and ordered the person to come out. R357:130, 148; 
R359:17. Getting no response, he moved to within three feet of the unit and 
found Defendant "curled into a ball" inside the heating unit. R357:129-30, 
132-33, 148-49. Bias repeated his command numerous times, as did the 
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other uniformed officers who joined him, but Defendant simply made eye 
contact without complying with the orders. R357:130-33, 149; R359:28-29. 
The only way in or out was a padlocked gate, suggesting Defendant had 
scaled the fence. R357:130, 134. No other basis was found for the noise Bias 
heard and no other people were found. Officers used a bolt cutter on the 
lock, and Defendant eventually came out. R357:130; R359:18. When the 
officer asked Defendant why he was hiding, Defendant said, "somebody is 
following me." R359:8. He claimed that he had called 911 to get police to 
help him. 
Bias concluded that Defendant matched the description of the car 
thief "very well" - h~ appeared to be Hispanic and was wearing a black 
beanie and a black jacket. R357:136-37, 141-42; R359:18. 1 
The first identification 
Within five minutes of Officer Bias's visit, another officer drove Oney 
to identify the abandoned car, then to the schoolyard where Oney positively 
identified Defendant as the man who stole his car. R357:45-47, 49-51, 91-93, 
135-36. At the "showup" -held within thirty minutes of the crime-
Defendant was the only non-officer present, was in handcuffs, and was 
1 A quick search of Defendant revealed no weapons, but a knife was 
found on him during booking. R359:25-26, 29, 46, 94. 
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illuminated with police spotlights. R357:49, 93-94; R359:22. However, Oney 
identified him based on his looks, not the setting. R357:49-50, 94-95, 106-07. 
Oney testified that Defendant was wearing the black jacket when Oney 
identified him at the showup. R357:49-50. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The second, third, and fourth identifications 
The State charged Defendant with first-degree-felony aggravated 
robbery. Rl-3. At a lineup four months after Defendant's arrest, Oney 
selected Defendant (#6) and one of the other men (#8). R357:51-54, 60-62, 95-
97; State's Exh. 43 & Def's Exh. 1 (in Addendum C). At trial, he explained 
that he recognized Defendant's eyes, thought his goatee looked familiar, 
and knew that he was the robber, but that one of the other men "looked 
familiar," prompting the dual identification. R357:62-64. Oney thereafter 
positively identified Defendant at both the preliminary hearing and the 
trial. R357:20. 
The trial court's ruling 
Before trial, the judge ad1nitted expert testilnony from Dr. David 
Dodd, PhD., concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification 
testimony. R89-108, 111-18, 142-44; R221; R356:passim. At the same time, 
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the judge denied Defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress all of Oney' s 
identifications of Defendant. R54-55, 60-88; R356:75-76. The judge ruled: 
THE COURT: Based upon what I've heard today, as well 
as the fact that as I think about five to 7 minutes in this contest 
- five to 7 -
[DEF CNSL] Seconds. 
THE COURT: --seconds, excuse n1e, in this context, it 
appears sufficiently enough under a dome light and otherwise 
darkened area where it's - it's pre-lit to have at least the State in 
this particular case ... provided sufficiently reliable evidence to 
suggest that - that identification should not be suppressed and 
for the other factors that [the prosecutor] has articulated all of 
which seem to be frankly compelling associated with the 
identification. [sic] The Court finds that that test associated 
with sufficiently reliable evidence to support the identification 
has been met by the State. And the victim in this particular 
case will be entitled to testify about what it is he identified on 
that evening. 
R356:75-76. The factors articulated by the prosecutor included: 
e Oney and the suspect were face-to-face within a foot of each other for 
5 to 7 seconds; 
• the car's dome light and dashboard lit Defendant's face the entire 
time; 
e Oney kept his eyes on Defendant at all thnes until Oney reached the 
front of the car where he turned and bolted for the house; 
e Oney's inability to sleep could have resulted from something other 
than fatigue; 
a the car had a fluid leak which led an officer to the abandoned car with 
its door open; 
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• a K9 sniffed the car's area and led his handler up the nearby sidewalk 
path through the schoolyard to the air conditioning unit outside the 
school; 
• an officer heard a fence rattle, fallowed the noise to the enclosed air 
conditioning unit, and, using a flashlight, saw an individual inside 
meeting Oney' s general description of the robber, including the 
ethnicity, general height and weight, black beanie, and black jacket; 
• the suspect' s first words to Oney were "Are you following me" or 
"why are you following me," and Defendant's first words to officers 
when found were "I'm being followed"; 
• at 4:00 a.m. on a winter morning, Defendant was found within a 
couple of miles of Oney's home and near the abandoned stolen car; 
~ Defendant met the suspect' s general description; 
• it is not reasonably likely that many individuals fitting the suspect' s 
general description would be in the area at that time of day; 
• Oney identified Defendant at the school within thirty minutes of the 
robbery; and 
e Dodd explained that even though certain details about an 
identification could be wrong, it does not necessarily mean that the 
identification itself is wrong. 
R356:70-75. 2 
2 Al though the judge did not make express findings of fact regarding 
the reliability of the identifications, he adopted as "compelling" the 
prosecutor's articulation of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991). R356:75-76. Accordingly, this Court should assume that 
the judge found the facts in accord with the prosecutor's argument. See id. 
at 787-88 (where "factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by 
the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we 'assume that 
the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision."') (quoting Mower v. 
McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6,245 P.2d 224,226 (1952)). 
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The prosecutor also reminded the court that an expert would guide 
the jury on weighing each factor. R356:70. Finally, the trial court insh4 ucted 
the jury about factors that may affect an identification's accuracy. R308-11. 
The defense 
In an effort to undermine the reliability of Oney's eyewitness 
identification at trial, the defense focused on the differences between Oney' s 
initial description of the robber and Defendant's appearance when he was 
arrested. Oney initially described the robber as having "long hair" sticking 
out the bottom of his beanie "maybe an inch," but Defendant had short, 
almost shaved, hair. R357:85-86; State's Exh. 43. Oney made no mention of 
facial hair in his initial report and said at the preliminary hearing that he 
saw no facial hair, but testified at trial that he remembered a goatee and that 
the goatee was part of the reason he focused on Defendant at the lineup; 
Defendant sported an untrimmed goatee when arrested. R357:63-64, 87-89, 
136-37, 149-50; R359:11-12, 18-19. Officer Bias described it as "long scraggly 
facial hair." Where Oney consistently maintained that the robber wore a 
black leather jacket during the robbery and at the arrest site, no jacket was 
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inventoried when Defendant was booked, and none was produced at trial. 3 
R357:43, 83-84, 106-07, 118; R359:52-53, 58, 69. 
A jury convicted Defendant as charged. R286. Defendant was 
sentenced and timely appealed to this Court, which transferred the case to 
the court of appeals. R335-38, 340-41, 348-52. 
The court of appeals' ruling 
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a 
new trial. See generally State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199. The majority 
identified the five factors articulated in the 1991 case of State v. Ramirez, 
conducted a simple balancing of some of those factors, and concluded that if 
u Ramirez was an extre1nely close call, we are confident that here" the 
testimony was "legally insufficient" to be deemed reliable. Id. at ,r,r12-15; 
see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782-84 (Utah 1991). It based its ruling on 
(1) the "troublesome" suggestiveness of the showup combined with the 
racial difference between Defendant and the eyewitness; (2) differences in 
Oney' s description of the robber the night of the robbery and at h"ial, 
especially regarding the length of the robber's hair and the existence of 
facial hair; and (3) Oney' s failure to identify only Defendant at the lineup. 
3 At least two police officers also remembered Defendant wearing a 
black jacket when he was arrested early on a winter morning, suggesting 
that the jacket was later misplaced. R357:141-42; R359:46-47. 
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Id. at ,I,I14-15. The majority ruled the evidence inadmissible, held that the 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the conviction, 
and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at if 19. 
Judge Pearce took the polar opposite position in his dissent, finding it 
impossible to "squint at Ramirez's holding in a way that permits [one] to see 
how the identification testimony offered in this case is less reliable than the 
testimony the Ramirez court deemed admissible." Id. at ,r21 (Pearce, J., 
dissenting). Judge Pearce reviewed each Ramirez factor, first under 
Ramirez's facts and then under the facts at hand; he acknowledged the same 
"concerns" noted by the majority. Id. at if if22-30. But, unlike the majority, 
he determined that, in "almost all respects, the showup involving 
Defendant in this case was substantially less troublesome than that the 
Ramirez court approved." Id. at ,I21. 
Review of the first three factors led Judge Pearce to find that this case 
fared better then Ramirez on each factor. Id. at ilif24-26 (Pearce, J., 
dissenting). Only the fourth factor-whether Oney's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent-caused Judge Pearce 
concern. Id. at ,I,I27-29. This factor included consideration of the consistency 
of Oney' s descriptions of the robber. Oney was not fully consistent in his 
identification of Defendant at the lineup where he identified both 
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Defendant and another man as the robber, was inconsistent in his 
description of Defendant's facial hair, and was wrong in claiming 
Defendant had long hair. Id. at ~f29. It was these inconsistencies, the judge 
explained, that "present the only way in which this matter could be 
considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez." Id. Ultimately, 
however, there were a "myriad" of other ways in which the testimony 
admitted in Ramirez was more unreliable than the testimony excluded in 
this case, prompting Judge Pearce to believe that the discrepancies were 
insufficient to require reversal under Ramirez. Id. 
Finally, Judge Pearce acknowledged that the showup in this case was 
"h·oublesome," as was the showup in Ramirez. Id. at if 31. However, where 
a similar showup did not render the eyewitness testimony in Ramirez 
inadmissible, Judge Pearce found no basis for a different outcome in this 
case. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Eyewitness identifications. This Court should clarify its state due 
process 1nodel governing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. At 
the outset, the right to due process protects against the miscarriage of justice 
resulting from state action. Absent police conduct causally related to the 
identification, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor 
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has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. This Court should 
also clarify that State v. Ramirez did not intend to eliminate the conditional 
two-step approach of the federal model applied in Neil v. Biggers. 
Under step one, trial courts must determine whether the police 
identification procedure itself was suggestive, and if so, to what extent 
(embraced in the fourth Long factor). If the procedure was not suggestive, 
the evidence should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry from 
the trial court. If the police identification procedure was suggestive, trial 
courts proceed to step two. In that step, trial courts must weigh the 
remaining Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification 
procedure to determine whether the identification was clearly unreliable. 
The identification should be suppressed as constitutionally inadmissible 
only if there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
Short of that, the identification should be submitted to the jury for its 
consideration. 
The showup by which Kendall Oney first identified Defendant as the 
robber was suggestive but did not produce the victim's identification of 
Defendant. Instead, Oney testified that his identification of Defendant was 
prompted by his recognition of the individual, not by the surroundings. 
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And the witnessing conditions at the time of the crime were 
imminently more reliable than in Ramirez. As a result, to the extent the 
identification procedure was suggestive, it cannot be said that the 
witnessing conditions were so poor that there was a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
II. Harmless Error. Should this Court rule that there was "a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" requiring exclusion 
of the identification testimony, it must determine whether the error was 
harmless. The court of appeals' majority reached this issue and, for the first 
time in this jurisdiction, applied the same standard used for a federal 
constitutional due process error: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction because, even if the 
federal standard applies, it was met here. Even without Oney's eyewitness 
identification of Defendant at the arrest site, the lineup, the preliminary 
hearing, and the trial, a thorough review of the evidence reveals sufficient 
compelling evidence of Defendant's guilt to establish that admission of the 
eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
ONEY'S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AS THE 
ROBBER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE 
The court of appeals majority held that Kendall Oney's identification 
of Defendant as the robber was constitutionally inadmissible under the state 
due process standard articulated in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 
(Utah 1991). State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,I,Ill-15. The dissent 
concluded otherwise, opining that if the identification testimony in Ramirez 
was admissible, so too is the testimony in this case. Id. at if 31. 
Both the majority and the dissent urged review of the Ramirez 
standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, citing 
its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case. Id. at 110, n.1; id. at 
'if 21 (Pearce, J., dissenting). This Court should clarify the state due process 
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals. 
*** 
For the most part, the federal constitution protects defendants from 
convictions based on unreliable evidence, "not by prohibiting introduction 
of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury 
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit." Perry v. New 
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Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012) ( emphasis added). For example, 
constitutional safeguards to counter unreliable evidence include "the Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus 
cross-examination of witnesses." Id. (citations omitted). 
The same holds true under the Utah Constitution. Under article I, 
section 12, defendants "have the right to appear and defend ... by counsel, 
... to be confronted by the witnesses against" them, and "to have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses" on their behalf. 
Utah Const. art. I§ 12. And this Court has recently added to this arsenal of 
weapons by requiring the admission of expert testimony on the fallibility of 
eyewitness identifications in sh·anger identification cases. See State v. 
Clopten, 2009 UT 84, if 49,223 P.3d 1103 ("' Clopten I"). 
Typically, then, the reliability of evidence is left for the jury to test 
through the crucible of trial, with all of its safeguards for determining the 
truth. PernJ, 132 S.Ct. at 723. There is a rare exception-when improper 
police conduct renders the evidence so unreliable that its admission can be 
said to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. For example, 
suppression is constitutionally required when a confession is prompted by 
police interrogation techniques that "'are so offensive to a civilized system 
of justice that they 1nust be conde1m1ed."' State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 
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,r11, 984 P.2d 1009 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986)). 
Similarly, suppression is constitutionally required where an identification 
results from a police identification procedure that is '"unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the 
accused a fair trial."' State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985) 
( emphasis added). 
A. A def end ant's due process rights under the Utah Constitution 
are not implicated absent State conduct. 
At the outset, it is important to clarify that due process concerns 
under the Utah Constitution do not arise absent State conduct. This Court 
has never suggested that an eyewitness identification not prompted by the 
police implicates state due process. Indeed, almost every case before this 
Court that has addressed the state constitutional admissibility of an 
eyewitness identification has involved at least an "arguably suggestive" 
police identification procedure. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777-84 (addressing 
admissibility of identification following one-person showup arranged by 
police); see also State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ,l,I9-11, 29-64, 44 P.3d 794 
(admissibility of identification following police lineup); State v. Hoffhine, 
2001 UT 4, ~,I7,13-19, 20 P.3d 265 (addressing admissibility of identification 
following two-person showup arranged by police); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, ,I,I7,41-47, 993 P.2d 837 (addressing admissibility of identification 
-21-
following police lineup); State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1995) 
(same); but see State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,Jif8, 25-30, 48 P.3d 953 
(concluding that police-administered photo array presentation not 
suggestive). @ 
This Court's due process jurisprudence in other contexts has also 
centered on the concern that government action may result in the 
deprivation of a defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness. For 
example, the Court" has held that due process concerns may arise when 
prosecutors engage in "potentially abusive practices" against a criminal 
defendant. See State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, iJ20, 37 P.3d 1160. The Court has 
likewise held that due process concerns may arise when a prosecutor 
destroys or loses exculpatory evidence. See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
ifif39-46, 1.62 P.3d 1106. Due process concerns do not arise absent 
government action. 
This Court in Ramirez likened the standard by which the admissibility 
of eyewitness identification evidence is determined to the standard applied 
when considering the constitutional admissibility of a confession. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 778. Under that standard, the trial court acts as a" gatekeeper to 
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects." Id. 
Significantly, ""[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession, 
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there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a 
criminal defendant of due process of law."'4 Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, il18 
(quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164). This Court should thus recognize, that 
absent police conduct related to an identification, there is no basis for 
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of state 
due process of law. 
As the United States Supreme Court recently explained in discussing 
the federal model, "the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not 
alone render its introduction at the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair." 
Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728. Simply put, "[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence 
does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process 
rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before 
allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness." Id. The purpose of the due 
process requirement "is not to displace the adversary system as the primary 
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of 
justice does not occur." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). That 
is, a miscarriage of justice that results from State conduct. See Perry, 132 
S.Ct. at 726 (observing that the very purpose of the "due process check" is 
4 The Court has not articulated a state due process standard for 
confessions different from the federal standard. 
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"to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable, 
notwithstanding improper police conduct"). 
Absent some police misconduct, a defendant's right to a fair h·ial is 
fully protected by the constitutional safeguards of effective counsel, 
compulsory process, confrontation, cross-examination, and the requirement 
that the State prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 
728-29. Added to that, this Court has now recognized a defendant's right to 
call qualified experts to educate the jury on factors that may affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications. See Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if 49. 
These measures, together with the rules of evidence, are more than 
sufficient to protect criminal defendants frmn convictions based on 
unreliable evidence. See PernJ, 132 S.Ct. at 729 (noting protection afforded 
by eyewitness expert testimony recognized in Clopten I). 
In su1n, like federal due process, state due process does not require a 
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification not prompted by police conduct. Rather, the safeguards 
against conviction based on unreliable evidence rest in the trial rights of 
article I, section 12, and the rules of evidence. 
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B. Ramirez did not purport to abandon the conditional two-step 
approach of the federal model. 
Historically, Utah courts examined the constitutional admissibility of 
an eyewitness identification under the federal due process standard. See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. In Ramirez, the Court adopted a somewhat 
different standard under state due process. Id. at 780. But the principle 
underlying both standards remained the same- a suggestive identification 
procedure administered by the police might render an identification so 
unreliable that its admission can be said to deny a defendant his due 
process right to a fair trial. 
1. The federal due process model is a conditional two-step 
analysis. 
Before Ramirez, this Court had "simply applied the federal analytical 
model for determining the reliability, and hence the admissibility" of an 
eyewitness identification. Id. at 779. The federal model involves a 
conditional two-step analysis. As a threshold matter, a court must 
determine whether the police used an "unnecessarily suggestive" 
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). If not, the court's due process inquiry 
ends. See id. But if police do employ an unnecessarily suggestive identi-
fication procedure, the court proceeds to step two- it must determine 
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"whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was 
[sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure [employed 
by police] was suggestive." Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
When assessing the reliability of a tainted identification under step 
two of the federal model, courts must consider the II totality of the 
circumstances" surrounding the tainted identification in light of five 
reliability factors: 
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the 
time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention, [3] the 
accuracy of the witness' description of the criminal, [4] the level 
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and [5] the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. The "Biggers 
factors" are "weighed [against] the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself" to determine whether II there is 'a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
98, 114, 116 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)). If so, the identification is constitutionally inadmissible. But "[s]hort 
of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh." Id. at 116. 
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2. Ramirez sought only to replace the Biggers factors with 
the Long factors. 
In purporting to follow Ramirez, the court of appeals applied a state 
due process model not contemplated by Ramirez. Rather than applying a 
conditional two-step analysis, the court of appeals treated the 
suggestiveness of police identification procedures and the overall reliability 
of an identification as a single inquiry which could result in suppression 
under state due process. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r,rll-15. 
In articulating its approach for determining the constitutional 
admissibility of an identification, the court of appeals purported to do no 
more than summarize the Ramirez analysis. See id. But Ramirez did not 
suggest such a fundamental departure from the federal analysis. To be 
sure, Ramirez broke "new ground under the Utah Constitution" in assessing 
the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identifications. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 778. But the state analytical model adopted in Ramirez only 
"diverges so mew hat" from the federal model. Id. Ramirez did not take 
issue with the conditional two-step approach of the federal nlOdel. Rather, 
it only faulted the federal standard used for judging the reliability of 
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11 arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications" under step two of the 
federal model.5 Id. at 779-81. 
Ramirez rejected the Biggers factors for step two as II scientifically 
unsupported" for assessing the reliability of an identification. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 780. In their place, Ramirez required an appraisal of a suggestive 
identification's reliability based on the "different criteria" identified in State 
v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986): 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether 
it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly." 
817 P.2d at 780-81 ( quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The Long factors, the 
Court held, "more precisely define the focus of the relevant inquiry" into 
reliability. Id. at 781. 
The Ramirez court misapprehended the federal due process model in 
one respect. The Court stated that the element of "suggestibility" included 
in the fourth Long factor has "no comparable emphasis given to [it] by 
5 Here, the court of appeals misinterpreted Ramirez to mean the 
appropriate analysis under the state constitution consists of only step 2. 
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Biggers." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. That is incorrect. Long's "suggestibility" 
inquiry is, in fact, the focus of step one under the federal due process model 
and the subject against which the Biggers factors are weighed under step 
two. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (" Against these factors is to be weighed 
the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself."). 
In sum, Ramirez did not suggest that a trial court's role in screening 
identification evidence "for constitutional defects" includes a general 
reliability analysis absent a suggestive police identification procedure. See 
817 P.2d at 778. It" depart[ed] from federal case law only to the degree th.at" 
some of the Biggers criteria rendered "the federal analytical model scientifically 
unsupported." Id. at 780 (emphasis added). But see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, il25 
(suggesting that suggestive police procedures and general umeliability of 
evidence are independent bases for excluding eyewitness identifications). 
C. This Court should clarify its state due process analysis. 
Because Ramirez did not purport to eliminate step one of the federal 
analysis, this Court should clarify Ramirez to prevent further confusion 
about and misapplication of the state due process analysis. This Court 
should clarify that, like the federal due process model, the state due process 
model involves a conditional two-step analysis incorporating the Long 
factors. 
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1. Step One- assessing the suggestiveness of the police 
identification procedure. 
First, a defendant seeking the exclusion of an eyewib1ess 
identification must establish that police used an "unnecessarily suggestive" 
identification procedure, Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197-99, or, at a minimum, an 
"arguably suggestive" identification procedure, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.6 
This step embraces the fourth Long factor addressing "suggestibility." See 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721 P.2d at 493 (asking whether "witness's 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, 
or whether it was the product of suggestion"). If a defendant meets that 
burden, the court may proceed to step two. But if not, the witness's 
identification should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry by the 
trial court. 
2. Step Two-weighing the Long factors against the 
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure. 
Second- if the defendant satisfies step one- the trial court should 
then weigh the Long factors ( except the fourth factor) against the 
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure itself (as assessed 
under the fourth Long factor). See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. The question 
6 Ramirez could be read to imply that rather than showing that the 
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the defendant need 
only show that it was "arguably suggestive." 817 P.2d at 779. 
-30-
r-: 
~ 
here is 11whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification 
was [sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure 
[employed by police] was suggestive." Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; accord 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if30 (holding that proper inquiry is whether 
identification "is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury 
for their deliberation"). 
This Court has held that in weighing the Long factors, trial courts 
must determine whether the identification "was sufficiently reliable so as 
not to offend defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly 
unreliable identification testimony before the jury." Id. The Court has not 
expounded on the "clearly unreliable" standard. But it appears to be the 
equivalent of the federal due process standard- the defendant must show 
"' a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'" Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384). It is a heavy burden, as 
the outcome in Ramirez makes clear. There, the Court held that the 
eyewitness identification was sufficiently reliable notwithstanding the 
"blatant suggestiveness" of the one-man showup and the relatively poor 
witnessing conditions surrounding the crime (no one ever saw the 
perpeh·ator's full face). Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
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In sum, an eyewitness identification should be excluded only if the 
weighing under step two results in a determination that notwithstanding 
the suggestive police identification procedure, the identification was clearly 
unreliable, i.e., "there is 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification."' Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 
384). Short of that, " [ c ]ourts need not, nor should they, step into the 
province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of identification for the 
jurors." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,l30. It certainly should not do so as a 
constitutional matter. This is particularly true where the constitution and 
rules of evidence equip a defendant with the tools necessary to challenge 
unreliable evidence. 
D. Kenneth Oney's identification of Defendant as the robber 
was not constitutionally unreliable. 
Like Ramirez, the showup identification of Defendant in this case was 
suggestive. But unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness testified that it was not the 
basis for his identification. And unlike Ramirez, the witnessing conditions 
here were eminently more reliable. As the dissent noted, one has to "squint 
at Ramirez's holding" to conclude otherwise. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r 21. 
When the suggestiveness of the arrest-site lineup (Long's fourth factor) is 
weighed against the remaining Long factors, it cannot be said that there was 
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This Court 
should thus reverse the court of appeal's ruling to the contrary. 
1. The arrest-site identification was at least arguably 
suggestive. 
As expla'ined, the first step in the due process inquiry is whether 
Oney' s identification of Defendant at the arrest site '"was the product of 
suggestion,"' Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493), and if 
so, to what extent. As explained, this inquiry embraces the fourth Long 
factor. The variables subject to consideration under this inquiry are usefully 
divided into two categories: (a) the circumstances of the identification 
procedure itself that may be suggestive (procedural factors), and (b) witness 
behavior that may signal that the identification was the product of 
suggestion rather than memory (witness factors). A review of these 
circumstances shows that Oney's arrest-site identification was less 
suggestive than in Ramirez. However, even if it was equally suggestive, the 
inquiry does not end. 
(a) Procedural factors of arrest-site identification. 
Relevant factors in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the 
identification procedure include "the length of time between observation 
and identification, ... the value of lineups compared to showups, the value 
of photo identifications compared to in-person identifications," and 
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potentially suggestive police conduct, such as the instructions given to the 
eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the 
lineup was carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the 
lineup." Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 
(citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8). 
A showup is often considered "inherently suggestive because it 
involves the presentation of a single suspect to a witness by the police ( as 
opposed to a lineup, in which several individuals are presented to the 
police, only one of whom is the suspect)." Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88 
(2nd Cir. 2009). Such was the case in Ramirez: the witness's identification of 
Ramirez "took place on the street in the 1niddle of the night. Ra1nirez, with 
dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the showup who 
was not a police officer. He stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence 
behind his back. [ And the] headlights of several police cars were trained on 
him." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The showup in Ramirez was a blatantly 
suggestive procedure. Id. 
As in Ramirez, the identification here was 1nade soon after the 
robbery-within 20 minutes-but that fact is a favorable factor. R357:106-07. 
According to Defendant's expert, a short interval improves accuracy. 
R358:52. The field identification was also similar. Like Ramirez, Defendant 
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was presented to Oney in the early hours of the morning, was the only non-
officer present, was handcuffed, was accompanied by police officers, and 
was illuminated by the headlights of police cars. R357:49-51. 
(b) Witness factors. 
Relevant factors in evaluating witness behavior that might indicate an 
identification was the product of a suggestive procedure indude (1) 
spontaneity and consistency in making the identification, (2) a weakened or 
compromised mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the 
identification, (3) "instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the 
event failed to identify defendant," and ( 4) "instances when the witness or 
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with 
defendant." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781, 783. Witness confidence is another 
relevant factor that may be examined. See State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, if 23, 
133 P.3d 363 (holding that courts may also "weigh certainty testimony" in 
assessing reliability, even though not required to be considered under 
Ramirez). 
No one established Oney's state of mind at the time of the showup. 
Oney said he was "pretty distraught" when police arrived within five 
minutes of his call to 911. R357:91. He identified Defendant at the showup 
approximately 20 minutes after that. R357:106-07. By that time, he had not 
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only gotten an immediate response to his 911 call and explained the 
situation to the officers, but he had recovered his stolen car. Such a fast and 
positive development would go far in soothing any remaining anxiety. 
Nothing suggested that he was emotional or distraught at the time. Further, 
Oney made his identification from the safety and anonymity of the police 
cruiser, eliminating any potential fear from the possibility of reprisal if the 
suspect saw him. R537:93. When asked if Defendant was the robber, Oney 
immediately answered "yes," noting that it was "definitely him." R357:93-
94, 135-36. No one suggested that he make a positive identification, and on 
the way over he was simply told that they had "probably found the 
suspect." R357:91-92. Oney' s quick, positive identification suggests that it 
was the product of memory, not suggestion. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if28 
(recognizing that spontaneous identification supports finding of reliability). 
Unlike Ramirez, he confirmed as much, explaining that he identified 
Defendant because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the 
identification took place. R357:49-50. 94-95, 106-07. And although witness 
confidence is no guarantee of accuracy, Oney's certainty was a factor that 
made it slightly more likely that the identification was reliable. See Guzman, 
2006 UT 12, if22 (recognizing eyewitness confidence as factor favoring 
reliability). 
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Oney consistently identified Defendant as the robber after the 
showup, although with somewhat less confidence at the lineup four months 
later. He picked Defendant because he remembered his eyes and thought 
his goatee looked familiar. R357:63-64. However, he hesitated because he 
believed the robber would not be in the lineup based on a phone call he had 
received the previous day and because he thought another person in the 
lineup "looked familiar." R357:60-64. Consequently, he chose both men. 
Id. He later positively identified Defendant at the preliminary hearing and 
at trial. See R355:5-6; R357:20. His partial identification may adversely 
impact the reliability of his identification to some degree, but that is only 
one of the relevant considerations. 
Finally, the inconsistencies in Oney's descriptions of the robber-the 
hair, the jacket, and the goatee-were reasonably explained. Through 
Defendant's expert, the prosecutor established that lighting and proximity 
can both obscure or distort things. R358:56-57. And officers corroborated 
the existence of the jacket at the arrest site. 
In sum, the arrest-site identification procedure employed by police in 
this case was less suggestive than the showup in Ramirez, where one of 
three victims sat in a police car and positively identified Ramirez as the 
masked man who robbed him earlier in the night while Ramirez was alone 
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and chained to a fence at one in the morning in the headlights of police cars. 
817 P.2d at 777. While the procedural factors of the arrest-site identification 
paralleled those present in Ramirez, the witness factors demonstrate that 
Oney' s identification was the product of memory, not suggestion. Most 
significantly, unlike Ramirez, Oney expressly stated that his identification of 
Defendant at the showup was based on his memory of the robber, not the 
circumstances surrounding the showup. 
But even if it were unnecessarily suggestive, when weighed against 
the Long factors - which this Court in Ramirez found to be more scientifically 
sound than the Biggers factors -it does not produce "a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 116 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
2. Witnessing conditions at the crime scene. 
Even if the identification procedure were suggestive, an evaluation of 
the Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure 
(to whatever extent that was) establishes that the identification was 
"sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant's right to due process." 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 30. 
*** 
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As explained, step two requires courts to weigh the remaining Long 
factors against the suggestive influence of the identification procedure. 
Although Long identifies four remaining factors, they are better understood 
as "witnessing conditions," with the last two factors combining to reflect a 
single condition: (1) "the opportunity of the witness to view" the 
perpetrator during the crime; (2) "the witness's degree of attention" to the 
perpeh·ator at the time of the crime; and (3) the witness's "capacity" to 
reliably identify the perpetrator given "the nature of the event being 
observed" and the witness's "physical and mental acuity." Long, 721 P.2d at 
493. Courts should weigh these witnessing conditions to determine "the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate" the event 
correctly. Id. 
(a) Opportunity to view robber during the robbery. 
The first witnessing condition is the witness's opportunity to view the 
perpetrator during the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. Relevant factors 
include overall visibility, such as lighting and obstructions; the distance 
between the witness and the actor; the length of time the witness viewed the 
actor; and whether the witness could see the actor's face, which may be 
adversely affected if the actor is wearing a disguise, such as a mask, hat, or 
sunglasses. Id. at 782; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if 32 n.22; Gary L. Wells, 
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Amina Mernon, & Stephen D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its 
Probative Value, 7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 53-54 (2006) 
("Wells, Mernon, & Penrod"); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness 
Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 281 (2003) ("Wells & Olson") (in 
Addendum D). 
Although the robbery occurred at 3:30 in the morning, Oney had 
ample opportunity and ability to see the robber. His initial contact with the 
robber occurred at close range-from about ten inches-within the confines 
of Oney's car door under the car's "[f]airly bright" interior lighting. For a 
full ten seconds, Oney was face to face with the robber's undisguised face 
under the dome and dashboard lights. When the two stood, Oney had the 
benefit of several illumination sources in which to see the robber's 
unmasked face, including the car's headlights, a nearby porch light, two 
street lights, and a neighbor's flood light. Although the lights were not 
directed at the robber's face, the bare trees permitted the maxhnum amount 
of light from each source to reach the area, resulting in "pretty bright" 
illumination. R357:18-19, 22-23, 25-29, 30-35, 67-72; State's Exhs. 9, 16-19. 
Oney kept his eyes on the robber throughout the ordeal, talking calmly to 
hiln. Standing face-to-face and almost touching, Oney moved slowly 
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around the robber and the car, with the robber keeping pace with him and 
ultimately moving into the car's headlights. 
Despite the close proximity, Oney did not initially mention 
Defendant's untrimmed salt and pepper goatee until expressly asked about 
facial hair at the preliminary hearing. The omission does not necessarily 
demonstrate that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable 
identification. Officer Bias admitted cutting short his initial investigation 
with Oney to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen car, suggesting Oney 
may not have gotten to that part of his identification and did not need to 
revisit it once Defendant was arrested. Until questioned about it at the 
preliminary hearing, Oney had no reason to believe he had omitted 
anything from his description of the robber. Moreover, while the lighting 
and proximity were sufficient to see the robber's face, they may have been 
insufficient to permit Oney to see the delineation between Defendant's face 
and his "scraggly" salt and pepper facial hair. See R358:56 (expert 
admission that things may be obscured by close proximity); R358:57 (expert 
opinion that features may be obscured depending on the lighting). As the 
lighting was not directed at the robber's face throughout the ordeal, any 
resulting shadows could effectively minimize the differences between the 
robber's face and his facial hair. 
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Additionally, Oney described the robber as wearing a black beanie 
that fit tight to his skull, obviously preventing Oney from realizing that the 
robber had a shaved head. He also believed he saw long, straight hair 
sticking out of the bottom of the beanie, although Defendant had none at 
the time of his arrest. Again, the mistake does not necessarily demonstrate 
that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable identification. 
Defendant's expert recognized that perception and ability to pick out 
features may change based on any number of factors, including distance 
and lighting. R358;54-57. Here, the close proximity of the men's faces 
during the initial seconds of their interaction, Oney's fixation on the 
robber's face, and the multidirectional lighting both at the car door and 
outside, either individually or combined, could be expected to obscure some 
features but not others. Defendant's expert did not rule out the possibility 
that, in the right lighting, a stand-up collar on the robber's shirt or jacket 
could give the impression of long, straight hair. See R358:57. 
Finally, Oney's repeated assertion that the robber wore a black leather 
coat strengthened his credibility. Oney consistently explained throughout 
this case that the robber wore a longish black coat, beginning with his first 
report to police and continuing through trial. He also maintained that 
Defendant was wearing the coat when he identified Defendant at the arrest 
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site. It is true that the jacket did not make it through processing at the jail 
and, hence, could not be produced at trial. But two officers who dealt with 
Defendant at the arrest site also testified that he was wearing a black jacket. 
Their testimony not only corroborated Oney's description but reinforces the 
fact that Oney's close proximity to the robber, the indirect lighting and 
Oney's focus. on the robber's face and hands provided him with ample 
opportunity to accurately.view the robber. 
(b) Degree of attention Oney gave to robber. 
The second witnessing condition is the witness's "degree of 
attention" to the perpetrator at the time of the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
781. Relevant factors include when the witness becomes aware that a crime 
is being committed, the amount and type of attention that the witness gives 
to the perpetrator, and the presence of distractions that may draw a 
witness's attention away from the perpetrator, e.g., noises or other activity. 
See id. (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 423). Distractions may include the presence 
or use of a weapon, which laboratory research has shown may result in 
modest impairment to identification accuracy. 7 Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 
7 Although the Court in Long and Ramirez placed distractions under 
the "opportunity to observe" factor, it is more appropriately analyzed here 
because dish·actions do not deprive the witness of the opportunity to 
observe; rather, they cmnpete for the witness's attention during that 
window of opportunity. 
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supra, at 53. On the other hand, the findings of field research on weapon 
focus have been" somewhat conflicting." Id. 
Oney's awareness of the robber was immediate, with the robber 
physically placing himself in Oney's face while Oney sat in the confines of 
his driver's seat. Oney's attention focused solely on Defendant from that 
moment and remained there throughout the entire ordeal. The robber did 
not run or attempt to hide but remained facing Oney without a disguise. 
Until the robber stood, Oney gave him his full attention without 
concern for either a weapon or any criminal conduct: the robber had Oney's 
full attention. Although the robber reached for the handle of something 
once he stood up, he did not withdraw the item and at no time did he 
brandish, let alone use, a weapon. Oney noticed the movement, which 
prompted him to include the robber's hands in his visual field and to 
formulate a mental escape plan. He did not look away from the robber, 
however, and he remained so focused on the robber that his memory 
included the robber's conversation. No external noises or distractions 
prompted Oney to divert or diminish his attention on the robber. 
(c) Oney's capacity to observe the robber given the nature 
of the event. 
The final witnessing condition is the witness's capacity to reliably 
identify the perpetrator given the nature of the event being observed and 
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the witness's physical and mental acuity. Long, 721 P.2d at 493. Relevant 
factors include the witness's age (research has shown that very young 
children and the elderly perform worse than other adults); the witness's 
physical limitations, such as uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury, 
intoxication, or extremely low intelligence; the witness's emotional state; the 
witness's personal motivations, biases, or prejudices; the distinctiveness of 
the perpetrator's appearance; and the race of the witness relative to the race 
of the perpetrator. See id.; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22. Also 
relevant is whether the witness's capacity to observe was impaired by stress 
or fright at the time of the observation. Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, if32 n.22. 
Oney' s physical abilities were not in any way impaired at the time of 
the robbery. He had not been drinking, there was no evidence of fatigue, 
and he was wearing his glasses at the time. R357:108-09. There was no 
evidence of any other mental or physical concerns or limitation that would 
adversely affect his capacity to reliably identify the robber. Neither was 
there evidence of "weapon-focus effect" that tends to decrease the reliability 
of eyewitness identification. See R358:26-32; Wells & Olson, at 282, supra. 
There was no weapon or other express threat used in the robbery. Oney 
believed the robber reached for what might have been a weapon at one 
point, but no weapon was ever produced. In any event, prior to that tilne, 
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Oney had no reason to suspect the robber possessed a weapon. And 
regardless of that possibility, Oney remained calm and in control through 
the remainder of the encounter, quickly creating and executing an escape 
plan and calmly talking to the robber until he succeeded in his escape. @ 
Additionally, nothing in the circumstances surrounding the 
identification or involving Oney himself suggests that he suffered such a 
heightened degree of stress that it rendered his identification suspect. See 
R358:26-32. While Oney was surprised at the robber's sudden appearance, 
nothing about the situation at that point suggested he suffered any undue 
sh·ess frmn the 1nan's presence: he simply thought the robber might want a 
drink or a ride. R357:18. It was nowhere near the hightened stress of 
Ramirez, where the witness was struck once and nearly twice with a pipe, 
was continually threatened with the pipe while another robber pointed a 
gun at him and issued more threats. 817 P.2d at 783. Arguably, under the 
circumstances, any fear Oney harbored did not raise to even the "ordinary 
fear" of a victim, which would not prevent the accurate observation and 
perception of events. State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah App. 1998) 
(victim's ordinary fear is not alone sufficient to defeat the third Ramirez 
factor). 
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Finally, Oney did not have the same racial background as Defendant, 
which may create a slightly higher risk of misidentification. See R358:58; 
Wells & Olson, at 280-81 (despite extensive examination, "no consistent 
overall differences attributable to race have emerged;" we simply know 
people are better able to recognize faces of their own race). On the other 
hand, a witness's prior exposure to the offender's race is a factor to be 
considered in assessing their ability to make an accurate identification. 
R358:49. 
Oney was forty years old, had lived in the same area for fourteen or 
fifteen years, and had lived in the same neighborhood for two. R357:15-16, 
100-01. A number of his neighbors were Hispanic, including those on either 
side and across the street, giving him an easy familiarity with their features. 
R357:44. His familiarity with the characteristics of Hispanics generally 
would tend to counter concerns of cross-racial bias. The court of appeals 
made no mention of this fact, however. Instead, the majority of that court 
determined that Oney' s close, unobscured exposure to the robber's entire 
face was a barrier to an accurate identification of the robber solely because 
of the concern for cross-racial bias. Proper consideration of Oney' s 
familiarity with Defendant's race along with the duration and proximity of 
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the viewing in the lighted confines of the car door weigh in favor of a 
reliable identification. 
*** 
In sum, the witnessing conditions were not so poor as to create a due 
process concern. The witnessing conditions were better than those in 
Ramirez, where rnost of the guiuT1an's face vvas covered vvith a scarf and the 
witness was the object of an assault and threatened assault with a gun. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83. Indeed, the witnessing conditions were, in most 
respects, much better than those in most crimes- the robber was wearing 
distinctive clothing but no mask, brandished no weapon, made no threats, 
and approached the victim in close proxhnity under numerous light 
sources. When these witnessing conditions are weighed against the arrest-
site showup, it cannot be said that there was a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification. Accordingly, any reliability concerns were 
properly left for the jury to decide. 
Indeed, the jury had before it all the tools necessary to assess the 
reliability of Oney' s identification testimony: the testimony of the defense 
expert on factors affecting the reliability of identifications, a jury instruction 
on point, and the argument of both counsel in closing, all of which informed 
the jurors in their consideration of the identification evidence. Defendant 
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adduced the expert's testimony objection-free and without limitation and 
argued his testimony in closing. Defendant took advantage of every 
opportunity provided for testing the reliability of the evidence and 
influencing the jury's consideration of it. Thus, even though the showup 
was arguably as suggestive as the one conducted in Ramirez, the 
identification was subject to comprehensive scrutiny by the jury, in keeping 
with the continuing development of eyewitness memory science in the 
years since Ramirez. 
II. 
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT 
If, as the State contends, Oney' s identification was sufficiently reliable 
to be presented to the jury for their deliberation, this Court's review is 
ended, and the court of appeals' decision should be reversed. See Point I, 
supra. 1£, however, this Court determines that under the appropriate 
application of Ramirez, there was "a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification" requiring exclusion of the identification 
testimony, it must determine whether the error was harmless. Brathwaite, 
432 U.S. at 116 (quotation omitted). 
This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the harmless error 
standard applicable to a preserved state constitutional error in admission of 
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eyewitness identification testimony is the erosion of confidence standard or 
the stricter federal "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. The 
court of appeals' majority determined that the error must be reviewed 
under the same standard that applies to federal constitutional due process 
errors. 2015 UT App. 199, 116 & n.2 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967)). They did so based on this Court's recognition in Ramirez that 
Utah's state constitutional due process analysis "is certainly as stringent as" 
the federal analysis. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,r16, n.2. However, this Court 
went on to require that Ramirez demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result had the identification not been admitted." Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 788. The same standard has since been repeatedly applied. See 
State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Clopten, 
2009 UT 84, ,I39. 
Because the issue of whether the burden shifts to the State to prove 
that a preserved state constitutional error in admission of eyewitness 
identification testimony is hannless beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter 
of first impression, it should be decided by this Court. See Utah R. App. P. 
46(a)(4). See also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, if16, n.2 (explaining majority's 
reasoning for applying federal prejudice standard without prior direction 
by this Court). 
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There is, however, no reason to reach that issue in this case because 
even assuming application of the federal standard, any error in admitting 
Oney' s identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Factors that determine whether an error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt include "the importance of the witness' testimony in the 
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." 
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted). 
Even without Oney's identification of Defendant, the jury would still 
have the benefit of his description of the robber, the bases for his 
description- unchallenged by expert testimony criticizing the reliability of 
his observations- and corroboration from Officer Bias that he believed 
Defendant matched the description and from both Officer Bias and Officer 
Deven Mayer that Defendant was wearing a black jacket when he was 
found. The prosecutor would provide the sa1ne explanations for the 
discrepancies involving the hair, goatee, and black jacket. The jury would 
also have the string of events that led the officers to the car and the school 
yard within minutes of the robbery, the dog's immediate discernment of a 
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lone scent leading down the pathway and through the school yard in the 
very direction officers later found the only person in the area, as well as the 
timing of the noise indicating the suspect jumped a fence just as the officer 
began following the dog through the school yard. Officer Bias would 
explain how the dog led officers toward the school but was stopped short of 
the school to do a safety sweep of the portable classrooms that they 
necessarily passed on their way to the school. 8 Instead of waiting to 
complete the sweep, Officer Bias continued in the direction the dog had 
indicated, rounded a corner of the school, and found Defendant. Moreover, 
despite establishing an immediate containment zone, no one but Defendant 
was found anywhere in the area. 
In addition, the jury would hear the circumstances surrounding 
Defendant's discovery and arrest at the school, including the indications 
that he was hiding in an out-of-the-way place requiring the use of a 
flashlight to see him, the fact that he stared at the officers while refusing to 
obey their repeated commands to come out of the unit yet clahned 
8 The court of appeals' majority suggests that the dog led the officers 
to the classrooms and stopped instead of leading the1n to the school. 2015 
UT App 199, if18. That interpretation is not supported by the record 
evidence. R357:128-29, 145-47; R359:17-18, 26-28; State's Exhs. 27 & 28. The 
dog was stopped for safety reasons at outbuildings located on their path to 
the school. Nothing suggests the dog initiated the stop. 
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thereafter that he called police to come to his aid. Those circumstances 
sh·ongly suggest that Defendant was hiding from the visible police 
presence. Further, he was found in possession of a knife, corroborating 
Oney's testimony that he reached for something tucked in his waistband. 
And finally, they would have the condemningly similar words uttered by 
the robber and by Defendant that someone was "following me." 
Given this compelling evidence, any error in the admission of Oney' s 
identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted on April 25, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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Addendum A 
State v. Lujan, 357 P .3d 20 (2015) 
792 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 2015 UT App 199 . . . •. 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Certiorari Granted by State v. Lujan. Utah, December 28, 2015 
357 P.3d 20 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
V. 
Manuel Antonio LUJAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20131166-CA. 
I 
Aug. 6, 2015. 
Synopsis 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Randall N. Skanchy, J., of 
aggravated robbery. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Onne, J., held that: 
[I] victim's eyewitness identifications of defendant at show-
up and in court were not sufficiently reliable to be admissible, 
and 
[2] erroneous admission of eyewitness identification 
testimony was not harmless. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Pearce, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
West Headnotes ( I 0) 
(11 
[21 
Criminal Law 
·•·"""' Identity of Accused 
Utah applies a more stringent standard in 
making eyewitness identification reliability 
determinations than that employed in the federal 
system. 
Cases tht1t cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
[3) 
[4] 
[51 
.. -···- ·-•-.. ------····--·----··-·----
,,:= Identity of Accused 
Five factors must be considered when analyzing 
the reliability of an eyewitness identification: 
( 1) opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event, (2) witness's degree of attention 
to the actor, (3) whether the witness had the 
capacity to observe the actor during the event, 
(4) whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter or whether it was a product of 
suggestion, and (5) the nature of the event and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember, and relate it correctly. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
i= Identity of Accused 
For purposes of five-factor analysis 
for determining reliability of eyewitness 
identification, the factor concerning the 
opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event, includes, but is not limited to, 
considering the length of time the witness viewed 
the actor, the distance between the witness and 
the actor, whether the witness could view the 
actor's face, the lighting or lack of it, and whether 
there were distracting noises or activity during 
the observation. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
·>~ Identity of Accused 
For purposes of five-factor analysis 
for detennining reliability of eyewitness 
identification, the factor concerning whether the 
witness had the capacity to observe the actor 
during the event includes considering whether 
the witness's capacity to observe was impaired 
by stress or fright, personal motivations, biases, 
prejudices, uncon-ccted visual defects, fatigue, 
injury, drugs, or alcohol. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
\~= Identity of Accused 
State v. Lujan, 357 P.3d 20 (2015) 
792 LJtah Adv. Rep. 40, 2015 UT App 199 . . . . . . . .. . . . 
16) 
171 
For purposes 
for detennining 
of five-factor analysis 
reliability of eyewitness 
identification, the factor concerning whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter or whether 
it was a product of suggestion, includes 
considering the length of time that passed 
between the witness's observation at the time of 
the event and the identification of the defendant, 
the witness's mental capacity and state of mind 
at the time of the identification, the witness's 
exposure to infonnation from other sources, 
instances when the witness failed to identify 
the defendant, instances when the witness gave 
descriptions that were inconsistent with the 
defendant, and the circumstances under which 
the defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
,,>,~ Identity of Accused 
For purposes of five-factor analysis 
for determining reliability of eyewitness 
identification, the factor concerning the nature 
of the event and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember, and relate it 
co1Tectly, includes considering whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the witness 
and whether the race of the actor was the same 
as the witness. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
~;,;:;. Confrontations at the scene or shortly after 
off cnsc or aJTest 
Criminal Law 
·,~;:.;, [n-Court Identification in General 
Victim's show-up and in-court eyewitness 
identifications of defendant were not sufficiently 
reliable to be admissible in aggravated robbery 
trial; show-up identification was made when 
it was dark, defendant was handcuffed, and 
all others present were police officers, in-court 
identification was made when defendant was the 
only defendant sitting at the defense table, victim 
181 
[9) 
failed to identify defendant at the lineup, victim 
was Native American and identified robber as 
"Spanish," and victim's original description of 
robber, with whom he came into close contact 
during the offense, omitted any mention of facial 
hair and included a definite recollection of long 
straight hair, while defendant had a goatee and 
shaved head. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
,,;:;:• Arrest and identification, evidence relating 
to 
Error in admission of victim's unreliable show-
up and in-court eyewitness identifications was 
not haimless, in prosecution for aggravated 
robbery; victim's identification of defendant was 
State's strongest evidence against defendant, and 
without the identifications, jurors would likely 
have found very significant victim's description 
of suspect, which described suspect as having 
long black and white hair although defendant 
had clean-shaven hair at time of his arrest, and 
evidence that a trained police dog following 
suspect's scent pulled officers toward portable 
classrooms at elementary school where officers 
found victim's abandoned car, while the officers 
who arrested defendant veered off from K9 
unit and found defendant curled up in an air 
conditioning unit in a different part of the school. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
<.000 Rulings as to evidence 
The State bears the burden of convincing 
the appellate court that improperly admitted 
eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[I 0) Criminal Law 
>·· Evidence in general 
Criminal Law 
t;= Curing Error by Facts Established 
Otherwise 
State v. Lujan, 357 P.3d 20 (2015) 
792 Utat1"Ac1v: Rep ... 46~·201·!5°UTApp.1gg"· ........... ----·--·· ·-- ·--
for the appellate court to determine that 
the trial court's error in admitting testimony 
was hannless beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
appellate court must consider the importance 
of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating 
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-examination 
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*21 Nathalie S. Skibine and Lisa J. Remal, for Appellant. 
Sean D. Reyes and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
Judge GREGORY K. ORME authored this Memorandum 
Decision, in which Judge KATE A. TOOMEY concuITed. 
Judge JOHN A. PEARCE dissented, with opinion. 
Memorandum Decision 
ORME, Judge: 
~ 1 Defendant Manuel Antonio Lujan appeals his conviction 
ofaggravated robbery, a first degree felony under section 76-
6-302 of the Utah Code. Because we determine that the trial 
court erroneously admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony, 
we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
~ 2 Early one November morning, a man could not sleep, so 
he got out of bed and went outside. He decided to get his car 
ready for an upcoming safety inspection. It was while the man 
was seated inside his car in his driveway that he came face-to-
facc with a robber. The man described the robber as "Spanish" 
and as wearing a black leather jacket and beanie. The robber 
had black and white "longish hair," which was straight and 
poked out of the beanie to "mid- *22 ear length." The man 
"definitely" remembered the robber's hair. 
1 3 The robber opened the man's driver-side door, squatted 
next to the seat, and asked the man, "Why you following 
me?" The robber stood, and the man saw him reach for what 
appeared to be the handle of a gun or a knife. The man was 
afraid he might be stabbed or shot. Wanting to return to the 
safety of his house, the man stood, nearly touching the robber, 
who was about his same height. He slowly worked his way 
around the robber and around the car and ran to his house. 
The robber drove off in the man1s car, and the man told his 
brother to call the police, which he did. Officers soon aITived. 
~ 4 The man's car had a fluid leak, and officers were able 
to follow a trail of fluid and recover the abandoned car a 
few blocks away, near an elementary school. A K9 unit was 
called, and the dog appeared to "pick[ ] up on a track of 
the person that they [were] looking for" at the walkway gate 
of the school. The dog pulled the officers through the gate 
and toward usome portable or relocatable classrooms." At 
that point, some officers "kind of split" from the K9 unit, 
and one of those officers had a .. gut feeling" to check an 
air conditioning unit outside the school, even though the 
dog was focused elsewhere. Officers found Defendant inside 
the air conditioning unit, and he told them "something like 
somebody is following me, somebody is out to get me." 
,i 5 Defendant is Hispanic, and he had closely-shaven hair and 
a goatee when the police found him. He was wearing a black 
beanie. Officers also testified that he was wearing a black 
jacket, but no jacket appeared in Defendant's booking photo, 
was listed on the jail property list, or was produced at trial. 
ii 6 Police contacted the man whose car had been stolen 
and told him that they had a suspect. They brought the 
man to the school and asked if he could identify Defendant, 
who stood handcuffed in the dark, the only non-officer 
present, illuminated by the headlights of police cars. The man 
identified Defendant as the robber. 
il 7 After being arrested and charged, Defendant requested a 
lineup, which the trial court granted. At the lineup, the man 
was unable to positively identify anyone as the robber. He did 
indicate that Defendant and another man looked familiar, but 
he was unsure whether either was the robber. 
,r 8 At the preliminary hearing, the man was asked to identify 
the robber, and he pointed to Defendant. As Defendant 
observes, he "was the only defendant sitting at counsel table 
and the only realistic choice." 
,i 9 Defendant moved to exclude evidence of the show-up and 
in-court identifications. The motion was denied, Defendant 
was convicted as charged, and he now appeals. The sole 
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issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred when 
it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the identifications. 
We conclude that it did. 
I 11 ,1 IO In State v. Ramirez. 8 I 7 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991 ), the Utah Supreme Court revised and clarified the 
protocol for com1s to use in analyzing the admissibility of 
eyewitness identifications. 1 See *23 id. at 779. 781-82. 
The Utah Supreme Court indicated that such clarification was 
necessary because "the scientific literature ... 'is replete with 
empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification.' "Id. at 779 (quoting State v. long, 721 P.2d 
483, 488 (Utah 1986)). This led the Court "to comment that 
'[p ]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate 
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give such 
testimony great weight.' " Id. at 780 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 490). Thus, Utah applies a more 
stringent standard in making reliability determinations than 
that employed in the federal system. Id. at 784. Compare 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 
34 L.Ed.2d 401 ( I 972} (indicating that "the factors to be 
considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification 
include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at 
the time of the crime, the witness'[s] degree of attention, the 
accuracy of the witness'[s] prior description of the criminal, 
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation"), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 
87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (focusing on whether 
an eyewitness confrontation was "so unnecessarily suggestive 
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that 
[ defendant] was denied due process of law"), with Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 781 (listing factors that are "generally comparable 
to the Biggers factors" but "more precisely define the focus of 
the relevant inquiry," and identifying the "ultimate question 
to be detennined [as] whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the identification was reliable"). 
distracting noises or activity during the observation. Id. at 
782. The second factor considers the witness's degree of 
attention to the actor. Id. at 781. 783. The third factor, 
whether the witness had the capacity to observe the actor 
during the event, includes considering whether the witness's 
capacity to observe was impaired by stress or fright, personal 
motivations, *24 biases, prejudices, unc01Tected visual 
defects, fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol. Id. at 783. The 
next factor, whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether 
it was a product of suggestion, includes considering the length 
of time that passed between the witness's observation at the 
time of the event and the identification of the defendant, the 
witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of 
the identification, the witness's exposure to information from 
other sources, instances when the witness failed to identify the 
defendant, instances when the witness gave descriptions that 
were inconsistent with the defendant, and the circumstances 
under which the defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification. Id. And the final factor, the nature of the event 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, 
and relate it con-ectly, includes considering whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the witness and whether 
the race of the actor was the same as the witness. Id. at 781. 
~ 12 The Ramirez court considered the first four factors 
in detail and concluded that it was "an extremely close 
case." Id. at 784. The Supreme Court was particularly 
troubled by the "blatant suggestiveness of the showup," 
where Ramirez was identified in a very similar fashion to the 
way Defendant was here-Ramirez "was the only person at 
the showup who was not a police officer," he "stood with 
his hands cuffed," and the "headlights of several police cars 
were trained on him." Id. The Court was also concerned 
with the "differences in racial characteristics between" the 
eyewitness and Ramirez. Id. The Court detennined, however, 
that "because the identification was based principally on the 
eyes, physical size, and clothing, these racial factors may have 
121 131 141 151 (61 il 11 In Ramirez, the Court sBfen of relatively little importance." Id. 
forth five factors that must be considered when analyzing 
the reliability of an eyewitness identification: ( l) opportunity 
to view, (2) degree of attention, (3) capacity to observe, (4) 
spontaneity and consistency, and (5) nature of the event. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. The first factor, the opportunity 
of the witness to view the actor during the event, includes 
(but is not limited to) considering the length of time the 
witness viewed the actor, the distance between the witness 
and the actor, whether the witness could view the actor's 
face, the lighting or lack of it, and whether there were 
[71 ~ I 3 The same factors that led the Supreme Court 
to conclude that Ramirez was "an extremely close case" 
are present here. See id. The show-up was conducted in 
almost identical fashion. Furthennore, the man who identified 
Defendant is Native American and Defendant is Hispanic. 
But unlike in Ramirez, the identification was not confined to 
the eyes, physical size, and clothing of Defendant. Instead, 
the State makes a point of the fact that the robber's entire, 
unobscured "face was about ten inches from" the man's when 
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the robber first crouched down next to the car. Thus "racial 
factors" are more significant here than they were in Ramirez. 
Cf id. at 776, 784 (noting that "racial factors may have been 
ofrelatively little importance" when eyewitness identification 
was based on the defendant's eyes, physical size, and clothing, 
and the eyewitness did not have the opportunity to view the 
defendant's entire face). 
,i 14 This case also presents additional indications of 
unreliability. For instance, the man failed to identify 
Defendant at the lineup, which is an important consideration 
under the fourth Ramirez factor. See id. at 783. Moreover, the 
man's original description of the robber omitted any mention 
of facial hair and included a definite recollection of long, 
straight hair. In contrast, Defendant had a goatee and a shaved 
head, both of which are features that seem hard to miss at a 
distance of ten inches, and the man did not miss the shaved 
head because it was covered with a beanie-he "definitely" 
remembered hair protruding well below the beanie. 
18) ~ 15 If Ramirez was an extremely close call, we are 
confident that here we can "say that [the man]'s testimony 
is legally insufficient when considered in light of the other 
circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability 
and, therefore, admissibility." See id. at 784. But our inquiry 
does not end there. We must also consider whether Defendant 
suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court admitting the 
identifications. 
191 1 16 We agree with Defendant that the State bears 
the burden of convincing us that the improperly admitted 
eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See Clwpnwn ,,. CaWornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 
S.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967) ("[B]efore a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be 
able to declare a belief that it was ham,less *25 beyond a 
reasonable doubt."). 2 The State has not met this burden. 
~ 18 Evidence supporting the State's case includes the facts 
that Defendant was wearing a beanie and a jacket when found 
and that he is Hispanic, which jurors might conclude matched 
the man's description of a "Spanish" robber. The State 
recognizes that its strongest piece of evidence, aside from 
the eyewitness identifications, albeit with their significant 
descriptive discrepancies, was Defendant's comment to police 
about someone following him-a comment similar to the 
question posed by the robber to the man, "Why you following 
me?" But without the identifications, the jurors would likely 
have found very significant the man's initial description of 
the robber-a description that lacked a goatee and included 
long black and white hair-and the evidence that a trained 
police dog following the suspect's scent pulled officers toward 
portable classrooms at the elementary school, while other 
officers veered off from the K9 unit and later found Defendant 
curled up in an air conditioning unit. 
il 19 When the eyewitness testimony is taken away, the State 
loses its strongest evidence against Defendant, and we cannot 
say that the trial court's error in admitting the unreliable 
eyewitness identifications was hannless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We accordingly vacate Defendant's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
PEARCE, Judge (dissenting): 
,i 20 I dissent. 
il 21 I agree with the majority that the time may have arrived 
for the Utah Supreme Court to revisit its holding in State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). But so long as Ramirez 
remains good law, we are duty-bound to apply it. I cannot 
squint at Ramirez's holding in a way that permits me to 
see how the identification testimony offered in this case is 
less reliable than the testimony the Ramirez court deemed 
admissible. Ramirez identified five factors a court must 
1101 ii 17 For us to determine that the trial court's eirnr was consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must consider "the 
importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution1s 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence 
or absence of evidence co[rro]borating or contradicting the 
testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of 
cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the 
overall strength of the prosecution1s case." State v. Villarreal, 
889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). When the man1s identifications of 
Defendant arc removed, the State's case is severely weakened. 
In almost all respects, the showup involving Defendant in this 
case was substantially less troublesome than that the Ramirez 
court approved. 
,i 22 The first Ramirez factor centers on the "opportunity of 
the witness to view the actor during the event." Id. at 782. TI1is 
includes consideration of how long the witness saw the actor, 
the distance between them, the lighting, whether the witness 
could view the actor's face, and whether there were distracting 
~-----...... ======-~ 
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circumstances that would affect the witness's ability to see the 
actor. Id. 
,r 23 In Ramirez, the witness (Wilson) testified at various 
times that he had seen the actor for either a second, a few 
seconds, or a minute or longer. Wilson also testified that 
the actor was about ten feet away from him; other witnesses 
described the distance as being as much as thirty feet away. 
Wilson testified that the actor was crouched at the end of a 
building and was wearing a mask over the lower part of his 
face. Wilson conceded that he could not see the actor's eyes 
clearly, but he "could see enough to know" they were "small." 
Id. Testimony varied as *26 to whether the lighting was 
good or whether shadows shrouded the actor. Id. at 782-83. 
,r 24 Here, the trial court found that the witness viewed 
Defendant for several seconds when they were face to face 
in the car's open doorway. They were less than a foot apart, 
and the area was lit by two street lamps, a porch light, 
a neighbor's floodlight, and the car's headlights, as well 
as the car's overhead dome light and lighted dashboard. 
Defendant's face was uncovered. In all relevant ways, with 
the possible exception of the duration of the observation, the 
witness's opportunity to view Defendant was superior to the 
observation Ramirez considered. 
,i 25 The second Ramirez factor examines the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor. Id. at 783. In Ramirez, 
Wilson was accosted by two men: Ramirez, who wie]ded 
a firearm, and a second man carrying a pipe. Wilson was 
struck with the pipe before he was even aware of Ramirez. 
While Wilson became aware of Ramirez's presence, the "pipe 
man" continued to threaten and swing the pipe at Wilson. In 
contrast, here, the witness was alone with Defendant. After 
observing Defendant for several seconds, the witness thought 
that the way Defendant moved his hand was suggestive of 
having a weapon. The witness began to get out of the car and 
negotiate his way around Defendant to escape the situation. 
Although concern over the potential possession of a weapon 
by Defendant may have distracted the witness, it remains a 
far cry from the distractions Wilson faced. 
ii 26 The third Ramirez factor looks at the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including "whether the witness's capacity 
to observe was impaired by stress or fright at the time of the 
observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, 
by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs or 
alcohol." State v. Ramirez, 817 P .2d 774, 783 (Utah I 991 ). 
The Ramirez court considered that Wilson had been struck by 
a pipe and was facing a gun pointed at him by a masked man 
while the assailant continued to swing the pipe and threaten 
him. The supreme court concluded that "it was reasonable 
to assume that Wilson experienced a heightened degree 
of stress." Id. Although the witness here was undoubtedly 
startled by the presence of a stranger in his car at 3:30 a.m., 
there was no evidence before the trial court that this impaired 
the witness's capacity to observe Defendant. Nor was there 
any evidence that injury, drugs, or alcohol may have impaired 
the witness. 
1 27 The fourth Ramirez factor considers whether 
the witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent. Id. It also examines whether the 
identification was the "product of suggestion." Id. Ramirez 
instructs that trial courts should consider a variety of factors, 
including the amount of time between observation and 
identification, the witness's mental capacity and state of mind 
at the time of the identification, the witness's exposure to 
infom1ation from other sources, instances when the witness 
failed to identify the defendant, instances when the witness 
gave inconsistencies in the description of the defendant, and 
the circumstances under which the defendant was presented 
to the witness for identification. See id. 
"28 In Ramirez, the showup occmTed less than an hour after 
the event and the court concluded that nothing in the record 
suggested that Wilson's mental capacity or state of mind 
influenced the identification. Wilson was aware that one of 
the other witnesses had not identified Ramirez as the gunman 
but was otherwise not exposed to other identifications or 
opinions. The supreme court noted that Wilson's descriptions 
had varied in some details, such as whether Ramirez had worn 
a hat or sported tattoos. Id. at 784. 
CU 29 In this matter, the showup took place thirty-five minutes 
after the robbery. There is no indication in the record that 
the witness had been influenced by additional infonnation. 
However, as the majority ably describes, there exist a number 
of concerns with the consistency of the witness's descriptions 
of Defendant. Notably, at a subsequent lineup, the witness 
identified both Defendant and another man as persons who 
might have stolen his car. Moreover, the witness originally 
omitted any mention of Defendant's facial hair and said that 
the robber had long, straight hair. Defendant had a *27 
goatee and was bald. The discrepancies in the witness's 
identification present the only way in which this matter could 
be considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez. 
However, in light of the myriad other ways in which the 
,.,, ·.·, I 
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testimony in Ramirez appears more unreliable than that at 
issue here, I cannot conclude that these discrepancies are 
enough to pull this case from Ramirez's reach. 
~ 30 Ramirez also examined whether Wilson's identification 
of Ramirez was the product of suggestion by looking at 
the procedures the showup employed. The identification 
occurred at night. Id. Prior to the showup, police officers 
remarked to Wilson that they had apprehended someone who 
fit the description of one of the robbers. Ramirez, the only 
person involved in the showup who was not a police officer, 
was handcuffed to a chain-link fence illuminated by the 
headlamps of police cars. Wilson identified Ramirez from the 
back seat of a police vehicle. Here, Defendant was similarly 
cuffed and lit by headlights. Defendant was also the only 
person at the showup who was not a law enforcement officer. 
1 31 I concur with the majority when it echoes the Ramirez 
court's conclusion that "[t]he blatant suggestiveness of the 
Footnotes 
showup is troublesome." 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991). 
However, even after acknowledging the troublesome nature 
of the showup, as well as Wilson's inability to see Ramirez's 
face (in part because Ramirez was wearing a mask), Wilson's 
changing testimony about whether Ramirez wore a hat, and 
the distraction caused by another assailant wielding a pipe, the 
Ramirez court found that Wilson's identification testimony 
was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. Id. at 782-84. 
Although it is far from the most satisfying result, if the 
testimony Wilson offered in Ramirez cleared the bar, so too 
must the testimony the witness offered in this matter. 
1 32 For these reasons, I dissent. 
All Citations 
357 P.3d 20, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 2015 UT App 199 
1 We decide this case within the framework established by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). We have 
every reason to believe, however, that Ramirez must be revisited. See Anne E. Whitehead, Note, State v. Ramirez: 
Strengthening Utah's Standard for Admitting Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 64 7, 689 (1992} 
(generally approving of Ramirez but recognizing that it "is not without flaws" because "the court's conclusion seems 
incongruous with the results of its application of the reliability analysis, leaving uncertain the future impact of the new Utah 
analytical framework"). Aside from any flaws inherent in the Ramirez analysis, scientific and legal research regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications has progressed significantly in the last twenty-four years. See generally National 
Research Council of the National Academies, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 11-12 (2014 ). 
Before Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court first took an in-depth look at the potential shortcomings of eyewitness 
identifications in State v. Long, 721 P .2d 483 {Utah 1986). In Long, the Court accepted the invitation to "either abandon 
any pretext of requiring a cautionary eyewitness instruction or make the requirement meaningful" by deciding "to 
follow the latter course." Id. at 487. The Court did this by "abandon [ing its] discretionary approach to cautionary 
jury instructions and direct [ing] that in cases tried from th[at] date forward, trial courts shall give such an instruction 
whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense." 
Id. at 492. 
Then, after Ramirez, the Court considered another aspect of cases involving eyewitness identifications-expert 
testimony. In State v. Buttetiield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, the Court affirmed a trial court's exclusion of an expert 
witness because the trial court had found that the proposed expert testimony "did not deal with the specific facts from 
[that] case but rather would constitute a lecture to the jury about how it should judge the evidence." Id. 11 44 {internal 
quotation marks omitted). The issue was revisited in State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 1114, 48 P.3d 953. In Hubbard, 
while leaving Buttetiield untouched, the Court did invite trial courts "to specifically tailor instructions other than those 
offered in Long that address the deficiencies inherent in eyewitness identification." Id. ,I 20. 
But in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P .3d 1103, the Court recognized that its "previous holdings ha[d] created 
a de facto presumption against the admission of eyewitness expert testimony, despite persuasive research that such 
testimony is the most effective way to educate juries about the possibility of mistaken identification." Id. ,I 30. The Court 
sought to change this by announcing "that the testimony of a qualified expert regarding factors that have been shown 
to contribute to inaccurate eyewitness identifications should be admitted whenever it meets the requirements of rule 
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. The Court "expect[ed] this application of rule 702 [to] result in the liberal and 
routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony." Id. 
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2 
While Utah jurisprudence now better recognizes the problematic nature of eyewitness identification, Ramirez remains 
the standard by which courts must evaluate the admissibility of this evidence. It is a standard that does not accurately 
reflect the changed views about handling this problematic evidence. And the disconnect between the legal analysis in 
Ramirez and its outcome makes it an unreliable tool for resolving particular cases, as shown by the two opinions in this 
case. All of this, taken together, indicates that it is time for our Supreme Court to reconsider Ramirez, a proposition 
with which the dissent agrees. See infra 1f 21. 
We recognize that State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), was primarily concerned with an alleged due process 
violation under the Utah Constitution. Id. at 781. See Utah Const. art. I, § 7. Utah's approach "is certainly as stringent 
as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis," but there is no reason to assume our constitution would impose a 
different standard of review for those few circumstances where our constitution is violated but the federal constitution is G.) 
not. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
·-·-.. -•--- ... - ............ -.. ---------·- --------------
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U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
··ei Article I. Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § L adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1. 1995. 
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AddendumD 
Addendum D 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Eyewitness Evidence 
Improving Its Probative Value 
, -::\ l '> 3 
.., Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon,- and Steven D. Penrod 
1 Iowa State University; 2 University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland; and 3 John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
SUMMARY-The criminal justice system relies heavily on 
eyewitnesses to determine the facts surrowidin.g criminal 
events. Eyewitnesses mciy identify culprits, recall conver-
sc,.tions, or remember other details. An eyewitness who has 
no motive to li.e is a powerful form. of evidence for jurors, 
especially if the eyewitness appears to be highly confident 
about his or her recollection. In the absence of definitive 
proof to the contrary, the eyewitness s <Lecount is generally 
accepted by police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. 
However, the faith the lega,l system pl<Lces in eyewit-
nesses has been shaken recently by the advent of forensic 
DNA testing. Given the right set of circumstances,forensic 
DNA testing C<.m prove that a person who was convicted of 
a crimr. is, in fact, innocent. Analyses of DNA exoneration 
cases since 1992 reveal that mistalrnn erewitness identifi-
cutiun was involved in the vust mujority of these convic-
tions, accounting for more convictions of innocent people 
them all other factors combined. We review the latest fig-
ures on these DNA exonerations and explain why these 
cases can only be a small fraction of the mistaken identi-
_fications that are occurring. 
Decades before the advent of forensic DNA testing, 
psychologists were questioning the validity of eyewitness 
reports. Hugo Miinsterberg's writings in the early part of 
the 20th centriry rnade a strong case for the involvement 
of psychological science in helping the legal system 
understand the vagaries of eyewitness testimony. But it 
was not u.ntil the mid- to late 1970s that psychologists be-
gem to conduct programmatic experiments aimed at 
wulerstwrding the extent of error and the variables that 
govern error when eyewitnesses give accounts of crimes 
they have witnessed. Many of the experiments condu.cted i.n 
the lute 1970s and throughout the 1980s resu.lte<Un cirticles 
by psychologists that contained strong 1v<1r11ings to the le-
gal system that eyewitness evidence was being overvllluecl 
by the justice system in the sense that its impuct on triers 
of fact (e.g., juries) exceeded its probative (legal-proof) 
va.lue. Another message of the research was that the 
Direct correspondence to Gary L. Wells. Psychology Department, 
Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011; e-mail: glwells@iastate.edu. 
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validity of eyewitness reports depends a great deal on the 
procedures that are used to obtain those reports and that 
the legal system wa ... not using the best procedures. 
Although defense attorneys seized on this nascent 
research as a tool for the defense, it was largely ignored 
or ridiculed by prosecutors, judges, and police until the 
m.id 1990s, when forensic DNA testing began to uncover 
cclses of convictions of innocent persons on the basis of 
mistaken eyewitness accounts. Recently, a number of 
jurisdictions in the United States have implemented 
procedural reforms based on psychological research, but 
psychological science has yet to have its fullest possible 
influence on how the justice system collects and interprets 
eyewitness evidence. 
The psychological processes leading to eyewitness error 
represent <t confluence of memory and socinl-influence 
vciriables that interact i1~ complex ways. These processes 
lend them.selves to study using experi,nental methods. 
Psydwlogica.l science i.~ in a strong position to help the 
criminal justice system understand eyewitness accounts of 
criminal events and improve their accuracy. A su.bset of the 
variables that affect eyewitness accuracy fall into what 
researchers call system variables, which are variables 
that the criminal justice system has control over, such as 
how eyewitnesses are instructed before they view a 
lineup and methods of interviewing eyewitnesses. We 
re·view a numbr.r of system ·vuriable ... <irul de.scribe how 
psychologic(l,l scientists have translated them into pro-
cedures that can improve the probative value of eyewitness 
accounts. Tf/e also review estimator variables, variables 
that affect eyewitness accur(l,cy but over which the system 
has no control, such as cross-race versus within-race 
identifications. 
We describe some concerns regarding external validity 
arulgeneralization that naturally arise when movin.gfrom. 
the la.boru.tory to the real world. These i11clu.de issues of 
base rates, multicollinearity, selection effects, subject 
populations, and psychological reali.i;m. For each of these 
concerns, we briP.fly note ways in which both theory and 
field data help make the case for generalization. 
45 
Eyewitness Evitltmcc 
INTRODUCTION 
Kirk Rloorlsworth harl never been in trouble with the law, and yet 
he was convicted in March 1985 for the 1984 sexual assault and 
Rlaying of a 9-year-olrl girl in Marylanrl (State of Maryland v. 
Kirk N. Bloodsworth, 1984). Five eyewitnesses identified 
Bloodsworth at trial. Luter that month, a ju<lge sentenced him to 
death. He spent 2 years on death row before he received a new 
trial Lased on the prosecution's withhol<ling of information about 
other suspects. This time he received a life sentence. Bloo<ls-
worth maintained a claim of innocence from the outset, but it was 
not until 1993 that he was released from prison on the basis of 
DNA testing that proverl he was not the source of semen founrl in 
the little girl's undcnvear. Bloodsworth was lucky that the 
unrlerwear had been preserved, because earlier (pre-DNA) tests 
had indicated nothing of value on the underwear. But what kind 
of luck is being convicted of a murder you did not commit'? His 
mother died while he was in prison, before learning the truth that 
he was innocent. And despite his release from prison, some 
people, including one of the original prosecutors, continued to 
helieve thal Bloodsworlh may have been the murderer. The 
eyewitness evidence just seemed too strong. Maybe Bloo<lsworth 
really was the murderer, they reasoned, and the tiny speck of 
semen came from someone other than the murderer-perhaps 
someone who hacl access to the little girl's clresscr drawer, for 
instance. Bloodsworth went on with his life, confident in his own 
inno<:ence but having to live with the occasional doubt raised by 
those who somehow remained unpersuaded. Then, in September 
20m, ONA testing got a hit on the actual murderer. Kimberly 
Shay Ruffner. Nineteen years after Kirk Bloodsworth was sen-
tenced to death, the proof was finally there: He had had nothing 
lo <lo with the sexual assault and slaying of the young girl. 
The case of Kirk Bloodsworth illustrates several problems 
with eyewitness evidence. First, it illustrates the fallacy of as-
suming that inter-witness agreement is necessarily strong evi-
dence of accuracy. Many factors can lea<l lo inter-witness 
agreement, such as interaction among the witnesses in which 
they share information. In general, factors that lead one eye-
witness to make a particular error will lead others to make the 
same error. Second, the Bloodsworth case illustrates the pro-
founrl levd of proof requirer! for exonerating evirlence to trump 
eyewitness identification evidence. Even when the semen was 
proved not to match Bloodsworth's DNA, many people were 
unwilling tu believe he was innocent. It was necessary to prove 
that someone else had commilled the murder. Third, the 
BlooJsworth case illustrates that mistaken identification is a 
dual problem: Not only might an innocent person be convicted 
but the guilty party remains free to reoffenJ. 
The role of scientific psychology in the problem of eyewitness 
evidence is a profound one. With few exceptions, the legal 
system has not conclucte<l research on eyewitness eviclcncc, has 
never conducted an experiment on memory, and has no scientific 
theory regarding how memory works. The scientific study of 
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eyewitnesses is purely the domain of psychology. When the U.S. 
Department of Justice finally wrote guidelines on eyewitness 
evidence in 1999, the only scientific studies cited were those 
published by psychologists in psychology journals. Torlay, psy-
chology is engaged in an active dialogue with judges, police, and 
prosecutors on ways to improve the probative (evidentiary) value 
of eyewitness reports. The credibility of scientific psychology 
has risen immensely in the legal system recently, largely Le-
cause psychologists were already "blowing the whistle" on 
eyewitness evidence well before forensic DNA tesling began 
uncovering mistaken ic.lentifications in the 1990s. In effect, 
psychologists were able lo use experiments lo identify eyewit-
ness problems long Lefore the legal system was smacked in the 
face with DNA exonerations. 
A primary purpose of this article is to describe empirical 
evidence supporting the proposition that some of the problems 
with eyewitness evidence can be addressed by improving the 
way the evidence is collected and preserved. We discuss how 
eyewitnesses are interviewed, how lineups are conducted, and 
why procedures can have a slrong impact on the resulting pro-
bative value of eyewitness testimony. These variables are called 
system variables, because they are under the control of the 
justice system (Wells, 1978). The importance of system vari-
ables that can reduce eyewitness error has become increasingly 
apparent in light of the proven inadequacies of traditional 
safeguards against eyewitness mistakes, such as the presence of 
counsel at lineups and the opportunity to present motions to 
suppress suggestive procedures (Stinson, Devenport, Cutler, & 
Kravitz, 1996, 1997). But even if the system reaches a point at 
which it makes perfect use of system variables, eyewitness 
errors attributable to other factors will remain. Thus, it is 
important to review these other (non-system-controlled) factors 
as well. 
This monograph is not intended as an exhaustive review of the 
eyewitness literature. Insteac.l, we focus on practices, proced-
ures, and research that address the most common threats lo 
eyewitness reliability. Although the bulk of the scientific unc.l 
legal literature we cite has a North American origin, the inter-
national research community has made extremely important 
contributions. In fact, historically, it was Europeans who played 
the much greater role in the study of eyewitness memory. 1 
We begin with a brief history of psychology's attempt to help 
the legal system on the eyewitness issue. Then we <lescriLe the 
DNA exoneration cases that began to unfold in the l 990s and the 
role these exonerations have played in giving scientific psy-
chology a stronger voice in the legal system's policies and pro-
cedures involving eyewitness evidence. We then give an 
overview of the standarrl methods used in eyewitness research, 
followed by selected findings on estimator and system variables. 
1\vc arc forlunalc lo have Siegfried Sporer, a strong European conlribulor lo 
the c•mpiric-:il likrature on cyewitnt'ss issues, write the editorial prececling thi~ 
monograph (sec p. i). Sporer phl('CS our report in a broader historical and in• 
ternutional context. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY 
In his hook /,a SuggeJtibilite: Alfred Binet (1900) argued for the 
creation of a practical science of testimony based on his ob-
servations about the effects of suggestion. Binet was the first to 
report that suggestive questioning influenced responses. But it 
was German psychologists who were among the first to argue that 
how eyewitnesses were questioned makes a great deal of dif-
f erenee. Louis William Stern was publishing and ediLing studies 
of eyewitness testimony as early as 1904 (Stern, 1904). In the 
United States, Guy Montrose Whipple published a number of 
articles in Psychological Bnlletin on eyewitness testimony 
(Whipple, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912). But it was Hugo Munster-
berg's (1908) book On the Witness Stand and his injection of 
himself into the legal system that had a more lasting impact in 
the United States. 
Miinsterberg was recruited by William James in 1892 to come 
to Harvard to run the university's psychological laboratory. 
Milnsterberg was very much a public figure and he appeared 
frequently in the popular press. He also was a somewhat con-
troversial figure al Harvard, presumably because his colleagues 
did not see a great deal of merit in applying psychology. His 
lectures and writings were extremely perceptive and well rea-
soned. albeit rather short on data by modern standards. His 
presr·ience is evirlent in such matters as his claim that eyewit-
ness certainty has a tenuous relation to accuracy and that while 
jurors might understanrl forgetting, they are not likely to 
understand that a witness can remember the wrong thing. 
Although Munst~rherg maintained a certain prominence in 
psychology, his impact on the legal system was muted dramat-
ically by the skilled eounterargumentalion of one of the grealesl 
minds in American jurispru<lence, John Henry Wigmore. Par-
ticularly problematic; for Mtinslerberg was a law review article 
by Wigmore (1909) that challenged Mtinsterberg's (1908) 
overstatements about the ability of psychology to help the legal 
system. Wigmore was especially effective in arguing that psy-
chology did not yet have ready tools for handling the problem of 
evaluating eyewitness accounts, as Mi.insterberg had claimed. 
For the most part, Wigmore won the argument, at least from the 
perspective of the legal system. 
Eyewitness research foll to a trickle in the periorl of the 1920s 
to 1960s. Some important work was done in the 19.30s by Burtt 
(19:H) and Stern (19~9). Thi~ 1940s produced some important 
studies by Snee and Lush (1941) on question effects an<l by 
Allport and Postman (194 7) on person-lo-person information 
transfer. And although Hastorf anJ Cantrill (1954) <lemonstrated 
the effects of personal prejudice on perception in the 1950s, 
there was little discussion of the relevance of this to the legal 
8ystem and to f!yewitnesses in general. There are differing 
accounts of why these decades were largely devoid of eyewitness 
psychology. Sporer (1982) argues that it was the result of zealous 
overgeneralizations by psychologists that failed to meet the 
needs and standards of the courtroom. 
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The Modern Era of Eyewitness Research 
More than any other individual's work, it was Elizabeth Loftus's 
elegant experiments on postevent information that gave rise to 
the modern era of eyewitness research. Loftus managed to show 
that realistic stimuli, such as pictures of stop signs and red barns 
in their natural settings, could be used in rigorous scientific 
experiments that revealed basic phenomena in memory and also 
had practical utility for understanding eyewitness error. By 
publishing her work in prestigious scientific psychology jour-
nals in the mid- and late l 970s-journals such as Cognitive 
Psychology, Journcil of Verbal learning and Verbal Behavior, and 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human le<Lming and 
Memory-Loftus legitimized the study of eyewitnesses in the 
minds of psychological scientists. Her book Eyewitness Testi-
mony (Loftus, 1979) remains one of the best known psychology 
hooks almost three decades after it was released. Like 
Mi.insterberg, Lofius was criticized for some of her claims (e.g., 
McCloskey & Egeth, 1983), but, unlike Mi.insterberg, she 
helped spawn a new generation of researchers who have care-
[ ully and strategically built an empirical literature Lhat the legal 
system must contend with. 
While Loftus was focusing on memory for evenls and the 
malleability of memory, Robert Buckhout at Brooklyn College 
was focusing on memory for people. Buckhout was more con-
cerned with mistaken identification from lineups than with 
memory for objects. Although Ruc:khout wrote a highly visible 
article in Scient(fic American reviewing research on eyewitness 
reliability (Rur:khout, 1974). he was not otherwise particularly 
successful in getting his work published in scientific psychology 
journals. He did. however, create his own "in house" outlet 
called Social Action and the law. Buckhout often used dramatic 
means to gel his point across. For example, he got a NP-w York 
City television station to broadcast a staged mugging followed by 
a six-person lineup. Of the 2,145 viewers who called in, nearly 
2,000 mistakenly identified the mugger in the lineup (Buckhout, 
l 980). Tt is possible that Buckhout could have published some of 
his experiments in better journals but chose nol to spend the 
time and effort required to go through the rigorous review pro-
cess. Still, Buckhout influenced many younger researchers, who 
took up the issue of mistaken identification. At about the same 
time, eyewitness research activity was growing in the United 
Kingdom, prompted by the investigation of the Devlin Com-
mittee (Devlin, 1976; see also Bull & Clifford, 1976; Cliffor<l & 
Bull, 1978; Davies, Ellis. & Shepherd, 1978; Ellis. Davies, & 
Shepherd, J 977). 
One of the organizing themes that emerged from the 1970s 
was the <listinction between system variables and estimator 
variables (Wells 1978). The argument was that some of the 
variables that affect the accuracy of eyewitness reports were 
unrler the control (or potentially under the control) of the justice 
system (system variables) while others were not (estimator 
variables). For example, how eyewitnesses are interviewed by 
police and how eyewitnesses are instructed prior to viewing a 
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lineup are system variahJes, becausf! they can be contro11ed hy 
the system that is collecting the eyewitness evidence. Other 
variables-such as cross-race versus within-race identifications 
or stress experienced by the witness during tlte event-cannot 
be controlled by the system. Both system and estimator variables 
can he controlled and manipulatr.rl in experiments, hut only 
system variables can be controlled in actual cases. Variables 
thut cannot be controlleJ by the justice system (even though they 
can be controlled in experiments) are called estimator variables 
because the best that eyewitness psychology can do jg help es-
timate their impact in a given case. 
The singling oul of system variables was important, because it 
addressed the primary argument that Wigmore used in his 
rlevastating criticism of Miinsterberg-namely, that psychology 
had no practical recommendations for dealing with the eyewit-
ness problem. Loftus's main findings fit nicely into the system-
variable framework. For instance. if certain types of questions 
(leading questions) result in eyewitnesses incorporating infor-
mation into their later reports regarding matters they did not 
witness, then psychology coulJ devise practical ways lo avoid 
this problem. Likewise, if certain instructions to eyewitnesses 
prior to viewing a lineup reduce the chances of mistaken iden-
tific.:alion, then psychology could advise on the best ways lo in-
struct eyewitnesses. 
Throughout the l 970s and 1980s, eyewitness research 
was largely ignorecl by the criminal justice system. The hig 
exception was criminal defense lawyers. Defense lawyers were 
quick to rec.ognize the potential for psychology to help them 
convince juries that eyewitness memory was not to be trusted, 
ancl they saw expert testimony as the me.chanism lo do this. The 
battle to permit expert testimony on eyewitness issues, however, 
was and is a contentious one. Expert testimony has lteen hoth 
pennitte<l and denied in nearly every slate in the United Stales, 
depending on the discretion of the trial judge. Prosecutors 
genernlly use four arguments against the admission of expert 
testimony nn eyewitness issues. One argument is that the eye-
witness literature is nol sufficiently mature or precise lo be 
considered scientific. Today, this argument almost never pre-
vails. However. the three other arguments continue lo prevent 
expert testimony on eyewitness issues in many jurisrlict.ions. 
One is that such testimony invades the province of the jury, 
because it is the jury that must decide the credibility of wit-
. nesses. Another argument is that the findings are merely a matter 
of common sense and that juries already know these things from 
their every<lay experience. Yet another argument is that the 
prejudicial value of expert testimony regarding eyewitnesses 
outweighs its probative value. This argument m;sumes that 
eyewitness experts can make juries more rlubious of the eye-
witness than they ought lo be. It is not the purpose of the current 
monograph to argue thf' mt"rits of expert testimony. W('. simply 
note that expert testimony for the defense was, until recently, 
virtually the only way the legal system acknowledged the 
scientific study of eyewitnesses. 
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Forensic DNA Testing: An Awakening of the Legal System 
Muc:h has changed in the past few years. hut not because of any 
change in how eyewitness scientists have approached their work. 
Rather, the arlvent of forensic: DNA testing has changed the way 
the legal system views eyewitness evidence. Previous studies of 
the conviction of innocent people had shown that mistaken 
eyewitness identification was implicated in the majority of 
wrongful conviction cases (e.g., Borchard, 1932; Frank & Frank, 
1957; Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986). But it was the develop-
ment of forensic DNA testing jn the 1990s that permitted de-
finitive cases of the conviction of innocent people in the United 
Stales to be uncovered. Defense lawyers Barry Scheck and Peter 
Neufeld, cofoun<lers of the Innocence Project in New York City, 
took the lead and are still the central figures in facilitating the 
use of forensic DNA to test claims of innocence by people who 
were convicted by juries. Scheck and Neufeld were quick to see 
the pattern: Eyewitness-identification error was at the heart of 
the evidence used to convict the vast majority of these innocent 
people. Press accounts of these exonerations caught the atten-
tion of U.S. Attorney General Janel Reno, and an early report 
commissioned by Reno revealed that 26 of the first 28 exoner-
ations were cases of mistaken eyewitness identification (Con-
nors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwan, 1996). follow-ups revealed 
that :36 of the first 40 DNA exonerations were mistaken-identi-
fication cases (Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & 
Rrimacombe, 1998). Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer (2000) re-
ported that 52 of the first 62 DNA exonerations were mistaken-
identification cases. As of this writing, there have been more 
than 180 definitive DNA exonerations; the proportion that in-
volves mistaken eyewitness identification continues to run about 
75% or more. The Innocence Project in New York maintains an 
up-ln-<late \Veb site, www.innocenceprojecl.org, that catalogues 
these DNA exonerations, and there are now innocence pro-
j eels worldwide (hllp://fore j uslice.org/wc/wrongf ul_con v iction_ 
websites.htm). 
Before the DNA exoneration cases, some people believed that 
the results of eyewitness experiments in psychology were mere 
aca<lemic exercises, games played with people's memories that 
would not apply to real witnesses and real crimes. At the very 
least, the DNA exonerations have proved that eyewitnesses can 
be absolutely positive and yet absolutely mistaken, just as was 
founrl in the experiments. But. do 180-plus cases of mistaken 
identification prove anything? If these cases were the total, then 
it might be argued that this is a rather small fraction of con-
victions. But consider the following observations. Virtually all of 
these DNA exoneration cases involved sexual assault. Some also 
involve<l murder, robbery, and other offenses, but sexual assault 
is the common feature. 
It is not that sexual assault witnesses are especially poor 
e.yewit.nesse.s. In fact, they might be the very best at identifying 
their altackers. because they lend lo get longer, closer views of 
them than do victirus of most other crimes. The reason these DNA 
exoneration cases are sexual assault cases is because they are the 
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cases for which biologically rich DNA traces were left behind by 
the perpetrator in the form of semen. (In 2004, nearly 95,000 
sexual assaults were reported, with a 43% clearance rate. For 
crime statistics, see www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/off enses_reporterV 
violent_crime/index.html.) Stranger-rape cases, in which iden-
tification is most likely to be an issue, constitute less than a third 
of all reported sexual assaults. More than 70% of rep011ed sexual 
assaults involve an intimate partner, relative, or acquaintance, so 
about 30,000 cases of stranger-rape come to the attention of the 
police each year. In contrast lo sexual assault cases, only a small 
fraction of murders (more than 16,000 reported in 2004) and 
almost no robberies (more than 400,000 reported in 2004) or 
aggravateJ assaults (more than 850,000 reported in 2004} result 
in hiologically rich trace evi<lence being left behind. What can 
the person who was convicted of a convenience store robbery or a 
<lrive-hy shooting use to prove that the eyewitness identification 
was mistaken? Thus, these 180-plus DNA exonerations repre-
sent a small proportion of the crimes for which eyewitness 
identification evidence has been used to convict people. Fur-
thermore, only a fraction of ol<l sexual assault eonvictions can 
now Le tested, because the eviJence was never collecte<l, was 
collected improperly, has deteriorated, has been lost, or has heen 
destroyed. All in all, the 180 (and growing) DNA exonerations 
can only be a small fraction of the total number of cases in which 
people have been convicted because they were mistakenly 
i<lentified by eyewitnesses. 
\'\1c will not venture an estimate of the number of people in 
prison who are i1111oce11t victims of mistaken eyewitness iden-
tification. Instead, our focus is on what the legal system might be 
ahle to do to help prevent these mistakes from occurring in the 
future. This is where we have seen some promising progress 
recently. Janel Reno's appointment of a working group to de-
velop guidelines for eyewitness evidence was a watershe<l event, 
because the group included five eyewitness researchers. Reno 
recognizeJ that scientific.: psychology was well ahead of the legal 
system both in recognizing the eyewitness problem and in de-
veloping solutions for ii. An account of this process, which 
yieldnl the first set of U.S. national guidelines on eyewitness 
evidence, has been published elsewhere (Wells, Malpass, 
Lindsay, Fisher, Turtle, & Fulero, 2000). Since the publication 
of the guide, a number of jurisdictions have formally adopted the 
recommendations and have gone well beyond the guide to in-
clude procedural changes recommended by eyewitness scien-
tists. These jurisdictions include the states of New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin, as well as the cities of Boston and 
Minneapolis, among others (Wells, 2006). 
Despite these encouraging reforms, it is estimated that 
only about 10% of the U.S. population reside in reformed 
jurisdictions (\Veils, 2006). Will these system-variable im-
provf'rnents continue hy increasin~ numbers of juris<lictions 
in the years to come'? Only time will tell. In the following sec-
tions we review some of the evidence that has led to the changes, 
and we note how the eyewitness-research area must continue to 
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devel~p lo ensure that the evolving relationship between the 
legal system and psychological science will be a fruitful and 
lasting one. 
COMMON METHODS USED IN EYEWITNESS 
RESEARCH 
The experimental method has dominated the eyewitness liter-
ature, an<l most of the experiments are lab based. Lab-based 
experimental methods for studying eyewitness issues have 
strengths and weaknesses. The primary strength of experimental 
methods is that they are proficient at establishing cause-effect 
relations. This is especially important for research on system 
variables, because one needs to know in fact whether a par-
ticular system manipulation is expected to cause better or worse 
pe1formance. In the real world, many variables can operate at 
the same time and in interaction with one another. Multicol-
linearity can be quite a problem in archival/field research, 
because it can be very difficult to sort out which (correlated) 
variables are really responsible for observed effects. The control 
of variables that is possible in experimental research can 
bring clarity to causal relationships that are obscured in archival 
research. For example, experiments on stress during witnessing 
have shown, quite compellingly, that stress interferes with the 
ability of eyewitnesses to identify a central person in a stressful 
situation (Morgan et al., 2004; Deffenbacher, Bornstein. Penrod, 
& McGorty, 2004). However, when Yuil1e and Cutshall (1986) 
studied multiple witnesses to an actual shooting, they found that 
those who reported higher stress had better memories for details 
than did those who reported lower stress. Why the different re-
sults? In the experimental setting, stress was manipulated while 
other factors were held constant; in the actual shooting, those 
who were closer lo the incident reported higher levels of stress 
(presumably because of their proximity) but also had a better 
view. Thus, in the actual case, stress and view covaried. 
The experimental methoJ is not well suited to post<liction with 
estimator variables-that is, there may he limits to generalizing 
from experiments to actual cases. One reason is that levels of 
estimator variables in experiments are fixed and not necessarily 
fully representative of the values observed in actual cases. In 
addition, it is not possible to include all interesting and plau-
sible internctions among variables in any single experiment 
(or even in a modest number of experiments). Clearly, general-
izations to actual cases are best undertaken on the basis of a 
substantial hocly of experimental research conduelecl across a 
wiJe variety of conditions and employing a wide variety of 
variables. Nevertheless, the literature is largely based on ex-
periments due to a clear preference by eyewitness researchers lo 
learn about cause and effect. Fm1hermore, "ground truth" (the 
actual facts of the witnessed event) is readily established in 
experiments, because the witnessed events are creations of the 
experimenters. That kind of ground truth is difficult, if not im-
possible, lo establish when analyzing actual cases. 
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Experimental Methods 
The ecological validity of witnessed events (when examined al 
the surface level) varies considerably across experiments. Some 
eyewitness experiments simply show slides to participant wit-
nesses. while others stage live crimes. Some of the staged crimes 
have been daborate ruses in which calls are made to "police" 
(actually confederates of the experimenter) and participants are 
shown lineups while still believing that what they witnessed was 
real (e.g., Luus & Wells, 1994; Wells & Murray, 1983). Perhaps 
the most common witnessed event used by researchers is the 
video crime. The immense time and cost involved in staging live 
crimes has undoubtedly made them less common in the litera-
ture in recent years, but the success of vi<leo crime experiments 
in the peer-review process suggests that researchers believe this 
method manages to capture the elements that are important for 
studying eyewitness processes. Usually, the memory-acquisition 
process is incidental in the sense that the participant witnesses 
do not know when they watch the video that the study concerns 
eyewitness memory. Instead, researchers commonly tell them 
Lhal they are going lo have lo form impressions or make judg-
ments about the people or scenes. Only later are they informed 
Lhal the study concerns eyewitness memory. 
In lineup experiments, the participant witnesses are usually 
tested with photo lineups rather than with live lineups. Again, 
the savings in cost and time are factors, but the use of photo 
lineups in experiments parallels their use in actual cases. In the 
United Kingdom, there has been a move toward the use of video 
li11~11ps (Pike, Kemp, Towell, & Phillips, 1997; Valentine & 
Heaton, 1999). Although some jurisdictions (such as New York) 
stiJI use live lineups, most jurisdictions in the United Stales use 
photo lineups. Even where live lineups are in common use, more 
often than not they are preceded by a photo lineup, and the live 
lineup is mere1y a confirmatory tool. Thus, the prevalence of 
pholo lineups in experiments rellecls what is happening in ac-
tual criminal investigations. 
IL is standard practice in experiments to use lineups in which 
the actual perpelralor is present in the lineup for some parlici-
pant witnesses and not present for others. The not-present 
lineups (target-absent or perpetrator-absent lineups) are crit-
ically impm1ant for eyewitness-identification studies that are 
designed to examine accuracy. Target-absent lineups simulate 
the real-world situation in which police have focused their 
suspicion on an innocent suspect. The standard procedure in 
lineup experiments is to create a target-absent lineup by re-
placing the target with another person who fits the target's de-
scription and leaving the fillers (the innocent distracters or foils 
in the lineup) the same. 
Participant witnesses in experiments typically take the per-
specli ve of a byslan<ler rather than a victim. However, some 
expPriments have examined possible differences between by-
stander eyewitnesses and victim eyewitnesses and have found 
no significant differences (Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch, 
Leippe, Marchioni, & Cooper, 1984). 
50 
Participant witnesses in experiments are typically college 
students. Tlie reliance on this population has been criticized, 
especially by prosecutors. However, many experiments have 
included other populations, such as young chilchen, adults, and 
the elderly. Importantly, when differences are found, the results 
favor the college students. Specifically, co1lege students arc less 
suggestible and more accurate as eyewitnesses overall than are 
either children or the el<lerly (Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Searcy, 
Bartlett, & Memon, 1999). Presumably this is due to the higher 
education level, intelligence, memory ability, visual acuily, 
alertness, and general health of college students relative to the 
general population. Thus, if anything, heavy reliance on college 
student subject populations for eyewitness re~earch may paint 
an unrealistic:ally rosy picture of eyewitness abilities. 
Within the basic eyewitness-experiment paradigm, manipu-
lations are embedded and their effects are observed. For ex-
ample, an experiment focusing on system variables might have 
everyone view the same simulated crime and then randomly 
assign some participant witnesses to receive a postevent sug-
gestion or randomly assign some Lo receive a particular pre-
lineup instruction. In an experiment focusing on estimator 
variables, participants might be randomly assigned to view a 
crime in which the perpetrator is of a different race or the same 
race or to make an identification after a short delay or after a long 
delay. 
Archival Methods 
Although the experimental method is preferred, archival studies 
of eyewitnesses have become more common in recent years. A 
major drawback to archival studies is the inability to establish 
cause and effect and the questionable basis for assuming ground 
truth. Studies of the DNA exoneration cases involve ground truth 
for identity of Lhe perpetrator, hut these are only case studies, not 
archival analyses. Archival analyses have proven to be par-
ticularly informative with regard to lineups. A lineup thal is 
properly constructed inclu<les only one suspect (who might or 
might not he the peq1etrator); the other people in the lineup are 
innocent fillers who would not be charged with the crime if they 
were identified by the eyewitness. Thus, when an eyewitness 
selects a filler in an actual lineup, it is immediately classifiable 
as an error. It is not the type of error that could send an innocent 
person to jail (only identifications of an innocent suspect could do 
that). but it is an identification error nevertheless. 
Archival analyses of filler identifications have yielded very 
interesting results. Wright and McDaid (1996) analyzed 1,561 
lineup outcomes in London an<l found filler-identification rates 
of 19.9%. These <lata are similar to the 21 % filler identification 
rate reportc<l by Slater (1994) in a study of 84;~ lineups con-
ducted by the Metropolitan Police in London. Behrman and 
Davey (2001) reported that 24% of identifications from live 
lin~ups in Sacramento, California, were identifications of fillers. 
Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) analyzed 119 lineups 
in the greater London area and found that 21.6% of the 
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eyewitnesses identified fillers. In these four studies of actual 
eyewitnesses to serious crimes, filler iclentifications constitute<l 
approximately one third of all positive identifications. These 
archival results represent a ver)' important complement to the 
experimental studies of eyewitnesses for several reasons. First. 
they indicate filler-identification results that are quite consistent 
with rates obtained in experiments (Ebbeson & Flowe, n.d.; 
Stehluy, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001). Secon<l, these ur-
chival results address a common criticism of experiments-
namely, that participant witnesses in experiments are not as 
cautious as actual crime witnesses are, because the conse-
quences of a mistaken identification in an experiment are nol 
serious. But the witnesses in the archival studies were actual 
witnesses to crimes anrl yet mistakenly i<lentified fillers in one 
third of their positive identifications. Third. the filler-identifi-
cat ion rates in the archival studies permit us to make conser-
vative estimates of the risk that an innocent suspect would face 
in these lineups. For example, with five fillers in each lineup 
(six-person lineup minus the suspect) and a 20% filler-identi-
fieatiun rate, the risk to any given filler is 4%. If an innocent 
suspeet has the same risk as a filler, the estimated risk to an 
innoc·ent suspect is 4%. 
These estimates of the risk to an innocent suspect are con-
servative for two reasons. First, lineups rarely yield equal dis-
tributions of error Lecause the innocent suspect will commonly 
stand out for any number of reasons, including the selection of 
fillers that bear a poor resemblance to the description of the 
p,~rpetrator given hy the witness (Valentine & Heaton, 1999; 
Brigham, Meissner, & Wasserman, 1999). Second, when the 
actual perpetrator is not in the lineup (i.e., the suspect is in-
nocent), the rates of filler identification increase (see Wells & 
Olson, 2002). Assuming that the perpetmtor was present in a 
large proµortion of the lineups in these arehival studies, the 
filler-identification rates underestimate the expected error rate 
fur any given lineup in which the perpetrator is absent. 
Archival studies also permit analyses that examine results as 
a Cunclion of <lifferenl levels or critieal variables. For example, 
Wright and McDaid (l 996) found that the filler-identification 
rate was 20.8% for violent crimes and l 7.6e,7o for nonviolent 
crimes. Valentine et al. (2003) found that the filler-idcntificalion 
rate was 15.9% when a weapon was present and 23.7% 
when there was no weapon. The !alter result seems peculiar in 
light of the experimental results indicating a deleterious effect 
for the presence of a weapon (see meta-analysis by Steblay, 
1992)-lmt in the weapons-effect section later in this mono-
graph, we note that archival data are subject to "selection ef-
fects" that may offset or reinforce the effects of variables such as 
weapon focus. 
Another interesting archival finding does nol eoncern eye-
witnf'sses per se hut has a powerful hearing on expe.cte<l rates of 
mistaken identification in the courtroom: Archival studies in-
dicate that those charged with a crime enter a guilty pica in 80 to 
90% of cases (Cole, 1986). Let us assume that 80% plead guilty 
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(the argument is stronger at 90%). We might assume that no 
mistakenly identified (innocent) suspects plead guilty and 
that all the guilty pleas are from guilty suspects. (In no sense do 
we intend for this assumption to he interpreted as a denial 
of the important work of Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004, and other 
false-confession researchers, who have clearly made a com-
pelling case that innocent people plead guilty.) Even if we 
presume tlwt 10% of mistakenly identified suspects plead guilty, 
90% of the innocent suspects and only 20% of the guilty sus-
peels will go lo trial. Assume further that a mere 4% of suspects 
i<lentifie<l from a lineup are innocent and 96% are guilty. If we 
assume that 80% of guilty suspects plead guilty and therefore do 
not go to trial, only 20% of the 96% (19.2% of the guilty) will go 
to trial, whereas 90% of the 4% (3.6% of the innocent suspects) 
will go to trial. Thus, at the trial level, 16% of the defendants 
(:t6% of the 22.8% going lo trial) will be cases of mistaken 
identification. Charman and Wells (2006} called this the 
"pleading effect"; it illustrates how the mistaken-identification 
rate can be expected to be higher at the trial level than at the 
lineup level (see Fig. 1). 
ESTIMATOR VARIABLES 
We first review estimator variaLles. Although these variables are 
not unrler the control of the justice system, they are important to 
our treatment for two main reasons. First, estimator variables are 
central to our understanding of when and why eyewitnesses are 
most likely to make errors. Informing police, prosecutors, 
judges, and juries about the conditions that can affect the ac-
curacy of an eyewitness account is important. Second, our 
understanding of the impmtance of any given system variable is, 
at least at the extreme, dependent on levels of the estimator 
variables. Consider a case in which a victim eyewitness is ab-
ducted and hel<l for 48 hours by an unmasked perpetrator; the 
witness has repeaterl viewings of the perpetrator, lighting is 
good, and so on. We have every reason to believe that this wit-
ness has a deep and lasting memory of the perpetrator's face. 
Then, within hours of being released, the eyewitness views a 
lineup. Under these conditinus, we would not expect system 
variables to have much impact. For instance, a lineup that is 
biased against an innocent suspect is not likely to lead this 
eyewitness to choose the innocent person, because her memory 
is too strong to be influenced by lineup bias. On the other hand, 
when an eyewitness's memory is weaker, system variables have a 
stronger impact. 
The effects on identification accuracy of a large number of 
estimator variables-witnes:.:;, crime, and perpetrator charac-
teristics-have been investigated by psychologists. Here we 
recount findings concerning several variables that have received 
significant research attention and achieved high levels of con-
sensus among experts (based on ilerns represented in a survey hy 
Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001) or have been the subject 
of interesting recent research. 
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Fig. 1. The ·'pleniling effer.t •· (Clwrrnan & W~lls, 2006). Assuming first that 96% of suspeets identified from 
n lineup arc guilty and 4% a1·e innoc<'.nl, if 80'Yn of thr. guilty suspects ancl lO'Yn of the innocent suspects pl encl 
guilty (the reby foregoing a trial), the rcsnlt is that 16% of the defendants who go to trial will be innocen t- that 
is 1 cai--1:s of mistaken id1:11tification. 
Cross-Race Identification 
Meiss11er and Brigham (2001a) published Lhe mosl recent broad 
review of research on the problems associated with what has 
sometimes l,een called other-rnce or cross-race identification 
impairment or own-race bins (O l{B). Meissner and Brigham 
analyzed data from ,39 research articles, with 91 independent 
samples involving nearly 5,000 participant witnesses. They 
examiner! measures of correct identification anrl false-alarm 
rates, as well as aggregate measures of discrimination accuracy 
and response criterion. They reported thal the chance of a mis-
taken identifica tion is 1.56 times greater in other-race than in 
sanre-race conditions and that the witnesses were 1.4 times more 
likely to correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face as 
they were to identify an other-race face. Participants were more 
than 2.2 Limes as likely to accurately categorize own-race faces 
as new versus previously viewed as they were lo accurately 
categorize other-race faces. Meissner and Brigham explored the 
qut-!sl ion of whet her cross-rnce co11tacl might reduce these effects 
and found that such cunlact played only a snwll role in ORB, 
accounting for just 2% of the variability across par1icipants (sec 
also Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003). They also found that the 
amount of viewing time available to witnesses s ignificantly in-
fluenced ORB; specificall y, false alarms lo other-race faces in-
crcasf'd when study timc was limited. 
l{ecent research by Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Moore 
(2003) examined cross-nice impairment in kindergarten 
S2 
children, third graders, and young adulls who viewed black and 
white target faces and a day later were tested with a six-person 
lineup. These researchers observed the usual cross-race 
effecl, which did not differ across age groups: In each age group, 
cross-race identi fication was less accurate than own-race 
iden ti fication. 
Stress 
Despite the importance of knowledge about the effects of stress 
on witnesses, researchers cannot simulate vio lent crimes and 
pose a threat to the well-being of experimental subjects. Re-
searchers have therefore resorted to a variety of mani pulaLions to 
induce stress, includ ing the use of violent versus nonviolent 
videotaped c rimes. Increased violence in videotaped re-
enac tments of crimes has been shown to lead to decrements in 
both identification accuracy and eyewitness recall (Cli.fford & 
Hollin, 1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978), but this finding is not 
universal (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987a) . 
Deffenbacher et. a l (2004) rec;ently published a meta-analysis 
of stress effect studies. The meta-analysis was conducted on 27 
tests of Lhe effects of heigh tenet! slress on identification accur-
acy and on 36 Lests of its effect on recal l of crime-related details. 
They found that high levels of stress negatively affec ted both 
lypes of memory. The effect of stress was notab ly larger for tar-
get-present than for target-absent lineups-that is, s tress par-
ti cularly reduced correct identification rates. The effect was also 
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TABLE 1 
f<ffcentages of A<:cu.rat,~ mul Mi.,;tuk,m Tcfoutiflcution.,; From 
Struly of Eyewitness lde11tification Under Higli Versus Low Stress 
High stress 
Com~ct irfontifications [target-present) 
Live lineup method 27 
Photospread metho<l 36 
Sequential photo method 49 
Mi:-:1aken idm11ificatio11s [lar~et-ah!.enl) 
Li\'e lineup method 45 
Photosprea<l method 4U 
Sequential photo method 0 
Note. Suurci-: Mur!!a,1 !'l 11I. (200•i). 
Low stress 
62 
76 
7f> 
so 
61 
0 
considerably larger for eyewitness-identification studies that 
simulated eyewitness conditions (e.g., staged crimes) than for 
face-recognition studies. 
These cff ects are well illustrated in a study by Morgan et al. 
(2004) that examine<l the eyewitness capabilities of more than 
fiOO active-duty military personnel enrolled in a survival-school 
program (see Table 1). After 12 hours of confinement in a mock 
prisoner-of-war camp, participants experienced both a high-
slress inlerrogalion with real physical confrontation an<l a 
low-str<>::;s interrogation without physical confrontation. Roth 
interrogations were 40 minutes long; they were conducted by 
different persons. A day after rf'lease from the camp, and having 
recovered from food and sleep deprivation, the participants 
viewed a 15-person live lineup, a 16-person photo spread, or a 
sequential presentation of photos of up to 16 persons. Regard-
less of the testing method, as Table 1 shows, memory accuracy 
for the high-stress interrogator was much lower overall than for 
the low-stress interrogator. 
Weapon Focms 
Weaponfocus refers to the visual attention eyewitnesses give to a 
perpetrator's weapon during the course of a crime. [t is expected 
that the attention the eyewitness focuses on the weapon will 
reduce his or her ability to later recall details about the per-
petrator or to rncognize the perpetrator. Researchers have as-
sessed eyewitness recall of various crime details in an attempt lo 
establish the parameters of weapon-focus effects on perception 
and memory; these efforts were reviewe<l in a meta-analysis by 
Stel>lay (1992). The review included 19 studies with a total 
sample of 2,082 participants. The weapon-focus effect on 
irlentifications was .r:;tatistically significant but reflected a morl-
esl impairment; the effect on description accuracy was larger. 
The analysis inrlicatecl that the weapon-focus effect was larger in 
target-absent lineups and when memory was generally impaired. 
R0.scarch by Mitchell, Livosky, ancl Mather (1998); Pickel 
(1998, 1999); and Shaw and Skolnick (1999) indicates thal any 
surprising object can draw attention away from the perpetrator 
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and that novelty, rather than threat, may he the critical ingre-
dient in the effect. 
Researchers have tried to detect weapon-focus effects in field 
studies, anrl the results are somewhat conflicting. Tollestrup, 
Turtle, and Yuille (1994) examined the effect of weapon focus on 
the rate of su::;pect identificatio11 and obtained data consistent 
with laboratory findings. But Valentine et al. (2003) did not 
find a weapon-focus effect in their study of 640 attempts by 
eyewitnesses to identify the alleged target in 314 lineups. 
Of course, as noted earlier, in nonexperimental studies it i:; 
difficult to control for variables that might obscure a weupon-
focus effect. For example, in lhe study by Valentine el al., lhe 
primary outcome variable is suspect choices rather than per-
petrator choices (i.e., witness identifications are intended to 
determine whether suspects are perpetrators)--whereas in ex-
perimental research the identity of the perpetrator is known to 
the researcher. 
Field research can also suffer from selection effects that can 
obscure the effects of variables of interest. For example, a true 
weapon-focus effect could be obscured if witnesses to crimes 
involving weapons believe that their memory is weak and are 
therefore less incline<l lo allencl lineups. The result could be a 
reduction in the number of weapon-focus-impaired witnesses 
presented with lineups and thus a reduced number of cases of 
weapon focus. 
As mentioned earlier, a selection effect might aclually re<luce 
our concern about the potential impact of weapon focus on 
eyewitness performance. 011 the other hanrl, it is conceivable 
that more intensive police investigations of weapon-present 
cases produce a higher proportion of perpetrator-present lineups 
for weapon-present witnesses, with the result that the apparent 
performance of weapon-present witnesses is improved even 
though their memories are impaired. lf investigations of all 
crimes were similarly intense, a weapon-focus effect might 
emerge. One might also imagine that the police are more mo-
tivated to "help" weapon-present witnesses identify perpetra-
tors who use weapons and who thus pose a threat to society. Such 
help might take the form of suggestive instructions to witnesses 
and suggestive lineups. 
Exposure Duration 
Common sense tells us that the amount of time available for 
viewing a perpetrator is positively ..issociate<l with the witness's 
ability lo subsequently identify him or her. Amela-analysis by 
Shapiro and Penrod (1986) showed that the linear trend for 
exposure time was associated with improved performance. The 
effects of exposure time were illustrate<l in a slu<ly by Memon, 
Hope, and Rull (2003) in which mock witnesses viewed a real-
istic videotaped crime in which the target/perpetrator was 
visible for 12 versus 45 seconds. Witnesses were tested with 
target-present and target-absent arrays 4-0 minutes later. The 
proportion of correct identifications in target-present anays and 
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com~ct rejections in target-absent a11"ays increased suhstan-
tia1ly when exposure time increased from 12 seconds 10 45 
seconds (from 32% to 90% for correct identifications and from 
15% to S9% for correct rejections), although mistaken identi-
fications in target-absent arrays remained high even with longer 
exposure (BS% al 12 seconds and 41 % at 45 seconds). 
Disguise 
It is common for people lo <lon disguises before engaging in 
criminal acts. Full-face masks, stockings, hats, and hoo<ls can 
be quite effective in diminishing the facial-feature cues ne-
cessary for recognition (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987a, 
1987b; Mc:Kelvie, 1988; Patterson & Baddeley, 1977). For ex-
ample, Cutler et al. (19876) had participants view a videotaped 
liquor store robbery and later attempt an iclentific:ation from a 
videotaped lineup. In half of the robberies, the robber wore a 
knit pullover cap that covered his hair and hairline. ln the other 
half, he did not wear a hat. The robber was less accurately 
i<lentified when he was disguised: 45% of the participants 
identified the robber in the lineup test if he wore no hat during 
the robbery; only 27% identified him if he wore a hat during the 
roLbery. 
Shapiro and Penrod, in their 1986 meta-analysis, coded ex-
periments for whether or not faces were changed between the 
initial viewing and recognition phases. Transformations in-
cluded changes in facial hair and deliberate disguises, such as 
masks or hats. Nontra11sfom1ccl faces were more accurately 
recognized (effect size d = 1.05; 75% vs. 54%) and less 
often falsely identified (d = .40; 22% vs. 30%) than transfonned 
faces were. 
Nol all disguises or changes in appearance work. Yarmey 
(2004) found similar levels of identification accuracy for a young 
woman viewed for lS seconds in naturalistic circumstances, 
regardlei:;s of whether or not she wore a baseball cap and <lark 
sunglasses. Thc:re was, however, an intPraction involving dis-
guise: Witnesses who were given enhanced retrieval instructions 
(involving mental rehearsal of the encounter) made significantly 
more correct rejections in the no-disguise condition than in the 
disguise conclition. 
Retention Interval 
Common sense tells us that memory declines over time. Can we 
expect eyewitness-i<lentification accuracy to decline as the time 
between the crime and the identification lest increases? Shapiro 
an<l Penro<l (.l 986) included retention interval in their meta-
analysis. When studies that manipulated retention interval were 
grouped into long versus short lime <leluys (the exact nwnipu-
lation depended on the study), longer delays led to fewer correct 
identifications (d = .43; 51 % vs. 61 %) and more false identi-
fications (d = .:13: 32% vs. 24%). Across all the studies exam-
ined in that meta-analysis (including those that did not directly 
manipulate retention interval), retention interval also proved an 
important determinant of correct identifications (r = -.11, p < 
.05), although there was no significant relationship with false 
identifications. 
Witness Intoxir.ation 
Rea<l, Yuille, an<l Tollestrup (1992, Experiment 1) tested 
identification ac:curacy one week after a staged event using a six-
person lineup; they found that alcohol intoxication while wit-
nessing the event was associated with a lower rate of correct 
identifications when the level of arousal (manipulated by vary-
ing the participants' perceptions of the probability of getting 
caught stealing an item from an office) was low during the event. 
False identification rates were the same for intoxicated and 
sober participants. Of course, after one week the participants 
were no longer intoxicated, which raises the question of what the 
effect of intoxication at viewing anJ identifi(:ation would be. 
Dysart, Lindsay, MacDonald, and Wicke (2002) note that the 
popular belief is that intoxicated witnesses are less accurate 
than sober witnesses. However, one theory concerning "alcohol 
myopia" (Steele & Josephs, 1990) predicts an interaction be-
tween blood-alcohol level and identification procedures in 
which witnesses who were intoxicated at encoding will be less 
accurate only in target-absent conditions. The theory suggests 
that, compared with intoxicated witnesses, sober witnesses will 
encode more information/cues about the perpetrator, which will 
facilitate correct rejections in target-absent procedures. In-
toxicated witnesses are likely to encode only salient cues, and 
erroneous identifications will resu1t where more subtle cues 
would have indicated that the suspect was not the target. On the 
other hanJ, using salient cues will be effective for intoxicated 
witnesses when the target is present. 
Dysart cl al. (2002) examined the effect of aleohol con-
sumption on identification accuracy using "showups," a pro-
cedure in which the witness is shown the suspect alone, without 
any fillers. A showup is the identification procedure most likely 
to be used by police with intoxicated witnesses. As predicted, 
the researchers found that in the target-present showup condi-
tion, hlooJ-alcohol level was not significantly related to correct 
identification: however. in the target-absent condition, higher 
Llood-alcohol levels were associate<l with a higher likelihood 
(52%) of a false identification than were lower blood-alcohol 
levels (22%). 
SYSTEM VARIABLES 
System variables (variables that can be controlled in actual 
cases) tend lo center on factors that come into play after the 
witnessed event has passed. At that point, the legal system has 
some eo11trol over a number of important variables, but not 
necessarily all variables. For instance, first responders at a 
crime scene can separatc eyewitnesses so they do not influence 
each other, but some interactions could have already occurred 
before the arrival of investigators. Similarly, although investi-
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gators haw~ total control over how a lineup is conducted. some 
inentifications occur outside the control of the legal system-for 
example. when an eyewitness spontaneously identifies someone 
on the street as the perpetrator of an earlier crime. 
System variables tend to be divided into two broad categories. 
One category ii- interviewing eyewitnesses, a process that 
generally involves recall memory. The other category is the 
i<lentificatiun of suspec:ls, a process that generally involves 
recognition memory. It is important to note that neither inter-
viewing nor identification is considered by eyewitness scientists 
to Le purely a memory process. Social influence can be a huge 
factor in both. 
The case of James Newsome, a man who served IS years for a 
mur<ler he dirl not commit, is an extreme example of an eye-
witness making a positive identification from a lineup, even 
though his memory told him that the man he identified was not 
the man who committed the murder. After Newsome was proved 
innocent and the actual perpetrator was found through physical 
evidence, eyewitness Anthony Rounds came forward and de-
scribed how Chicago police had forced him to identify Newsome 
from the lineup, even though he knew that Newsome was not the 
man he saw commit the murder. According Lo Rounds, the lineup 
administrators told Rounds whom to identify; when he resisted, 
their intimidating insistence led him to identify Newsome and 
give confident identification testimony at trial. A lawsuit in 2002 
yielrlerl strong evirlen<:e to support Rounrls's claim, and a jury 
awarded damages to Newsome; the finding was upheld by the 
U.S. Se\'enth Circuit Court of Appeals (Newsome v. McCabe 
et al.. 2002). 
Although this is an extreme example, it illustrates how ex-
traneous external variables can influence eyewitness testimony 
withot1l operating through memory mechanisms. Under other 
circumstances, social-influence variables are thought to actu-
ally influence memory. For instance, a misleading question such 
as "What kiml of hat was the gunman wearing?" when the 
gunman had no hat could lead an eyewitness to develop a 
memory for a hat that did nol exist. For these reasons, eyewitness 
scientists concern themselves with both social-influence vari-
ables and memory variables. 
Interviewing Eyewitnesses 
Research on interviewing eyewitnesses dates back lo the early 
1900s. Alfred Binet (1900) was the first to study suggestibility in 
children in France, and William Stern (1904) initiated eyewit-
ness research on interrogation in Germany. Snee and Lush 
(1941) wrote a short empirical article on the t1Sf' of interrogatory 
versus narrative methods of interviewing eyewilnesses. MoJem 
rcsf'arc-h on the issue undoubtedly owes much to the influence of 
Elizabeth Loftus, who used the method of asking questions of 
cyewitnes~es lo implant mislearling infonnation (e.g., Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974). This line of research paved the way for experi-
mental studies of the effects of explicit and subtle forms of 
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misinfonnation imparted during questioning of adult and child 
witnesses {for reviews see Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Loftus, 2005; 
Wright & Loftus, 1998). This work led to important theoretical 
advances in our understan<ling of the mechanisms underlying 
eyewitness suggestibility in interviews. Examples include the 
source-monitoring framework {Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 
Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001); fuzzy-trace 
theory (Brainer<l & Reyna, 1998; Memon, Hope, Bartlett, & 
Bull, 2002); an activation-based memory model (Ayers & Reder, 
1998); relrieval-induced forgelling (Macleod, 2002}; the role of 
metacognition {Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000); and the 
social-influence approach {Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; 
Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, in press; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, 
Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001). 
In this monograph, we do not discuss the mechanisms re-
sponsible for rlistmtions in information retrieved in eyewitness 
interviews. Instead, we use one example of a procedure that 
arose as a result of a direct request from the police to improve the 
probative value of eyewitness evidence. This example shows 
how researchers have attempted to wrap their knowledge about 
memory and social influence into a set of procedures for inter-
viewing eyewitnesses. It is also the most developed and exten-
sively researched procedural package for gathering detailed 
reports from cooperative eyewitnesses. (Readers who are inter-
ested in other approaches to interviewing eyewitnesses, in-
cluding interviews designe<l to detect rleception, should refer to 
reviews by Granhag & Stromwell, 2004; Memon & Bull, 1999: 
Poole & Lamb, 1998; and Vrij, 2000.) 
The Cognitive lnteroicw 
The cognitive interview (Cl) was initially developed by the 
psychologists ll. Edward Geiselman {University of California, 
Los Angeles) and Ronald P. Fisher (Florida International Uni-
versity) in the early 1980s (Geiselman et al., 1984; Geiselman, 
Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985) and has resulted in more 
than two <leca<les of research. Two main forces <lrove the de-
velopment of the CI. The first was a request from police officers 
and legal professionals to improve the practices of police in-
terviewers when gathering information from eyewitnesses. 
Analysis of the techniques used by untrained police officers in 
Florida (Fisher, Geiselman. & Raymond, 1987) suggested that 
there existed some fundamental problems in the conduct of 
interviews. leading to ineffective communication and poor 
memory performance. The "stanJar<l police interview" was 
eharacleriied by constant interruptions, excessive use of a 
predetermined list of questions with an expectation that wit-
nesses could provide answers, and questions that were limed 
inappropriately. For example, if the witness was descriLing one 
of the perpetrators, the officer might switch the line of ques-
tioning to the actions of another perpetrator. Interestingly, the 
same problems were identified in studies of the typical police 
interview in Britain (George, 1991) and Germany (Berresheim & 
Weber, 2003). 
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TABLE 2 
Step 1. Build rapport 
(a) Personalize the inlerview 
Exchange names. Make sure the witness is comfortable an<l is willing to try to remember as much as possible. Ask the witness to give as many 
dclails as po:,sihle hut not lo guess or fabricate. 
(I,) Transfer c:ontrol to the witne$S 
Tell the witness that you do not have knowledge of the event an<l it is the witness who hol<ls all the relevant information. Let the wilni::ss choose 
the starling point fort he narrative and give the account al his or her own speed and in his or her own word!'.. Do not interrupt the witness. if at all 
possihle. Lislrn actively lo what he or she has to say. Allow for pauses. 
Stt:p 2. Hecn:ate the context of the original event an<l ask the witness to repo11 in detail. 
To reinstate context, invite the witness to close his or her eyes and place himself or herself back at the scene. 
Step :-3. Open-ended namition 
(i) Request narrative description 
Ask the witness lo ~ive a narrntivc ac:counl of the event in his or her own words. If clarification is required, use open-ended questions. Do nol 
interrupt the narration to ask questions, although prompts such as .. tell more" may be used. Avoid judgmental comments and closed (yes/no) 
riuestions. 
(ii) Focused retrieval 
This is nol a technique but a general guideline lo follow lo help the witness concentrate on what he or she is describing hy 
• uging open-ended questions 
~ allowing for long pauses 
• not interrupting the witness when he or she is speaking 
(iii) Extensive retrieval 
Encourage the witness to search through his or her memmy more extensively hy asking him or her to report details from a number of different 
perspectives and in different chmnological orders. 
(iv) Wilm$s-c:0111pa1ible questioning 
Time the questions appropriately so they are compatible with the witness's retrieval pattern rather than adhering to a protocol. 
Stt:p 4-. Closure 
Re sure to leave time lo brief the witness and let him or her know what might happen next. Exchange contact information and encourage the 
witness lo gel in touch if he or she rememl>ers additional details. 
~oh·. Adapll:d from Fi1<lu,r 1111d G1,i.~clrnnn (1992). 
The CI in its present form represents the alliance of two fields 
of f;tudy: communication anrl cognition. The social-psychologi-
cal concerns of managing a face-to-face interaction and com-
municating effectively with a witness were integrated with what 
psychologists knew about the way people remember things. The 
social aspects are embodied in what is referred to as a structured 
irzterview, which consists of a phase<l procedure (free report 
followed by open-ended questions) and incorporates techniques 
tu facilitate communication. These techniques indu<le rapport 
huilcling, which is designed to increase the transfer of c:ontrol 
from the interviewer to the witness, and the use of a questioning 
strategy guide<l hy the witness's own free report rather than one 
that is based on a predefined protocol. The stnwtured interview 
resembles the recommended procedure for conducting investi-
gative interviews with witnesses and victims in many countries 
(see Poole & Lamb. 1998; Westcott, Davies, & Bull, 2002). 
The original version of the Cl was presented as a set of four 
specific cognitive techniques for imprnving eyewitness recall. 
Following a series of laburntory simulations an<l field research, 
the procedure was revised in 1.992 (Fisher & Geiselman, l 992). 
The version of the CI that has subsequently evulve<l focuses 
heavily on communication techniques and social dynamics and 
is a proc(!dure in which the cognitive and eommunication 
S6 
components work in tandem. Here we will focus primarily on 
research and practice relating Lo the revised Cl (also referred to 
in the literature as the "enhanced" CI). For a summary of the 
revised CI procedure, see Table 2. 
The revised Cl comprises several phases during which the 
interviewer engages with and establishes rapport with the wit• 
ness, asks the witness to provide a narrative account of the 
witnessed event, and then probes with questions relating lo 
the <letails the witness has pruvi<le<l. Throughout the process, the 
interviewer interrupts as little as possible, allows the witness to 
dictate the subject mailer and sequence of questioning, and 
listens actively to what the witness has to say. One of the primary 
aims of the CI is lo facilitate the exchange of information he-
lween the witness and interviewer through effective communi-
cation. 
The first task of the interviewer is to build rapport with the 
witness. This rapport serves two functions. First it puts the 
witness at case, minimizing the discomfort and distress some-
times associated with sharing an intimate or fearful experience 
with a stranger. Second, there is some evidence that building 
rapport with open·ended questions can increase the accuracy uf 
a child witness's report (Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 2004). An 
important component of rapport building in the revised CI is for 
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the interviewer to explicitly "transfer eontrol" to the witness (see 
Table 2 for rletails). 
The "cognitive" pa1i of the CI relies on two theoretical prin-
c:iples. First, a retrieval cue is effec:tive lo the exlent Lhat there is 
an overlap between the encoded information and the retrieval 
C'\H~. Reinstatement of the original encoding context increases 
the accessibility of stored information (Tulving & Thomson's 
encoding specificity hypothesis, 19n). Second, multiple trace 
theory (Bower, 1967)-which proposes that memories are made 
up of networks of associations rather than discrete and uncon-
neete<l inci<lents-states that a memory can be cue<l by several 
means and that information nol accessible with one technique 
may Le accessible with another. 
Having established rapport with the witness, the interviewer 
instructs the witness to mentally reconstruct the physical and 
personal contexts that existed at the time of the crime. Inter-
viewers can help witnesses by asking them to form an image or 
impression of the environmental aspects of the original scene 
(e.g., the location of objects in a room); to comment on any 
emotional reactions and feelings (e.g., surprise, anger) at the 
time; aml to describe any sounds, smells, and physical condi-
tions (e.g., hot, humid, smoky) that were present. Occasionally a 
witness can Le taken back to the scene of the crime. Once the 
witness has mentally reconstructed the context, the interview«~r 
asks him or her to provide a detailed account of the event 
(the free na1Tativc). To extencl retrieval, the witness is asked to 
report all details. including partial or incomplete memories. 
To minimize editing, Fisher and Geiselman (1992} adviser! in-
terviewers to instruct witnesses to report everything that comes 
to minr!. evf!n if it is trivial or out of chronological order. In 
addition to facilitating the recall of additional information, this 
technique may yield information that can he valuahle in piecing 
together details from different witnesses to the same crime. 
Roberts and Higham (2002) obtained ratings of the forensic 
relevance of details elicited with the CI by asking police officers 
anrl prosecutors lo rate the relevance of each detail to a criminal 
investigation/court proceeding. Al best, only 50% of the 
information the Cl elicited was deemed relevant by forensic 
experts. Most of the correct, forensically relevant details ap-
peared in the free-narrative account (cf. Mcmon, Wark, Bull, & 
Kohnken, 1997). 
Once the witness lrns provided an open-ended account, the CI 
interviewer cnn probe for detnils using open-ended questions 
and, when appropriate, can ask follow-up questions to clarify 
what the witnes1; has said. It is imperative that interviewers 
remind witnesses that if they are unsure of an answer to a 
question, they should say so and not guess. Appropriate se-
quencing of the interviewer's questions (referred lo as inter-
viewee-compatible questioning) is critical. Each eyewitness will 
havc. a 1111iquf" mental rP.prf'Sf'ntation of the c>vent, rlepe.nrling on 
the details or aspects of the event he or she attended to and the 
orrlt>r in which <~vents unfolded for him or her (Fisher & 
Schreiber, in press}. The interviewer should be guided by the 
Vol11111t' 7-Numlwr 2 
interviewee's pattern of recall rather than adhering to a rigid 
protocol or predetermined checklist. For example, if an inter-
viewee is describing a suspect's face. this indicates that the 
mental image of the perpetrator's face is currently active and 
details about the face are accessible (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & 
Barsalou, 2003). At this point, the interviewer should ask 
questions relating lo the suspect's appearance and not switch to 
another topic, such as the suspect\, car. 
ln a Cl, the witness is encouraged lo focus or concentrate on 
mental images of the various parts of the event, such as the 
suspect's face (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992). The interviewer 
exhausts the content of each image by asking the witness lo form 
an image and then describe it in as much detail as possible. 
Bekerian and Dennett (1997) refer to this focus on specific 
features as "molecular imaging," as compared to the general 
"molar" approach, which emphasizes reinstating environmental 
context. To effectively engage the interviewee in focused re-
trieval, the interviewer must speak slowly and clearly, pausing at 
appropriate points to allow the interviewee time to create an 
image and respond (Memon, 2006). Unfortunately, the use of 
imagery can produce increases in errors and increased use of 
inferences in eyewitnesses' spoken reports (Bekerian & Den-
nett, 1997; for a discussion, see Stevenage & Memon, 1997). 
Alternative retrieval cues can he used to access an event. For 
example, witnesses can be asked to recall an event in different 
temporal order or from different perspectives. Some researchers 
have found that witnesses can recall additional details if they 
deviate from the e\'enl script and describe the event from the end 
or the middle or if they describe its most memorable aspect 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman & Callot, 1990). How-
ever, in other studies, no additional details have surfaced when 
the witness recalls Lhe event for a second Lime, in a different 
order (Memon, Wark, Bull, et al., 1997}. One of the most con-
troversial components of the original CI was that witnesses were 
asked to "recall" an event from the perspective of another wit-
ness or from another location at the scene. The instruction to 
change perspective typically does not yield additional details 
and can inc:rease errors, particularly if witnesses do not under-
stand what the interviewer wants them to do (Boon & Noon, 
1994; Memon, Cronin, Eaves, & Bull, 1993). Fisher, Brennan, 
and McCauley (2002) suggest that changing perspectives could 
be potentially valuable for highly traumatized witnesses who 
might find it loo stressful to describe the event from their own 
perspective. However, forensic investigators are uncomfortable 
with the instruction to change perspective, presumably because 
it could invite witnesses to speculate (Kebbell, Milne, & Wag-
staff, 2001). 
Evaluation of the Cl 
The CI has been examined in approximately 65 studies lo date. 
A meta-analysis of 53 studies found a median increase of :~4% 
111 the amount of correct information generated in the CI 
as compared with a different interview model (Kohnken, 
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Milne, Memon, & DuJl, 1999). Then~ was also an increase in 
incorrect cfotails; we will return to this later. With the exception 
of two field studies, alJ the studies have tested volunteer wit-
nesses (typically c:ollege students) in the laboratory. Witnesses 
observe either a live event or a videotape of a simulated crime. 
After a short delay (typically hours or clays), the witnesses par-
ticipate in a face-to-face interview. The witnesses receive either 
the CJ or a control interview. The control is either u stanJurd 
police interview or a structured interview that incorporates the 
phased approach referred lo earlier. The interviews are tape 
rec.:orc.led, transcribe<l, and then scored for the number of correct 
and incorrect statements. The accuracy of the reported state-
me11ts is high an<l comparable for both types of interview. 
Giinter Kohnken and his colleagues in Germany (Kohnken, 
Schimmossek, Aschermann, & Hofer, 1995; Kohnken, Thurer, 
& Zorberbier, 1994) were the first lo demonstrate the superiority 
of the CI over the structured interview. In their studies, the 
structured-interview group received training in basic commu-
nication skills that was comparable in quality and length to the 
CI group's training. The training included instruction on rapport 
builJing and the use of various types of questioning. In the 1994 
1-,tudy, both interviewees and interviewers were non-psychology 
stu<lents with no prior experience in investigative interviewing. 
The to-be-remembered event was a vi,IP-otape showing a blood 
donation. Participants were tested a week after viewing the 
Yi<leotape. Each interviewer concfocte<l one interview (n = ~O). 
The CI significantly increased the amount of correctly recalled 
information over Liu· structured interview without increasing the 
number of errors and confabulated (made-up) details. In a 
subsequent stucly with adult participants, a small increase in 
confabulated details was also noted (Kohnken et al., 1995). 
Memon and colleagues (Memon, Wark, Holley, Bull, & 
Kohnken, 1997) directly examined whether the Cl advantage 
was due lo the use of the communication components of the 
revised CI (rapport building, transfer of control, and elements of 
the structured interview) or of the cognitive components (con I ext 
reinstatement, imagery, reverse order, and reporting in detail). 
As in the Kohnken research, cognitive and structured inter-
viewers received similar training, and each group was Jed to 
helieve it was w,ing the superior interview technique. A third 
group of interviewers sen1ecl as the control and was not trained. 
Both trained groups elicited more correct information than the 
untrnined group did. However, this was offset by the fact that 
they also produced a significantly higher number of errors and 
confabulations than the untrained group. These findings are 
important in themselves hut also raise the question of what is an 
appropriate control group. The cognitive interviews produce 
more correct details than <lo interviews conducted by an un-
trnine<l group of interviewers. However, a structured interview 
with some of the communication components of the Cl built in 
can also yield increases in correct recall. The increase in errors 
that occasinnaUy occurs could he somewhat problematic (for a 
discussion, see Memon & Stevenage, 1996; .Memon, 2006). 
Some have argued that the production of incorrect as well as 
cort'ec:t information suggests that the CI may he affecting report 
criteria (Mcmon & Higham, 1999; Roberts & Higham. 2002). 
Others argue that there is no suggestion that. witnesses should 
lower their output criteria to produce unsure responses and in-
lerviewe:rs should instruct witnesses not to guess or fabricate 
details (Fisher el al., 2002). It is important to note that accuracy 
rates typically do not <liffer Letween the CI and comparison 
groups. 
The efficacy of the CI with nonstandard populations-notably, 
young children, the elderly, and people who are intellectually 
impaired-has also been examined. Given that the primary aim 
of the CI is to increase the amount of information retrieved, it 
may be the most effective procedure to use with young chilrlren, 
because children tend not to provide as much information as 
adults do. The results are somewhat mixed. The Cl has been 
found to increase the amount of correct information recalled by 
children aged 7 to 11 years when the comparison group was a 
standard (untrained) group (Saywitz, Geiselman, & Bornstein, 
1992). When the comparison is a structured interview, the CI 
increases correct information but can also increase errors in 8-
to 9-year-olds (Memon, Wark, Bull, el al., 1997; Milne, Bull, 
Memon, & Kohnken, 1995). 
More recently, Akehurst, Milne, and Kc>lmken (200:3) exam-
ine<l whether the revised CI would aid the recall of chil<lren aged 
8 to 9 years an<l ] 1 to 12 years after a 6-day delay. Children 
viewed a video of a shoplifting and were interviewed 4 hours or 6 
clays later. The Cl led to an increase in correct recall as com-
pared with a structured interview, with no increase in errors. 
There were no interactions involving age group or delay. As to 
the suitability of the Cl for younger children, Holliday (2003a) 
reported that a modified version of the revised CI could increase 
the amount of correct information recallec.l in the narrative (free-
recall) phase of the interview in 4- to 5-year-olds as compared 
with a structured interview. In a later study with 4- and 8-year-
olds, Holliday (2003h) found that a CI given after postcvcnt 
misinformation reduced children's reporting of misinformation 
in the interview (for a similar finding with 8- to 9-year-olrls, see 
Memon, Wark, Bull, et al., 1997). 
There is some evidence lo suggest the CI can aid the 
recall of adults (Milne, Clare, & Bull, 1999) and children 
(Milne & Bull, 2006) with mild learning disabilities, although 
further research is required with this population, using larger 
sample sizes and people with a broader range of learning 
difficulties. 
To date, there have only been two published studies of the 
efficacy of the CI when the witnesses are older adults. Mello anc.l 
Fisher (1996) found the Cl led to similar incrf!aSF-S in correct 
recall when the participants were older adults (mean age = 72 
years) hut Searcy, Bartlett, Swanson, aml Memon (200!) found 
no differences in correct identification (recognition) of a target 
when witnesses aged 62-79 years were interviewed using a 
procedure resembling the CJ. 
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The failure to find an effect of CI on recognition (in this case, 
identification of a target) is consistent with earlier studies. In 
four separate studies. Fisher, Quigley. Brock, Chin, and Cutler 
(1990) found no advantage of the Cl in recognition, but it di<l 
elicit better descriptions of the target as compared with a no-
instruetion control. Gwyer and Clifford (1997) comparen the 
revised version of the CI with a structured interview and again 
found no reliable effectg on reeognitio11 performance in target-
present conditions but a reduction in false identifications in 
target-absent conditions in their short (4-8-hour) delay group 
(ef. Yanney, 2004). This finding did not generalize to the long 
(96-hour) cfelay group. 
These fin<lings come as no surprise. The literature in<licates 
that environmental manipulations of context are not effective in 
a recognition test when alternative cues are available. Accord-
ing to Smith and Vela (2001), this is because the influence of 
contextual cues will be reduced or will be outshone when there 
are strong retrieval cues present at the time of the memory test. 
This is referred to as the outshining hypothesis. For instance, in 
a recognition tesl in which a copy of the item lo be remembered 
is provideJ, this item serves as a retrieval cue, an<l contextual 
cues are n~nderecl ineffective. When the task is lo recall an item 
uf information in the ubsence of a specific retrieval cue, the 
reinstatement of c:onlext should guide memory (Smith, 1994). 
However, as pointe<l out by Fisher an<l Schreiber (in press), the 
outshining hypothesis leads to the pre<lic:tion that experimental 
manipulations should have smaller effects in target-present than 
in target-ahsenl conditions. 
Future studies should examine whether witnesses interviewed 
with the revis<>ei CI are morn likely to make correct rejections 
und whether the effect of a Cl in an identification situation will 
vary as a function of retention interval (Gwyer & Clifford, 1997) 
unJ other relevant system an<l estimator variables. 
Ap/>lic<1.tion/Tmi11.ing 
Police officers complain that eyewitnesses sel<lom provide suf-
ficient information (Kebhell & Milne, 1998). The Cl has proved 
to be a prime system variable in that a full and accurate eye-
witness statement may determine whetheror not a case is solved. 
The question is, what impact has the CI had on interviewing 
practice? 
Despite the extensive scientific research on the Cl, knowledge 
and application of it is not widespread among investigators in the 
United Stales, and it does not appear to have hau a substantial 
impact on the methods police officers use lo interview witnesses 
(Fisher & Schreiber, in press). Nevertheless, personnel from 
police and nonpolice organizations have received training in the 
leehnique. These organizations include the FBI; the National 
Transportation Safety Board: the Department of Ho1rn~land Se-
curity: the Federal Department of Law Enforcement: and the 
l1ureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. and Firearms.NASA personnel will 
receive such training in the near future. The training has varied 
across states am! differs between federal and state training 
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academies. Fisher and Schreiber (in press) note that federal 
investigators receive 18 hours of training in interviewing, in-
cluding techniques for interrogating suspects and nonpsycho-
logical topics such as the legal aspects of interviewing. 
In England and Wales, the CI was introduced in a booklet to 
every police officer as part of the national investigative inter-
viewing package in 1992. However, while Britain has some good 
examples of police training in the CI, with input to the trainers 
from researchers. the training is typically limited to the de-
tective ranks or is on]y provided in a minimal, introductory form 
to junior officers (see Milne & Bull, 2006). A survey of police 
officers (Kehbell, Milne, & Wagstaff, 1999) suggesled that 
relatively few officers used the full CI in practice. Training 
programs have also been developed in other European coun-
tries. as well as in Australia, New Zealand, and Israel (Fisher, 
2005). The efficacy of the Cl has also recently been demon-
strated in Brazil (Stein & Memon, in press). with the aim of in-
troducing it to the Brazilian police and judiciary in the near 
future. 
Given the extensive research on the CI and the light it has 
shed on faulty interviewing practices, have police interviews 
improved in the 20 years since the CI was first introduced? In a 
recent analysis of police interview techniques, Fisher and 
Schreiber (in press) asked 2;3 Miami detectives experienced in 
investigations of robbery, sexual assault, homicide, and internal 
affairs to tape record their witness interviews. Analysis of these 
interviews revealed techniques and behaviors similar to those 
identified 20 years earlier. This was particularly disappointing 
in view of the scientific progress made in the field and the efforts 
by Fisher and Geiselman to disseminate their findings to prac-
titioners and to implement training programs. 
The pictun~ is just as bleak across the Atlantic. Clarke and 
Milne (2001) conJucted a national evaluation of investigative 
interviewing training (the Planning, Engage, Account, Closure, 
Evaluation-or PEACE-model) in England and Wales to see 
if it ha<l improved workplace practice. The PEACE model pro-
vides two ways of obtaining an interviewee's account: the CI an<l 
conversation management. The latter involves asking witnesses 
to give their own account of events: the interviewer then selects 
specific topics from the account uncl questions the witnesses in a 
Jogical sequence. Clarke and Milne (2001) found little evidence 
of any cognitive interviewing taking place. Most officers seem 
preoccupied with getting a statement from the witness and 
asking closed questions. One reason for the lack of development 
in witness-interviewing skills is that resources have targeted the 
use of inlem>galive techniques or suspect interviews at the ex-
pense of gathering information from cooperative witnesses 
(Milne & Rull, 2006). 
Resources need lo be directed toward training in witness-
interviewing practices. Milne and Bull (2006) argue that this 
will involve procedural changes in collecting evidence in the 
United Kingdom, such as electronic !"<"cording of a11 witness 
interviews to maintain an accurate record of the original ac-
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count, assessment of training and supervision of witness, and 
victim interviews to ensure that appropriate techniques are 
used. With respect to the United Stales, R.P. Fisher (personal 
c:ommunication, March 28, 2006) has noted that nonpolice 
groups. such as engineers, have displayed a willingness to use 
CI in investigations, suggesting that perhaps those with an 
academic background or a motivation to use investigative 
techniques to arrive at solutions find it easier lo un<lerstan<l the 
theory behind the CJ. Following this line of reasoning, perhaps 
police officers with specialist skills {homicide, child protection) 
might Lenefit more from training in the CL However, those who 
are specialists may already have an established protocol for 
interviewing and thus be less willing to adopt new techniques 
(Memon, Milne, Holley, Bull, & Kohnken, 1994). 
We advocate a two-tiered approach to training. First, there 
is a need for more extensive training programs on witness-
interviewing techniques for new police officers. Training and 
examples of how faulty witness testimony can contribute to 
miscan-iages of justice might also prove fruitful (see Savage & 
Milne, in press). The moniloring and assessment of witness in-
terviews (e.g .• recording) is essential. A second approach is to 
present trainees with a simpler, more accessible version of the 
cognitive interview (e.g., Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2004) 
lo encourage wider use. 
Identifying Criminal Suspects 
The identification of a criminal suspect can be the most im-
portant eyewitness evidence that is presented al a trial. This is 
especially true when the eyewitness claims to have seen the 
suspect commit the criminal act. In that case, the eyewitness-
identification testimony is direct evidence of guilt in the sense 
that the accuracy of the inentification has a one-to-one rela-
tionship to the ultimate issue of whether the suspect committed 
the crime. Tn other situations, eyewitness identification evi-
dence may be circumstantial-for instance, if the eyewitness 
only saw the person in the vicinity of the crime or saw the person 
leaving a building at a certain time. In these cases, other types of 
evidence are needeJ to complete the inference that the person 
who wus seen is the same person as the one who committed the 
crime. Regardless of whether the idenlifi<·ation is direct or cir-
cumstantial. those who observe identification testimony (for 
example. j1frors) are likely to aecept it as accuralf! if the eye-
witness is confident and consistent (e.g., Berman & Cutler, 
1996; firndficld & Wells, 2000; Brigham & 11othwell, 198:~; 
Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Lim, Mirando, & Cully, 
1986; Lindsay, Wells, & O'Connor, 1989; Lindsay, Wells, & 
Rumpel, 1981; Maas, Brigham, & West, 1985; Wells & Leippe, 
1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). 
Lineups 
A primary methorl for obtaining identifications of criminal 
suspects is the use of the lineup. Lineups can be either live, as 
commonly seen on TV shows, or photographic. In the experience 
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of the first and third authors, most lineups in the United States 
are conducted using photographs. At its simplest level, a lineup 
involves placing a suspect among distracters (called fillers) and 
asking the eyewitness if he or she can identify the target. The 
lineup is more complex than it at first appears. Understanding 
how mistaken identifications can occur with lineups and what 
kinds of system improvements can be made to prevent mistakes 
requires an understanding of the structural properties oflineups 
and their possible outcome distributions. 
lineup Structure. Regardless of whether there is more than one 
culprit, or target, a lineup should contain only one suspect, with 
the remaining members being known-innocent fillers (Wells & 
Turtle, 1986). It is critical to keep in mind that the suspect might 
or might not be the target {i.e., might or might not be the actual 
culprit). Hence, we will refer to two possible states of truth: (a) 
the suspect is the target, an<l (b) the suspect is not the target. 
Recause there is on]y one suspect per lineup, these two states of 
truth are equivalent lo target-present and target-absent lineups. 
Tn a target-present lineup, two kinds of e1Tors can be made: (a) an 
incorrect rejection (making no identification), and (b) the 
identification of a filler. Note that one cannot mistakenly identify 
an innocent suspect in a target-present lineup. The only time an 
eyewitness can mistakenly identify an innocent suspect is in a 
target-absent lineup. 'forget-absent lineups can also result in 
filler-identification errors, but these errors would not result in 
charges being brought against an innocent person. We reserve 
the term ·'mistaken identification" to refer to the identification of 
an innocent suspect; the identification of anyone other than the 
suspect is called filler irlentification. Thus, the structural 
properties of a lineup produce the set of possible outcomes 
shown in Table 3. In an exp~riment, participant witnesses are 
shown either a target-present or target-absent lineup to simulate 
the real-world fact of an unknown probability that the police are 
focusing on an innocent suspect. The proportion of target-
present and target-absent lineups (the target-present base rate) 
is commonly 50/50 for experiments, but Bayesian statistics 
permit quantitative analyses of what happens across all possible 
base rntes for any given experiment {see Wells & Lindsay, 1980; 
Wells & Olson, 2002; Wells & Turtle, 1986). 
Typical Outcome Distributions. As would be expected from 
heller-than-chance performance, experiments typically show 
that accurate identifications are more likely tlwn inaccurate 
identifications and that lrne rejections are more likely than are 
false rejections (Clark, 2003; Wells & Lindsay, 1980; Wells & 
Olson, 2002). Notice, however, that there are two types of filler 
identifications. Filler identification Type 2 is a "miss" in the 
sense that the target was present and could have been chosen but 
the eyewitness picked someone else. Filler identification Type l 
is an accurate rejection in the sense that the suspect is innocent 
and the eyewitness did not pick him or her. In genera], experi-
ments show that Type 2 filler identifications are more likely than 
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TABLE 3 
Pm;.~ibfo Out,:m11w; From u Lilllm]J 
S1n1e of truth 
Suspt:ct not target 
Suspect is target 
Identification of suspecl 
Accurate identification 
Mistaken idenlilicalion 
Response of Eycwitnci-s 
Identification of filler 
Filler identilic:ation type l 
Filler identification type 2 
No identification 
False rejection 
True rejection 
Nole. Filll!l' i<lentif1c11ti1111 type l c1111 l,e construed us 111111ccurnte rejection in the sense thut the target wus 1101 present un<l the 
1:ycwi1ncss did not pick him or her. Filler iclcntificalion type 2 is a "miss" in the S<'nsr. thal lhc lnrgct wa~ prcsr.nl hut was not 
piclu\1I. Source: Chunnnn & W,ills {20116). 
are Type l tiller identifications (Wells & Olson, 2002). This 
makes sense an<l fits well with the concept of relative judgments 
(Wells, 1984), in which it is presumed that eyewitnesses tenrl to 
select the person who looks most like the targel. When the target 
is ahsent, the chances increase that one of the fillers will be 
perceived as looking like Lhe largel. Usually, eyewilness-
irlentification performance is calculated hy the extent lo which 
accurate identifications exceed mistaken identifications and 
true rejections exceed false rejections. However, the rate of 
mistaken iuentifications can be decrease<l without increasing 
correct rejections by shifting identifications to fillers in the 
target-absent lineup. This is a key to understanding how careful 
selection of fillers for lineups can reduce mistaken identifica-
tions even if it does not reduce the propensity of eyewitnesses to 
at.tempt identifications from target-ahsent lineups. 
Target Removal Witholll Replacement. The relative-judgment 
c·onceptualization (Wells, 1984) has permeated the literature 
on lineups. It simply states that eyewitnesses have a tendency 
lo identify a person from the lineup who looks most like their 
memory of the target relative lo the other lineup members. As 
lung as the actual target is in the lineup, the rdative-
judgment procel:is shoul<l work well. However, if the actual target 
is not in the lineup, problems ensue, because there will always 
be sorneo11e who looks more like the target than the other lineup 
members. Various results have been interpreted as supporting 
the relative-judgment conceptualization. but the removal-
without-replacement (RWR) effect is the best evidence in sup-
port of the relative-judgment conceptualization. 
In the original demonstration of the RWR effect (Wells, 199:~). 
eyewitnesses viewed either a six-person lineup that contained 
the target or a five-person lineup in which the target was re-
111oved aml not reµlace<l with anyone. In both con<litions, the 
eyewitnesses were instructed that the target might not be present 
{see following section on pre-lineup instructions). When the 
target was present, S4,% pickt"d the target, 21 % selected no one, 
anJ 2!1o/c selecle<l fillers. Wells reasoned that if the 54% rep-
resented true re<:ognition rather than a relative judgment, re-
moval of the target should result in the 54% joining the 21 % in 
picking no one. When the target was removed, however, only 
32% selected no one, and 68% selected fillers. Thus, among the 
54% selecting the target when the target was present. it is es-
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Li mated that 79.6% of them (43%/54%) would have selected one 
of the fillers in the absence of the target. Recent data show the 
RWR effect to be robust across a variety of conditions, anr) the 
magnitude of the effect appears lo be greater when memory is 
weaker (Clark & Davey, 2005; Mac Lin, Wells, & Phe1an, 2004). 
There remains some debate about the psychological processes 
underlying the RWR effect. Ebbessen and Flowe (n.d.), for in-
stance, suggest that it could simply represent a downward cri-
terion shift that occurs when the target is removed. Regardless of 
the interpretation, the RWR effect illustrates the substantial risk 
that accrues lo an innocent suspect when the actual target is not 
present. 
The effect also further illuminates the problem of filler 
selections that we noted earlier in the discussion of archival 
studies using police files, in which one third of positive 
identifications by witnesses were identifications of innocent 
fillers. In the American archival study, Behrman anrl Davey 
(2001) found that nearly a quarter of witnesses selected a filler 
(and 50% selected the suspect). Thus, the average filler was 
selected by 5% of witnesses-what might be termer! "had 
guesses'' (at least in the sense that witnesses' memories were not 
good enough lo avoid en-ors; Penrod, 2003). Of course, in a 
perfectly fair array, one would have to assume that at least 
another 5% of witnesses wuulc.l "guess" the suspect. These 
selections might be characterized in various ways: Steblay et al. 
(2001) called them "calculated guesses" and Penrod called 
them "lucky guesses." 
As we discuss later, there ure reasons lo believe Lhal many 
lineups are not fair and that calculated/lucky guesses produce 
many suspect idenlifications that look like "hits" but are really 
the product of biased arrays and witness guessing. Steblay et al. 
(2001) reported, for instance, that in studies of target-absent 
simultaneous arrays in which a filler similar to the suspect was 
designated the "innocent suspect," that person was picked by 
27% of witnesses (across all studies. one of the six fillers-in-
cluding the suspect-was picke<l Ly 51 % of witnesses). One 
might expect that in a fair lineup the innocent filler would he 
selected by 8.5% (Sl %/6) of witnesses instead of 27%. The 
much higher rule of suspect identification suggests that the 
witnesses had some memory for the appearance of the missing 
target hut not enough of a memory to avoid mistakenly identi-
fying an innocent person. 
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Pre-Linenp Instructions. One of the first and most fundamental 
lineup system variables to be tested empirically was the in-
struction (or warning) to eyewitnesses that the target might or 
might not be in the lineup. Malpass and Devine (1981) used both 
target-absent lineups and target-present lineups; they either 
gave the pre-lineup instruction that the target might or might not 
be present or gave no instruction. When participants viewed a 
target-present lineup, the instruction had little effect on the 
distribution of responses. When they viewed a target-absent 
lineup, however, the instruction reduced choosing rates (Jra-
matically. This general pattern, in which the i1istruction reduces 
the chances of lmth mistaken identifications and filler identifi-
cations, has been replicated extensively (see meta-analysis by 
Steblay, 1997). A more recent meta-analysis indicates that ac-
curate identification rates in target-present lineups might be 
~lightly harme<l by the instruction, but the decline in accurate 
identifications when the target is present is much smaller than 
the decline in mistaken identifications when the target is absent 
(Clark, 2005). 
Selection of Fillers. The characteristics of the fillers used 
in a lineup have a strong influence on the chances that 
an innocent suspect will be identified in a target-absent lineup. 
In general, if the innocent suspect fits the description 
of the target and the fillers do not, the innocent suspect 
is likely to be mistakenly identified. The first empirical dem-
ons! rat ion hy Lindsay and Wells (1980) was followed by a debate 
aliout the optimal criteria for selecting fillers. Two primary 
strategies for selecting fillers have been advocated. One is to 
select fillers who resemble the suspect. Luus and Wells (1991) 
argued against this strategy because it has no "stopping point" 
an<l also because it risks creating a lineup of clones, which 
woultl reduce accurate identification rates for target-present 
lineups. Wells, Ry<lell, an<l Seelau (1993) found that selecting 
fillers on the basis of the description given by the eyewitnesses 
managed to protect the innocent suspect in target-absent 
lineups without harming accurate identification rates in target-
present lineups. On the other hand, selecting fillers on the basis 
of their resemblance to the suspect harmed hit rates with no 
additional protection for the innocent suspect in target-absent 
li1wups. 
Wogalter, Marwitz, and Leonard (1992) presented another 
argument against selecting fillers on the basis of their 
resemblance to the suspect: The "backfire effect" refers to the 
idea that, somewhat ironically, the suspect might stand out if he 
or she wus the basis for selecting the fillers in the lineup, be-
cause the suspect represents the central tendency or origin of the 
lineup. Chu-k an<l Tunnicliff (2001) reported evi<lence for the 
backfire effect. However, eyewitnesses' descriptions of the tar-
get are often sparse and sometimes do not even match the 
characteristics of the suspect (Lindsay, Martin, & Webber, ·1994-; 
1\1eissner, Sporer, & Schooler. in press; Sporer, 1996, in press). 
The general recommendation for selecting fillers for lineups has 
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been to use the eyewitness's description of the target anrl to take 
any additional measures needed to make sure that the suspect 
does not stand out in the lineup (Wells et al., 1998). 
Along with these strategies for selecting fil1ers, various 
techniques to assess lineup fairness by using "mock witnesses" 
have been developed. The task of a mock witness is to examine 
the lineup and try to discern which person is the suspect. From 
this mock-witness paradigm, various metrics have been <level-
oped to assess the extent to which the suspect stands out unfairly 
(Ma]pass & Lindsay, 1999). In lab studies, the mock-witness 
parn<ligm appears to be sensitive lo lineup bias an<l is relatively 
robust across variations in lineup procedure (e.g., simultaneous 
vs. sequential proce<lures; see McQuiston & Malpass, 2002). 
Studies of photo arrays and lineups from actual cases using the 
mock-witness method reveal that arrays are frequently biased 
against suspects, who are picked more than twice as often 
(relative to the fillers) as one would expect by chance alone 
(Brigham et al., 1999; Valentine & Heaton, 1999; Wells & 
Bradfield, 1999b). 
Lineup Size. A common practice in the Unite<l Stales is to use 
five or six persons (a suspect plus four or five fillers) in a live 
lineup and six or eight photos in a photo lineup. For purposes of 
this discussion of lineup size, we will assume that each lineup 
member is viable in the sense that the fillers are selected to fit 
the description and in other ways do not make the suspect stand 
out. Given a set of properly selected lineup fillers, there is no 
reason to believe that an innocent suspect has a greater chance 
than any of the fillers to be identified by an eyewitness. Hence, 
eyewitness researchers have adopted the assumption that the 
chances of a mistaken identification are (l/N) x p(I). where N 
is the number of lineup members and p(l) is the probability 
that art eyewitness will make an identification (see Doob & 
Kirshenbaum, 1973; Wells, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1979). Note that 
increasing lineup size reduces the chances of a mistaken 
i<lcntification in a negatively decelerating fashion (i.e., each 
additional lineup member reduces the chances of a mistaken 
identification less than the previous addition did). Because of 
this negative deceleration, the addition of persons to the lineup 
brings diminishing returns. Thus, adding six additional mem-
bers to a six-person lineup reduces the chances of mistaken 
identification from 16.7% to 8.3% (i.e., among those making an 
identification). But, adding six members to a 12-pcrson 
lineup reduces the chances of mistaken identification from 
8.:3% lo 5.S%. 
If reducing the chances of a mistaken identification were the 
only consideration, increasing the size of the lineup to a very 
high number is a good i<lea, even with <liminishing returns. But 
the formula speaks only to mistaken identifications from target-
absent lineups and not to the chances of accurate identifications 
from target-present lineups. The idea of a system variable im-
provement for lineups is lo reduce the chances of a mistaken 
identification without harming the chances of an accurate 
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identification. Thus. the critical question is what happens to 
accurate identifications as a function of increasing lineup size? 
The eyewitness-identification literature has not derived a pre-
cise function relating lineup size to accurate-identific:ation 
rates. Levi (2002) reported no drop in accurate-identification 
rates when lineup sizes were increased from l O lo 40 persons. 
In fact, the literature includes reports of eyewitnesses being able 
to view up to about :{OU photos with little reduction in the 
chances of an accurate identification (Ellis, Shepherd, Flin, 
Shepherd, & Davies, 1989; Lindsay, Nosworthy, Marlin & 
Martynuck, 1994}. These results are consistent with the general 
observation that identifications of the target from target-present 
lineups are not as sensitive to lineup variations as mistaken 
irlentifications from target-absent lineups are (Charman & 
Wells. 2006). For example, the "might or might not be present" 
instruc.tions have little effect on accurate identifications from 
target-present lineups but appreciably reduce identifications 
from target-absent lineups (Stehlay, 1997). Similarly, the use of a 
filler-biased lineup has little effect on accurate identifications 
from target-present lineups but increases mistaken identifica-
tions from target-absent lineups (Wells, Rydell, & Seelau, 
199~). Also, suggestive influences from lineup administrators 
appear to have little effect when eyewitnesses view a target-
present lineup but have a strong effect when the eyewitnesses 
view a target-absent lineup (Haw & Fisher, 2004). More sys-
tematic research is needed heforc it will be possible to conclude 
that lineup sizes can easily be raised to 20 or more persons 
without harming accurate idf'ntification rates, hut there appears 
to be great promise in the simple idea of increasing the nominal 
size of lineups. 
Double-Blind lineups. Police conducting a lineup hus been 
likened lo psychologists conducting an experiment (Wells & 
Lum;, 1990). One element of this rich .. malogy is the ic.lea of the 
double-blind lineup (Wells, 1988). Normally, a lineup is con-
ductec.l by the case detective. who also asscmbleJ the lineup and 
knows which person is the suspect and which people are merely 
fillers. The psychological literature on experimenter-expectancy 
effects reveals the <langcrs of permitting a person who knows the 
correct, desired, or expected answer to administer a face-to-face 
test (Harris & Rosenthal. l 98S). and yet this is standarrl practice 
for lineups. Experiments have shown that when the lineup ad-
ministrator is led to believe that a particular lineup member 
(rnnc.lomly selected) is the suspect, the chances that the eye-
witness will identify that person are increased (Haw & Fisher, 
2004; Phillips, McA uliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). Furthermore, 
when the eyewitness selecls the person whom the lineup ad-
ministrator was led lo believe is the target, the eyewitness ex-
pres~P.s higher levels of conGdenee in the identification 
(Garrioch & Brimacombe. 2001). 
The idea of the double-blind lineup is straightforward: The 
person who administers the lineup should not be aware of which 
lineup member is the suspect and which members are fillers 
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(Wells et al., 1998). This recommendation does not presume any 
intention or awareness on the part of the lineup administrator 
to influence the eyewitness. Some police jurisdictions might be 
concerned about manpower issues involved in using an in<le-
pendent lineup administrator. Because most lineups in the 
United States are actually photo spreads of some sort rather than 
live lineups, an alternative to using a double-blind administrator 
is to have a laptop computer administer the lineup, thereby ef-
fectively eliminating any possible influence from the lineup 
administrator (for a description of suc:h a program, see Mac Lin, 
Zimmerman, & Malpass, 2005). 
Sequential Lineups. An alternative to the traditional police 
lineup. the sequential lineup, was introduced in the mid-1980s 
(Lindsay & Wells, 1985}. Unlike the traditional police lineup, in 
which all members are presented to the eyewitness at once 
(simultaneous lineup), the sequential lineup presents the lineup 
members to the eyewitness one at a time. The eyewitness is told 
that he or she will view a number of people-the number is not 
specified. The witness makes a decision on each lineup member 
(yes, no, or not sure} before the next lineup member appears. The 
theory behind the sequential lineup is that it prevents eyewit-
nesses from relying on relative judgments, in which one lineup 
member is compared with another an<l the one most similar to 
the target is picked. Although the eyewitness can compare the 
lineup member ctmently being viewed with those already seen, 
there is a chance that a lineup member yet to come might look 
even more similar to the target. The initial results indicated 
support for a sequential-superiority effect in which identifica-
tions from target-absent lineups diminished while identifica-
tions of the target from target-present lineups remained largely 
the same. 
Years of additional experiments culminated in a meta-
analysis that aggregated data across 4,145 participant witnesses 
(Stelilay et al., 2001). The meta-analysis supported the original 
observation of lower mistaken ic.lentification rates for the se-
quential than for the simultaneous lineup; however, there was 
also a reduction in accurate identifications of the target from the 
target-present li11eups. In general, the sequential procedure 
appears to result in fewer identification attempts overall com-
pared with the simultaneous procedure. Although the seffuential 
procedure reduced mistaken identifications at a greater rate 
than it did accurate identifications, this shift in performance is 
consistent with a criterion shift in which eyewitnesses set a 
higher criterion for identification with the sequential than with 
the simultaneous proce<lure (Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & 
Mac Lin, 2005). However, these results are also consistent with a 
shift away from relative judgments. 
Recall that the RWR effec:t indicates that some propo1tion of 
accurate identifications appears to result from relative judg-
ments rather than true recognition. Thus, a shift away from 
relative judgments is likely to result in fewer accurate identifi-
cations as well as fewer mistaken identifications. An argument 
6.1 
Eyewitness Evidence 
can be ma<le that a more conservative lineup test (whether owing 
to a higher criterion for making a positive i<lentification or lo a 
reduced reliance on relative judgments) is desirable, as mis-
taken iclentification is the primary cause of convictions of the 
innocent. The trade~off of accurate and mistaken identifications 
ultimately is a clccision for po]icymakers, not scientists. How-
ever, Steblay et al. (2001) and Penrod (2003) argue that any 
losses of accurate i<lentifications that result from reduce<l reli-
ance on relative judgments are merely reductions in lucky or 
calculated guesses. 
A recent field experiment involving actual lineups con<lucte<l 
in Illinois (Illinois Pilot Program, 2006) has been touted as a 
comparison of the sequential lineup and the traditional simul-
taneous lineup. The authors' report on the experiment interprets 
its results as indicating that the traditional simultaneous lineups 
yielded fewer filler identifications and more suspect identifica-
tions than did the sequential lineups. In fact, however, this two-
condition experiment actually confounded several variables. 
Perhaps the most important confound was that the simultaneous 
lineups were never conducte<l using <louLle-blin<l procedures 
but were always conducted by the case Jetectives. The se-
quential li1wups, in contrast, were always conducted using the 
double-blin<l methoc.J. Tlrns, the low filler rate obtained in the 
simultaneous lineups could havP. heen the result of not using 
double-blind procedure:--. Consistent with this concern, it should 
he notecl that the douhle-hlincl sequential-lineup clata in the 
Illinois Pilot Program conformed quite well with data obtained 
using the double-blind sequential procedure in the Hennepin 
County (Minnesota) pilot project (about 8% filler identification 
rates; see Klobuchar. Steblay, & Caligiuri, in press). In contrast, 
the very low filler rate reported in the lllinois Pilot Program 
using the nonLlind simultaneous procedure (about ~~%) is an 
extreme outlier from the approximately 20% rate found in other 
jurisdictions with simultaneous lineups (see Behrman & Davey, 
2001; Slater, 1994; Valentine et al., 2003; Wright & McDaid, 
1996). The profoundly low filler-identification rate for simul-
taneous lineups reportetl in the Illinois Pilol Program suggesls a 
suppression of filler identifications and/or a reluetance to report 
filler identifications by the nonblind lineup administrators. 
Thus. we are reluctant at this time to consider the Illinois Pilot 
Program to be an interpretable test of the simultaneous versus 
sequential procedure. 
Composites 
When there is no dear suspect, investigators sometimes resort to 
the use of sketch artists or composite faces. Little systematic 
research on sketch at1ists exists, i11 part because variance across 
artists (e.g., in their abilities} is presumed lo be significant and u 
fairly large sample would be required to reach generalizable 
conclusions. Considerable research exists, however, on com-
posite production systems, which are increasingly being used by 
crime investigators in place of sketch artists. Composite pro-
duction systems create faces by selecting features (e.g., nose, 
eyes, chin, head shape. hair, mouth, brows, ears) and combining 
them into a face. One of the original systems, Identi-Kit, use<l 
line drawings of facial features on transparencies. An accom-
panying booklet displayed all the possible features, and the 
eyewitness selected features that were then overlaid on each 
other to form a complete face. A later system, Photo-Fit, used the 
same system, except that the features were black-and•white 
photos of actual facial features instea<l of line drawings. 
In recent years, computer software programs have replaced 
transparency-based composite systems. Examples of such soft• 
ware are E-Fit, Evo-FI'l~ CD-Fit, and Mac a Mug (Frowd et al., 
2005). The FACES program is currently popular among U.S. law 
enforcement agencies (Cote, 1998). FACES indudes 361 hair 
selections, 63 head shapes, 42 forehearl lines, 410 sets of eye-
brows. 514 sets of eyes, 593 noses, 561 sets of lips, 416 jaw 
shapes, 145 moustaches, 152 beards, 33 goatees, 127 sets of 
eyeglasses, 70 eye lines, 147 smile lines. 50 mouth lines, and 40 
chin lines. In each feature category, a selection button permits 
the user to view subsets of the feature that meet a particular 
description. For instance, eyes are diviJed into the subsets 
narrow, deep set, overhanging lids, heavy lids, average blue or 
green, almond-shaped blue or green, average brown, almond-
shapeJ brown, and bulging. Noses are tlivicle<l into the subsets of 
narrow, average with round base, average with broad hase, 
average pointed, hooketl nostrils not showing, hooked nostrils 
showing, slightly flared nostrils, very Aarerl nostrils, round 
(bulbous), average large, wide base with nostrils showing, and 
wide base with nostrils not showing. Jn addition, controls permit 
the feat mes to be moved up or down and closer or farther apart, 
and lo be made larger or smaller. The features are displayed on 
one side of the computer screen, and the face is built on the other 
side. When a feature is clicked, it appears on the face. To make 
changes-for example, in the eyes-one simply clicks a dif-
ferent set of eyes, and those on the face are replaced with the new 
ones. 
All composite systems use a pmt-to-whole method to build the 
face: The eyewitness constructs a face by selecting features and 
assembling them. Numerous face-recognition researchers have 
noted that this method may conflict with the natural way faces 
are encoded in memory-namely, in a holistic manner (e.g., 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997; Wells & l·lry-
ciw, 1984). Research experiments generally indicate that com-
posite faces tend lo be rather poor likenesses of the original faces 
(e.g., Bruce, Ness, Hancock, Newman, & Rarity, 2002; Ellis, 
Davies, & Shephar<l, 1978; Kovern, Penrod, Pappas, & Thill, 
1997). The research by Kovera et al. illustrates the difficulty of 
generatiug a composite that resembles the intended target. The 
researchers used a set of 50 composite images of the faces of 
high-school classmates and faculty created by former students. 
Other graduates of the same schools judged the composites' 
quality. The judges were told that some of the composites were of 
former high-school clussmates: they were asked to identify them, 
rating the faces' familiarity and their own confidence in that 
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assessment anci, where possible, giving names. Ratings of fa-
miliarity and confirlenc:e rlirl not rliffercntiate significantly be-
tween the known and unknown faces, and only 3 of the 167 
names offererl for the composites prover! to he co1,-ec:L! Ratings 
by the composite constructors of their familiarity with the targets 
and thPir assessments of the quality of their composites were 
unrelated to identification accuracy on any measure. The re-
searchers conclu<led that "the findings ... raise <loubts about the 
likelihood that composites prepared under field conditions will 
yield a pinpointed identification of a perpetrator by individuals 
who know the perpetrator" (Kovera et al., 1997, p. 245). 
Although early research using the ldenli-Kit and Photo-Fit 
suggeste<l that the poor likenesses might Le due to the composite 
systems themselves (e.g., Loo few choices of features; Ellis et al., 
1978). there is an emerging consensus that people simply do not 
have good memories for isolaterl facial features and that any 
system that requires parts-to-whole-face recall will be severely 
limited. Furthermore, research suggests that having eyewit-
nesses build a composite face can damage memory for the ori-
ginal faee am.I make the witnesses less able lo 1:ecngnize the 
original target face in a later lineup (Wells, Charman, & Olson, 
200S). Similar effects have been observed for giving verbal 
descriptions of faces, a phenomenon called the verbal over-
slwdowing effect (originally clemonstrated by Schooler & 
Engstler-Sdwoler, 1990; and see meta-analysis by Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001 h). 
Recent research has produced some encouraging results for 
cases in which multiple eyewitnesses independently produce 
composites. In such cases, morphing the individual composites 
produces a new face that is a better likeness of the person than is 
any individual composite (Bruce et al., 2002; Hase} & Wells, in 
press). But even the morph of four individual composites does 
not pro<luce a Jramatic likeness of the original face. Hase] and 
Wells rt>ported that the ability lo pick the original target from 
sets of four alternative faces was 35% for imliviJ11al composites 
and 48% for four-composite morphs (chance = 25%). 
POSTDICTION VARIABLES 
Posldictio11 variables are neither system nor estimator variahl<"s 
in the traditional sens1~, because they are not presumed to 
causally affect the accuracy of eyewitnesses. These variables are 
measurable products that correlate with the accuracy of eye-
witnesses in a noncausal manner. The most researched of these 
is the confidence (certainty) of the eyewitness. Another post-
diction variable is response latency-specifically, how long the 
eyewitness takes to make ,m identification. The third post<liction 
variable that we review here is self-reported decision process. 
Confidence 
The confidence an eyewitness expresses in his or her identifi-
cation is one of the most researched questions in the study of 
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eyewitnesses. First, there is a strong intuitive appeal to the irlea 
that confidence am! accuracy should be closely related. Second, 
courts have explicitly endorsed the idea that the reliability of an 
eyewitness should be gauged at least in part by the person's 
confidence, a tenet advocated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977). Third, even in the absence of 
instructions to pay attention to eyewitness confidence, partici-
pant jurors rely heavily on the confi<lenc:e of the eyewilness in 
deciding whether he or she made an accurate identification (e.g., 
Bradfield & Wells, 2000; Fox & Walters, 1986; Lindsay el al., 
1986; Lindsay et al., 1989; Limlsay et al., 1981; Wells, Fergu-
son, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells et al., 1979). 
Initially, eyewitness researchers focused on the relationship 
between eyewitness-identification confidence and eyewitness-
identification accuracy {Wells & Murray, 1984). This was a 
useful starting point, but it is now clear that the relationship 
between confidence and accuracy varies greatly as a function of 
many other factors. For instance, it depends, in part, on how 
similar the mistakenly identified person is to the actual target 
(Lindsay, 1986). The confidence-accuracy relalionship is gen-
erally higher when memory strength is stronger rather than 
weaker {Deffenliacher, 1980); when ii is calculated only among 
those who make an identification rather than among both those 
who make an identification and those who do not (Sporer, Pen-
rod, Read, & Cutler, 1995); and when it is calculated across 
witnesses under different viewing conditions rather than among 
witnesses who had the same viewing conditions (Read, Vokey, & 
Hammersley, 1990). 
In their meta-analysis of 30 studies involving a total of 4,036 
participant witnesses, Sporer et al. (1995) estimated that the 
confidence-accuracy correlation among choosers could be as 
high as + .4 l. Wells, Olson, & Charman (2002) nole that a .41 
point-biserial correlation (a correlation between a two-level 
variable and a continuous variable) between confidence an<l 
accuracy in eyewitness identification is less than the point-
biserial correlation between height and gender in humans. 
Nevertheless, under conditions of uncertainty, a post<liction 
variable that has a .41 correlation to a criterion variable is not 
something that should be ignored. In fact, the American Psy-
chology-Law Society's white paper on lineups endorses the idea 
of making a clear record of the confidence of an eyewitness that 
triers-of-fact might later use (Wells ct al., 1998). 
Accuracj' of Higl,ly Conficlenl Witnesses 
Though conficlence-aecuracy correlations are sometimes rela-
tively high, most research yields relatively low correlations. 
Attempts have hecn marle to increase the correlation through 
accountability, context reinslulemenl, and other thought ma-
nipulations, but none has been successful, and such measures 
commonly have the reverse effect of harming the confidence-
accuracy relationship (Robinson & Johnson, l 998). Some have 
argued that despite the generally weak confidence-accuracy 
correlation. accuracy may be very high among the most confi-
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dent witnesses. One analytic method that addresses this ques-
lion uses calibration methorls that measure peoples' confirlence 
on a percentage scale (zero. 10%, 20%, 30%, and so on) and 
then elump~ people together at rlifferent levels of confidence to 
assess their accuracy (see Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002; 
Rrewcr, Weber, & Semmler, 2005; Brewer & We1ls, 2006; Cutler 
& Penrod, 1989; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Weber & 
Brewer, 20o:3, 2004). 
Cutler and Penrod found witness overconfidence of 10 to 20% 
(that is, witnesses were making 10%-20% more errors than their 
confidence levels indicated). Juslin et al. (1996) found that 
confidenc:e scores were roughly comparable lo accuracy scores; 
in particular, in a 95% confidence group, judgments were 85 to 
90% accurate (the exact numbers are not reporterl-numbers 
are estimated from figures). Although these numbers look 
promising, even in the 95% confidence group there appear to be 
10 to 15% errors; en-ors are much higher-with greater over-
confidence-at lower confidence levels. 
Other researchers have found less promising results. Though 
the publisheJ numbers are slightly ambiguous, it appears that 
the top 21 % most confident witnesses in Brigham, Maus, Sny<ler, 
and Spaulding (1982) were 85% correct. Brewer el al. (2002) 
founJ that eyewitnesses who were very confident in the accuracy 
of their identifications (95% certain) were about 70 to 75% 
correct-that is, high error rates and substantial overconfi-
dence. In a 1987 sturly by Fleet, Brigham, and Bothwell, 75% of 
subjects who rated themselves as extremely confident were ac-
curate. Brigham (1990) found a 74% accuracy rate for the top 
27% most confident witnesses. Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999) 
reported that they found overconfidence in both general-know-
ledge domains and eyewitness-memory domains and that the two 
were correlated. The latter finding suggests that confidence has 
an individual-difference component that can be independent of 
the task. Research by Perfect and Hollins (1996) suggests that 
poor confidence-accuracy relationships are at least partly at-
tributable to people's lac!k of insight regarding their general 
abilities in the eyewitness domain. 
The general point is that these results are consistent with 
other measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship. 
Even lhP calibration approach rlocs not uniformly support the 
notion that confidence is a highly reliable indicator of accuracy. 
Error rates can be high among even the most confident 
witnesses. Furthermore, these numbers presume that the crim-
inal justice system would skim off only the most confident wit-
nesses and thut none of those witnesses would have had their 
confidence artificially boosted. 
The Problem. Grows Worse 
Imagine that prosecutors are skimming only the most confident 
witnesses; there is no artificial confidence-boosting among the 
witnesses; and we have reliable measures of confidence, not the 
vague verbal reports currently obtained by police. Among these 
highly confident witnesses, the results above indicate that 20 to 
6() 
30% could he in error. But even if the error rate is only 10% for 
these highly selected and most confident witnesses, they will all 
appear highly confident to jurors-so confidence cannot help 
the jurors figure out which witnesses have made errors. ln<leed, 
the simple correlation between confidence and accuracy for 
these witnesses wi1l be much worse than among all witnesses, 
because there is very little variability in confidence and maybe 
no useful variance. Though it is tempting to conclude that jurors 
might be entitled to assume a fairly high base rate of accuracy 
among these highly confident witnesses (even if confidence 
cannot aid them in differentiating accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses), the pleading effect discussed earlier suggests that it 
would not Le safe to conclude that the accuracy rate is fairly 
high; inrlee<l, the accuracy rate could be fairly low, because the 
guilty defendants facing confident witnesses have already 
pleaded guilty. ln short, the research results and logic call into 
question the notion that witness confidence can be of significant 
assistance to jurors. 
Even if the research showed that eyewitness-identification 
confidence an<l accuracy are related al a level that could have 
practical utility, this conclusion would come with another huge 
caveat. Wells and Bradfield (1998) showed that giving con-
firming feedback to eyewitnesses who had made mistaken 
identifications (e.g., "Good, you identified the suspect") pro-
duces profound distortions in their retrospective judgments, 
including their recol1ections of how confident they were when 
they made their identification, how good a view they had when 
they witnessed the event, and how much attention they devoted 
to the target's face during the event. 
The idea that eyewitness confidence can be driven by vari-
ables that are independent of accuracy has theoretical roots in 
Leippe's (1980) early analysis of the prohlem, hut the fact that 
other testimony-relevant variables (such as self-reports of al· 
tention and view) are also malleable is a startling revelation. 
There are numerous replications of this phenomenon, known as 
the post-identificationfeedback effect. (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 
2002; Dixon & Memon, 2005; Hafstad, Memon, & Logie, 2004,; 
Neuschatz et al., 2005; Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004; Wells 
& Bradfield, 1998, 1999a; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003; also 
see a meta-analysis by Douglass and Stcblay, in press). The post-
identification feedback effect occurs even if the feedback is 
delayed for 48 hours (Wells et al., 2003). The effect occurs for 
both positive identifications and "not there" decisions (Semmler 
ct al.. 2004), and the effect occurs for both the elderly (Neus-
chatz et al., 2005) an<l young children (Hafste<l et al., 2004). 
Importantly, the confidence-inflating effect of confirming feed-
back is greater for eyewitnesses who have made a mistaken 
irlentification than for those who have made an accurate iden-
tification; as a result, confirmatory post-identification feedback 
harms thf! accuracy-confidence relationship (Bradfielrl ct al., 
2002). Furthermore, a recent experiment showed that the post-
identification feedback effect occurs for actual eyewitnesses to 
real crimes (Wright & Skagerberg, in press). 
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The post-identification foerlback effect is of considerable 
practical imporl, because it is a common practice for lineup 
administrators to give eyewitnesses feedback about their iden-
tifieations. When an eyewitness has received some form of 
feedback before being asked about his or her confidence in the 
identification, the confidence statement is contaminated. Eye-
witnesses tend to believe that the feedback did not affect them; 
however, those who report that the fee<lbuck <lid not affect their 
response to the retrospective confidence question are never-
theless affected just as much as are the smaller portion of wit-
nesses who report that it might have affected them {Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998). Fortunately, if the eyewitness is asked to in-
dicate his or her confidence level Lefore receiving feedback, this 
tends to inoculate the eyewitness against post-identification 
feedback effects (Wells & Bradfield, 1999a). The need for im-
merliate measures of confidence is further inrlicaterl hy the fact 
that repeated questioning, expenditure of effort over time, and 
publir. displays of confidence (as might happen at a trial) all tend 
to inflate eyewitness confidence even when accuracy is held 
constant (Shaw & McClure, 1996; Shaw & Zerr, 20W~; Shaw, 
Zerr, & Woythaler, 2001). Clearly, the must pristine measure of 
witness eonfidence is one collected from the witness al the lime 
uf identification an<l before the contaminating influence of these 
later events. 
An intriguing phenomenon that appears to be related to the 
post-identification feedback effect is visual hindsight bias. 
1 farley. Carlsen, and Loftus (2004) presented participants with 
pl10tographs of familiar faces that were severely rlegraderl 
(blurred) but gradually resolved to full clarity. After the identity 
of the face became apparent, participants predicted the level of 
blur that would permit a na'ive observer to identify the face. 
Participants who had already learned the identity of the face 
consistently prec.licted that a nai've participant woulc.l be able to 
idenlif y the face al levels of blur that were in fact loo severe for 
identification. Thus, once the "correct" answer is known, people 
think that objeclively poor viewing conditions are nevertheless 
sufficient for accurate identification. This "saw it all along" ef-
f~ct could he an important component of the propensity for 
eyewitnesses to have retrospective overconfidence in their 
iclentifications. 
Response L,1tcncy 
Another interesting postdictor of eyewitness accuracy is the 
n:spunse latellt")'" of tlie eyewitness in making a lineup identifi-
cation. \Ve use "response latency" rather than "decision time," 
because the former term incorporntcs buth decisional and motor 
{'0lllponenls (Weber, Brewer, Wells. Semmler, & Keast, 2004). 
The effect was first Jocumented by Sporer ( 1992); considerable 
data have accumulated showing that witnesses who make ac-
curate identifications from lineups do so faster than do those who 
make inaccumte iclcntifieations (Ounning & Perretta, 2002; 
Dunning & Stern, 1994; Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Smith, 
Lindsay, Pryke, & Dysart, 2001; Sporer. 1993, 1994; Weber 
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et al., 2004). Sporer (1992) suggested that this occurs because 
comparisons made to the target involve a large number of 
common features between memory and the stimulus face, 
thereby permitting a very fast decision in recognizing the target. 
Comparisons to an innocent lineup member, on the other hand, 
involve fewer common features between memory anrl the stim-
ulus, thereby resulting in a slower decision. The potential 
practical value of the negative relation between response la-
tency and identification accuracy is considerable because, un-
like confidence, response latency is a performance variable 
rather than a self-report. And, unlike confidence, response la-
tency can be measured without the eyewitness's awareness. 
Furthermore, response latency and confidence are not fully re-
dundant postrlietors of accuracy {Smith et al., 2001; Weber et al., 
2004). 
For response latency to be useful at the level of evaluating an 
individual eyewitness, however, some criteria have to be set for 
"fast" anrl "slow." How are police, prosecutors, judges, and 
juries to know whether a given result (e.g., response latency of 
20 secon<ls) was fast or slow and thus should Le considered 
accurate or inaccurate? Dunning and Perretta (2002) ap-
proached this problem by repeatedly selecting different re-
sponse latencies, examining the percentages correct above and 
below eaeh response latency, and calculating the obtained chi-
square values for each response latency. The response latency 
that prorlucerl the greatest value was then considered to be the 
best rule for deciding on the decision criterion. Using this ap-
proach, Dunning and Perretta found that a response latency of 
10 to 12 seconds worked best across four different data sets. 
Furthermore, the 10-12-second response latency was highly 
discriminating-those who responded before the 10-12-second 
latency had a probability of accuracy of nearly 90%, while those 
who took longer than 10-12 secomls had a probabi]ity of ac-
curacy of approximately 50%. Dunning and Perrella called this 
the "10-12 second rule." The consistency of the 1O-12-second 
response latency data sets fits nicely with Dunning and Stern's 
(1994) notion of automatic versus deliberative processing in 
eyewitness identification. They arguerl that automatic decision 
processes (which are fast) are likely to be characteristic of ac-
curate eyewitnesses, while deliberative processes (which are 
slower) ought to be more characteristic of inaccurate eyewit-
nesses. Furthermore. because automatic processes tend Lo be 
uninHuenced by decision context, the speed of accurate iden-
tifications ought to be relatively stable across situations-
hence, the 1O-12-second mle was µruposed to be stable across 
various circumstances and conditions. 
!\fore recent research, however, has shown that the l O-12-
second rule is not stable across variations in witnessing and 
lineup conditions. Weber el al. (2004) found that the maximally 
discriminating time ranged from S seconds to 29 seconds across 
variations in conditions. Fu.rthermore, eyewitnesses who re-
sponded faster than the optimal time boundaries did not show 
particularly high probabilities of being accurate; they were often 
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in the SO to 60%· range rather than the 90% range found hy 
Dunning anrl Perretta (2002). Although the 10-12-second rule 
does not appear to be stable. the fact that accurate identifica-
tions are made faster than inaccurate identifications is itself a 
very reliable finding. 
Self-Reported Decision Processes 
Another potential postdictor of eyewitness-identification ac-
curacy is eyewitnesses' reports of the processes they use to make 
their identification decisions. Wells (1984) argued that mistaken 
identifications tend to arise from making relative judgments in 
which the eyewitness compares one lineup member to another to 
decide who looks most like the target; Wells argued that an 
absolute judgment (comparing the lineup member lo memory) 
would be more likely to be accurate. Consistent with this as-
sumption, Stern anJ Dunning (1994) found that eyewitnesses 
who agreed with the statement "l <:omparecl the photos fin the 
lineup] lo each other lo narrow the choices" were more likely lo 
have marle a mistaken identification than were those who en-
tlor~ed the statement "I just reeognized him, I cannot explain 
why" or those who said the photo "popped out:• Similar results 
have been reported by Smith et al. (2000), Smith et al. (2001), 
Dunning and Stern (1994). and Lindsay and Bellinger (1999). 
One of the problems with self-reporteu uecision processes is 
that, like eyewitness confidence, they are subject to distortion. 
For instance, confirmatory post-identification feedLack leads 
eyewitnesses Lo be more likely to recall that the lineup photo 
"popped out" and less likely lo report having made a relative 
judgment (Wells & Braclfielcl, 1998). Furthermore, if eyewit-
nesses thought these kinds of self-reports would be used lo as-
sess the Ji ke1y accuracy of their identifications, they might shape 
their answers acc:orrlingly. 
Overall, it appears that postdiction has not been highly suc-
cessful for eyewitness identification. Indicators of confidence 
measured at the time of the identification may have some di-
agnostic value with regard to accuracy, but feedback, prose-
cutorial skimming, and plea bargaining can operate lo obliterate 
the diagnostic value of confidence. This underscores the primary 
message of the system-variable approach-namely, that it would 
lie heller lo use procedures that liclp prevent mislakcn idcnli-
fications from occurring i11 the first place than lo try to detect 
errors after tlw fact. 
PHOGRESS AND PROSPECTS 
F:yewitncss science has made consi<lerahle progress in recenl 
years in gelling a number of jurisdictions in the United Stales lo 
improve their identification procedures and undertake training 
in the cognitive interview. The state of New Jersey, for instance, 
has adopted an entire package of reforms for how it conducts 
lineups. These reforms are based explicitly on the eyewitness 
literature and include the adoption of recommendations for 
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selecting lineup fillers, instructing eyewitnesses before the 
lineup, using double-blind lineup administrators, using the 
sequential procedure, and obtaining a confidence statement 
from the eyewilness before extemal factors ean influence the 
person's confidence. Other jurisdictions-including the states 
of Wisconsin and North Carolina and the cities of Boston and 
Minneapolis-have also adopted these reforms. In each of these 
jurisdictions, eyewitness scientists played a central role in ex-
plaining the literature and helping translate the findings into 
practical reforms of eyewitness-identification procedures. 
In many jurisdictions, eyewitness researchers have become 
involved in training police investigators in eyewitness-identifi-
cation procedures or training the trainers. Increasingly, eye-
witness researchers are targeting some of their writings toward 
law enforcement journals to more directly make the research 
findings accessible lo law enforcement (e.g., Turtle, Lindsay, & 
Wells, 2003). Jury simulations have shown that mock jurors 
respond more favorably to eyewitness-identification testimony 
when it was obtained using these packages of reformed pro-
cedures than when procedures deviate from these reforms 
(Lampinen, Ju<lges, OJegunl, & Hamilton, 2005). This is an 
unusual impact for a laboralory-hased psychological science. In 
the years ahead, it is expected that these reforms will become 
even more widespread and the role of scientific psychology more 
deeply ingrained in the legal system. 
Despite this progress, we believe that research has only 
scratched the surface of ways to help the legal system improve 
the accuracy of eyewitness accounts. Thus far, almost all im-
provements to lineup procedure have been designed to reduce 
the chances that an innocent suspect will be identified without 
reducing identifications of the target. It has been more difficult 
lo discover ways lo increase the chances that the eyewitness will 
iJentif y the target in target-present lineups. Both research ex-
periments and archival analyses of actual lineups suggest that 
eyewitnesses fail to identify the target about 50% of the time. 
This does not 11ecessari1y mean that the target walks away; in 
some cases, other evidence is sufficient lo charge or convict the 
person. Nevertheless, there is room to improve these hit rates. 1t 
seems likely that some failures to identify the target from target-
present lineups are due at least in part to changes in the target's 
appearance. Specifical1y, the appearance of the target when the 
eyewitness viewed the crime represents a moment in time. The 
photo seen in a photographic lineup may be olJer or more recent. 
Attempts to use pre-lineup instructions that warn the eyewitness 
that the target's appearance might have changed have not proveJ 
successful in increasing accuracy; in fact, they seem to increase 
errors (Clrnrman & Wells, in press). 
It could be argued that research has been profoundly con-
servative in its approach to the eyewitness-identification prob-
lem. Specifically, researchers have tended to operate within the 
confines of the traditional lineup, in which a suspect is placed 
among fillers and the eyewitness makes a verbal identification. 
But what if the lineup had never existed and the legal system 
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turni>ci to psychology to cletermine how information could 
hf! extracted from eyewitnesses' memories? Specific methods for 
obtaining detailed reports from witnesses-such as the cogni-
tive inter\'iew-rlo not appear to aid identification, hut the 
quality of witness descriptions could be improved though 
innovative questioning procedures. This is an area in which 
research is sparse, despite the potential to study the effective-
ucss of various types of retrieval cues in eliciting descriptions 
(Sporer, in press). The focus on target identification has also 
resulted in research that has selectively focused on the impact of 
a specific system or estimator variable on lineup performance, 
insteatl of exploring relevant interactions. For example, 
is the weapon-focus effect more pronounced when a witness has 
a shorter exposure to the target, when the retention interval 
is longer, and when the witness is making a cross-race 
identification? Operating from scratch, it seems likely that 
modern psychology would have developed radically different 
ideas. For instance, brain-activity measures, eye movements, 
rapid displays of faces, reaction times, and other methods for 
studying memnry might have Leen cJevelope<l insteacJ of the 
traditional lineup. Once we step outside the confines of the 
lrnditional lineup, it is possible lo imagine a future science of 
eyewitness evidence that is radically different from the methods 
used today. 
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■ Abstract The criminal justice system relies heavily on eyewitness identification 
for investigating and prosecuting crimes. Psychology has built the only scientific liter-
ature on eyewitness identification and has warned the justice system of problems with 
eyewitness identification evidence. Recent DNA exoneration cases have corroborated 
the warnings of eyewitness identification researchers by showing that mistaken eyewit-
ness identification was the largest single factor contributing to the conviction of these 
innocent people. We review major developments in the experimental literature con-
cerning the way that various factors relate to the accuracy of eyewitness identification. 
These factors include characteristics of the witness, characteristics of the witnessed 
event, characteristics of testimony, lineup content, lineup instructions, and methods of 
testing. Problems with the literature are noted with respect to both the relative paucity 
of theory and the scarcity of base-rate information from actual cases. 
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Eyewitnesses are critical in solving crimes, and sometimes eyewitness testimony 
is the only evidence available for detennining the identity of the culprit. Psycho-
logical researchers who began programs in the 1970s, however, have consistently 
0066-4308/03/0203-0277$ I 4. 00 277 
G 
278 WELLS ■ OLSON 
articulated concerns about the accuracy of eyewitness identification. Using var-
ious methodologies, such as filmed events and live staged crimes, eyewitness 
researchers have noted that mistaken identification rates can be surprisingly high 
and that eyewitnesses often express certainty when they mistakenly select someone 
from a lineup. Although their findings were quite compeBing to the researchers 
themselves, it was not until the late 1990s that criminal justice personnel began 
taking the research seriously. This change in attitude about the psychological litera-
ture on eyewitness identification arose primarily from the development of forensic 
DNA tests in the 1990s. More than 100 people who were convicted prior to the 
advent of forensic DNA have now been exonerated by DNA tests, and more than 
75% of these people were victims of mistaken eyewitness identification (Wells 
et al. 1998, Scheck et al. 2000). The apparent prescience of the psychological 
literature regarding problems with eyewitness identification has created a rising 
prominence of eyewitness identification research in the criminal justice system 
(Wells et al. 2000). 
Because most crimes do not include DNA-rich biological traces, reliance on 
eyewitness identification for solving crimes has not been significantly diminished 
by the development of forensic DNA tests. Interestingly, research on eyewitness 
reliability has been done only by psychologists-primarily cognitive and social 
psychologists-and the psychological literature represents the only source of em-
pirical data on eyewitness identification. The vast criminal justice system itself has 
never conducted an experiment on eyewitness identification. 
COVERAGE OF THIS REVIEW 
No review of the eyewitness identification literature has previously appeared in the 
Annual Review of Psychology. Therefore, we include here references to articles 
from the 1970s and 1980s that we think especially critical to the development of the 
literature, but we primarily emphasize more recent developments. Also, because 
the eyewitness identification literature has become so vast, we are necessarily se-
lective in our citations and coverage. Readers should note that this review focuses 
on eyewitness identification rather than on eyewitness testimony in general. Eye-
witnesses commonly testify about many things, such as which hand a gunman 
used, the color of a car, or recollections of a conversation, but these event memo-
ries are outside the scope of this review. The large literature on child eyewitnesses, 
suggestibility, and recovery of repressed memories is not reviewed here. 
BASIC CONCEPTS 
The eyewitness identification literature has developed a number of definitions and 
concepts that require explanation. A lineup is a procedure in which a criminal 
suspect (or a picture of the suspect) is placed among other people (or pictures of 
other people) and shown to an eyewitness to see if the witness will identify the 
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suspect as the culprit in question. The term suspect should not be confused with 
the tenn culprit. A suspect might or might not be the culprit (a suspect is suspected 
of being the culprit). Fillers are people in the lineup who are not suspects. Fillers, 
sometimes cal1edfoils or distractors, are known-innocent members of the lineup. 
Therefore, the identification of a fi11er would not result in charges being brought 
against the filler. A culprit-absent lineup is one in which an innocent suspect is 
embedded among fi11ers and a culprit-present lineup is one in which a guilty suspect 
(culprit) is embedded among fillers. The primary literature sometimes calls these 
target-present and target-absent lineups. 
A simultaneous lineup is one in which all lineup members are presented to 
the eyewitness at once and is the most common lineup procedure in use by law 
enforcement. A sequential lineup, on the other hand, is one in which the witness 
is shown only one person at a time but with the expectation that there are several 
lineup members to be shown. 
A lineup'sfunctional size is the number of lineup members who are "viable" 
choices for the eyewitness. For example, if the eyewitness described the culprit as 
being a tall male with dark hair and the suspect is the only lineup member who 
is tall with dark hair, then the lineup's functional size would be 1.0 even if there 
were 10 fillers. Functional size was introduced as a specific measure (Wells et al. 
1979), and competing measures have been proposed, such as Malpass's (1981) 
"effective size." Today functional size is used generical1y to mean the number of 
lineup members who fit the eyewitness's description of the culprit. 
Mock witnesses are people who did not actually witness the crime but are asked 
to pick a person from the lineup based on the eyewitness's verbal description of 
the culprit. Mock witnesses are used to test the functional size of the lineup. 
The diagnosticity of suspect identification is the ratio of accurate identification 
rate with a culprit-present lineup to the inaccurate identification rate with a culprit-
absent lineup. The diagnosticity of "not there" is the ratio of "not there" response 
rates with culprit-absent lineups to "not there" response rates with culprit-present 
lineups. The d;agnosticity of filler identifications is the ratio offiller identification 
rates with culprit-absent Jineups to fl lier identification rates with culprit-present 
lineups. 
Among variables that affect eyewitness identification accuracy, a system vari-
able is one that is (or could be) under control of the criminal justice system, while 
an estimator variable is one that is not. System variables include instructions given 
to eyewitnesses prior to viewing a lineup and the functional size of a lineup. Esti-
mator variables include lighting conditions at the time of witnessing and whether 
the witness and culprit are of the same or of different races. 
The distinction between estimator and system variables has assumed great sig-
nificance in the eyewitness identification literature since it was introduced in the 
late l 970s (Wells 1978). In large pait, the prominence of this distinction attests to 
the applied nature of the eyewitness identification literature. Whereas the devel-
opment of a literature on estimator variables pennits some degree of postdiction 
that might be useful for assessing the chances of mistaken identification after the 
280 WELLS ■ OLSON 
fact, the development of a system variable literature permits specification of how 
eyewitness identification errors might be prevented in the first place. 
ESTIMATOR VARIABLES 
Estimator variables can be sorted into four broad categories: characteristics of the 
witness, characteristics of the event, characteristics of the testimony, and abilities of 
the testimony evaluators to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witness 
testimony. 
Characteristics of the Witness 
Are members of certain groups better eyewitnesses than those of others? The 
empirical evidence is not overwhelming. For example, there is no clear evidence 
that males and females differ significantly overall in ability to identify people from 
lineups. A meta-analysis by Shapiro & Penrod ( l 986) indicated that females might 
bes I ightly more likely to make accurate identifications but also slightly more likely 
to make mistaken identifications than are males (due to females being more likely 
to attemp an identification), thereby yielding an overall equivalent diagnosticity for 
males and females. Although males and females might take an interest in different 
aspects of a scene and thereby remember somewhat different details (e.g., Powers 
et al. 1979), overall abilities of males and females in eyewitness identification 
appear to be largely indistinguishable (but see Brigham & Barkowitz 1978, Shaw 
& Skolnick 1999). 
The age of the eyewitness, on the other hand, has been consistently linked to 
eyewitness identification performance, with very young children and the elderly 
performing significantly worse than younger adults. The eyewitness identification 
errors of young children and the elderly are highly patterned: When the lineup 
contains the actual culprit, young children and the elderly perform nearly as well 
as young adults in identifying the culprit, but when the lineup does not contain 
the culprit the young children and the elderly commit mistaken identifications at a 
higher rate than do young adults (see the meta-analysis on children versus adults 
by Pozzulo & Lindsay 1998). 
There is little evidence that intelligence is related to eyewitness identification 
performance. Although an early study by Howe11s (1938) indicated a significant 
relation between face recognition accuracy and intelligence, later studies have 
shown no relation (e.g., Brown et al. 1977). A word of caution is in order here, 
however, because Howells's sample of witnesses included a much greater range 
of intelligence at the low end than have later studies. At the low extremes of 
intelligence, a pattern similar to that found with children seems likely, namely a 
high rate of mistaken identifications in response to culprit-absent lineups. 
The race of the eyewitness has been examined extensively. Although no con-
sistent overall differences attributable to race have emerged, the evidence is now 
quite clear that people are better able to recognize faces of their own race or 
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ethnic group than faces of another race or ethnic group. A recent meta-ana]ysis 
by Meissner & Brigham (2001) shows that this effect is robust across more than 
25 years of research. 
. Little published research relates personality characteristics to eyewitness iden-
tification accuracy. Hosch et al. (1984) found that high self-monitors (individuals 
· who adapt their behavior to cues regarding what is socially appropriate) are more 
susceptible to biased lineup procedures than are low self-monitors, and Hosch & 
Platz ( 1984) found a relation between self-monitoring and correct identifications. 
Also, a meta-analysis by Shapiro & Penrod (1986) indicated that individuals high 
in chronic trait anxiety (a general attitude of apprehension) made fewer mistaken 
identifications than individuals low in chronic trait anxiety. Their meta-analysis 
also indicated that field independents (those with a perceptual tendency to dif-
ferentiate parts of a visual field from the whole) made fewer accurate identifi-
cations (but equal mistaken identifications) than did field dependents. However, 
little research has been directed at the role of personality in eyewitness identifi-
cation, and no strong theory relating personality to eyewitness identification has 
emerged. 
Characteristics of the Event 
A variety of factors affect the abi1ity of an eyewitness to identify the culprit at 
a later time, including the amount of time the culprit is in view, the lighting 
conditions, whether the culprit wears a disguise, the distinctiveness of the culprit's 
appearance, the presence or absence of a weapon, and the timing of knowledge 
that one is witnessing a crime. 
Distinctive faces are much more likely to be accurately recognized than nondis-
tinctive faces (e.g., Light et al. 1979). Faces that are highly attractive or highly 
unattractive are easier to recognize than are faces that are average in attractive-
ness (e.g., Fleishman et al. 1976), but what makes a face distinctive is not entirely 
clear. Because the arithmetic mean (averaged at the pixel level) of several faces 
(a prototype) is judged to be more attractive than the individual faces that were 
averaged (see Lango is & Roggman 1990), the distinctiveness-recognition relation 
is probably not due to a simple deviation from the arithmetic mean of individual 
facial features. 
Simple disguises, even those as minor as covering the hair, result in significant 
impairment of eyewitness identification (Cutler et al. 1987). Sunglasses a}so impair 
identification, although the degree of impairment can be reduced by having the 
targets wear sunglasses at the time of the recognition test (Hockley et al. 1999). 
Photos of criminal suspects used in police lineups are sometimes several years old. 
Changes in appearance that occur naturally over time and changes that are made 
intentionally by suspects can have quite strong effects on recognition. Read et al. 
( 1990) found that photos of the same people taken two years apart were less likely 
to be recognized as the same people when their appearance had naturally changed 
(via aging, facial hair) than when their appearance had remained largely the same. 
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Clearly, at the extreme of low light levels there is a point at which a face cannot 
be perceived well enough to be recognized later. Surprisingly, however, we know 
ofno experiments that have measured the light levels required for the encoding of 
faces. We encourage researchers to address this question. 
As would be expected, the amount of time a culprit's face is in view affects 
the chances that the eyewitness can identify the person later (E1lis et al. 1977). 
However, this relationship depends less critically on the eyewitness's opportunity 
to view per se and more on the amount and type of attention that the witness directs 
at the culprit. Given equal exposure time to a face, people are more likely to be 
able to recognize that face later if they make abstract inferences about it (e.g., is 
this person honest?) than if they make physical judgments (e.g., does this person 
have a large or small nose?). Presumably, this effect occurs because the abstract 
inferences require holistic processing of the face whereas the physical judgments 
require feature processing (Wells & Hryciw 1984). 
In general, the amount of time a culprit's face is in view is not as critical for 
eyewitness identification accuracy as the type or amount of attention given by 
the witness. For example, Leippe et al. ( 1978) exposed unsuspecting people to a 
staged theft of a package. Some were led to believe that the package contained a 
valuable item and some were led to believe that the package contained a trivial 
item. In addition, some learned of the value of the item in the package before the 
theft and some only learned the value after the thief had fled. Although all had the 
same opportunity to view the thief, the witnesses who knew the value of the item 
beforehand were significantly more accurate at identification than the other three 
groups. Observers often do not realize that they have witnessed a crime until after 
the culprit has fled. Although they might have had significant opportunity to view 
the culprit, they might have had little reason to attend closely. 
One factor that can signal to eyewitnesses that a crime is occurring is the pres-
ence of a weapon. Unfortunately, learning that one is an eyewitness to a crime 
via the culprit's display of a weapon might not make the person a better eye-
witness. A number of studies have been directed at the question of the so-called 
weapon-focus effect. A meta-analysis of these studies indicates that the presence 
of a weapon reduces the chances that the eyewitness can identify the holder of 
the weapon (Steb lay 1992). Loftus et al. ( 1987) monitored eyewitnesses 's eye 
movements and found that weapons draw visual attention away from other things 
such as the culprit's face. Complicating the issue somewhat is the fact that the 
presence of weapons or other types of threatening stimuli can cause arousal, fear, 
and emotional stress. The effects of such stress on memory are still being debated. 
Some research shows that increased levels of violence in filmed events reduces 
eyewitness identification accuracy (e.g., Clifford & Hollin 1981) whereas other 
research has failed to find this effect (e.g., Cutler et al. 1987). Deffenbacher ( 1983) 
suggested that the effect is likely to follow the Yerkes-Dodson Law where only 
very high and very low levels ofarousal will impair memory. Christianson 's ( 1992) 
review of the evidence relating emotional stress to memory suggests that emotional 
events receive preferential processing; emotional response causes a narrowing of 
attention (as suggested by Easterbrook 1959) with loss of peripheral details. 
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Characteristics of Testimony 
Considerable interest and research have been directed at the question of whether 
there are characteristics of an eyewitness's testimony that could be used to postdict 
whether the witness made an accurate or false identification. The bulk of this re-
search has focused on the certainty (confidence) of the eyewitness. Although early 
research suggested that the certainty an eyewitness expresses in an identification 
is largely unrelated to the accuracy of the identification, current analyses suggest 
a more hopeful but also more complex view of the cerlainty-accuracy relation. 
Although any given experiment might show a statistical1y nonsignificant relation 
between certainty and accuracy, meta-analyses of the literature show a reliable 
correlation. Several moderators of the strength of the relation have been identi-
fied. One important moderator is the overall accuracy of the eyewitnesses. When 
accuracy is low (e.g., from poor witnessing conditions), the certainty-accuracy 
relationship suffers (Bothwell et al. 1987). Later meta-analyses indicate that the 
certainty-accuracy relation is stronger if the analysis is restricted to those mak-
ing an identification ( choosers only) than if it also includes witnesses who make 
correct and false rejections (Sporer et al. 1995). In fact, using a weighted average 
of effect sizes for choosers only, Sporer et al. reported a 0.37 certainty-accuracy 
correlation across 30 studies. More recent work indicates that directing eyewit-
nesses to reflect on their encoding and test conditions or asking them to entertain 
hypotheses regarding why their identification might have been mistaken can im-
prove the relation between accuracy and certainty, especially when this relation 
is calculated using calibration methods rather than the point-biserial correlation 
(Brewer et al. 2002). 
Although the 0.37 correlation estimate for the certainty-accuracy relation is 
more optimistic than the early estimates, recent studies suggest the literature might 
be overestimating the utility of eyewitness certainty in actual cases. In a series of 
experiments, eyewitness certainty was shown to be highly malleable among eye-
witnesses who had made mistaken identifications (Wells & Bradfield 1998, 1999). 
After making mistaken identifications, some eyewitnesses were given confirming 
feedback by the lineup administrator ("Good, you identified the suspect") whereas 
others were given no feedback about their identification. This feedback served to 
distort the eyewitnesses' recollections of the certainty they had in their identifica-
tions. Those given confiiming feedback recalled having been very ce11ain in their 
identification compared to those given no confinning feedback. This certainty-
inflation effect is greater for eyewitnesses who make mistaken identifications than 
it is for those who make accurate identifications, resulting in a significant loss in 
the ce11ainty-accuracy relation (Bradfield et al. 2002). In actual cases, it is com-
mon for lineup administrators (usually the detective in the case) to give confirming 
feedback to eyewitnesses, thereby inflating the certainty of the eyewitness and con-
founding the certainty-accuracy relation. Even if the lineup administrator refrains 
from giving the witness confirming feedback, the witness is likely to make con-
firming inferences from later events (e.g., an indictment of the identified person). 
Another real-world factor that can muddle the meaning of eyewitness certainty is 
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repeated testing. Shaw and his colleagues (Shaw 1996, Shaw & McClure 1996) 
have shown that repeated questioning of eyewitnesses on a matter about which they 
were inaccurate serves to inflate their certainty that they were accurate. Hence, it is 
unclear whether the .37 correlation between certainty and accuracy revealed in the 
Sporer et a1. meta-analysis of experiments can be directly applied to actual cases 
in which there are other influences that inflate the certainty of eyewitnesses. 
An even more promising indicator of eyewitness accuracy is the speed with 
which the eyewitness makes an identification from a lineup. Several studies have 
now found that witnesses who make accurate identifications from a lineup reach 
their decision faster than do witnesses who make mistaken identifications 
(Dunning & Perretta 2002; Dunning & Stem 1994; Robinson et al. 1997; Smith 
et al. 2000; Sporer 1992, 1993, 1994). In an impressive set ofresults, Dunning & 
Perretta found that those who made their decision in less than 10-12 seconds were 
nearly 90% accurate in their identifications from a lineup whereas those taking 
longer were approximately 50% correct. The 10-12-second rule was developed 
post hoc to produce the best separation of accurate and inaccurate witnesses, so 
some caution is called for with regard to how well the 10-12-second rule works 
in other situations; but the general relation between accuracy and speed of iden-
tification has received support in several studies. In addition, the idea that faster 
identifications are more likely to be accurate than are slower identifications makes 
good theoretical sense. It has long been theorized that mistaken identifications re-
sult from a deliberated judgment in which witnesses compare one lineup member 
to another and use inferences and elimination strategies to decide which person 
must be the culprit whereas accurate identifications result from a more automatic 
recognition process that does not require comparisons of one lineup member to 
another (Wells 1984a). 
Lay Observers' Judgments of Accuracy 
Observers (e.g., jurors) have little ability to make correct discriminations between 
accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identification testimony. Several methods have 
been used to assess the adequacy of people's judgments about eyewitness iden-
tification accuracy. Surveys, for example, show poor agreement (often less than 
50%) between the answers that lay people give about variables affecting eyewit-
ness identification accuracy and the answers researchers score conect based on the 
empirical literature (e.g., Deffenbacher & Loftus 1982, Mcconkey & Roche 1989, 
Noon & Hollin 1987). Another approach has been to use "prediction" studies in 
which eyewitness identification experiments are described and people are asked 
to predict the results. The results of these studies show a tendency to overestimate 
eyewitness identification accuracy and a failure to correctly predict interactions 
between variables (e.g., Brigham & Bothwell 1983, Wells 1984b). 
A third approach is to cross-examine eyewitnesses to staged crimes and to 
ask subject-jurors to determine whether witnesses made accurate or mistaken 
identifications. In a series of experiments using this methodology, subject-jurors 
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have shown little or no ability to make such discriminations (Lindsay et al. 1989, 
Lindsay et al. 1981, Wells et al. 1981, Wells & Leippe 1981, Wells et al. 1979). 
Because observers' belief rates exceeded eyewitnesses' accuracy rates, these 
studies are commonly cited as evidence that people are overbelieving of eye-
witnesses. However, this pattern of overbelief is restricted primarily to poorer 
witnessing conditions; when witnessing conditions were good, belief rates and 
eyewitness identification accuracy rates were more similar. In addition, mock 
jurors sometimes underbelieved the eyewitnesses who had quite low levels of 
certainty. 
SYSTEM VARIABLES 
System variables are those that affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications 
and over which the criminal justice system has (or can have) control. In general, 
these tend to be lineup test factors, such as how witnesses are instructed prior to 
viewing a lineup or how the lineup is structured. The distinction between system 
variables and estimator variables is consequential in several respects. Whereas esti-
mator variables can at best increase the probabi1ity that the criminal justice system 
can s01t accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications, system variables can 
help prevent inaccurate identifications from occurring in the first place. Consider, 
for instance, the idea thatjurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness identification tes~ 
timony. Although expert testimony about eyewitness identification might manage 
to reduce jurors' tendencies to overestimate eyewitnesses' accuracy, the system 
variable approach might enable eyewitness identification accuracy to match the 
level of jurors' beliefs (Seelau & Wells 1995). 
The procedure used by crime investigators conducting a lineup has been likened 
to that of researchers conducting an experiment (Wells & Luus 1990). Crime 
investigators begin with a hypothesis (that the suspect is the culprit), create a design 
for testing the hypothesis (embed the suspect among fillers), carry out a procedure 
(e.g., provide pre-lineup instructions and present the group to an eyewitness), 
observe and record the eyewitness's behavior (witness decision), and then interpret 
and revise their hypothesis (whether the suspect is the culprit). All the types of 
things that can go wrong with an experiment to cause misleading results can also 
go wrong with a lineup. For instance, the instructions might bias the witness, the 
hypothesis might be prematurely leaked, the design might be flawed, the behavior 
might be misinterpreted, confinnation biases might be operating, and so on. Indeed, 
a great deal of the research literature on system variable eyewitness identification 
could be construed as the extension of sound experimental methodology to the 
design and procedure of police lineups. 
Most system variable research in eyewitness identification can be placed into 
four categories: instructions, content, presentation method, and behavioral influ-
ence. Before reviewing these system variables, however, it is important to under-
stand the role played by the presence versus absence of the culprit in the lineup 
and the concept of a relative-judgment decision process. 
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Culprit-present Versus Culprit-absent Lineups 
A lineup might or might not include the actual culprit. If police investigators have 
unknowingly focused on an innocent person as their suspect and place that suspect 
in the lineup, then the eyewitness(es) will end up viewing a lineup for which the only 
correct answer is "not there." Research repeatedly shows that culprit-absent lineups 
present great problems for eyewitnesses. The same eyewitnesses who identified 
an innocent person from a culprit-absent lineup might otherwise have been able to 
identify the actual culprit from a culpiit-present lineup (Wells 1984a). In one study, 
for example, 54% of eyewitnesses were able to identify the actual culprit from a 
6-person culprit-present lineup and 21 % made no identification. When the culprit 
was removed without replacement (making it a 5-person culprit-absent lineup), 
however, the rate of no identification rose only to 32%, with the other 68% of 
the eyewitnesses who saw this lineup mistakenly identifying someone from the 5 
remaining members of the lineup (Wells 1993). 
A theoretical view that has been used heavily in the eyewitness identification 
literature is that eyewitnesses tend to use a relative-judgment decision process in 
making identifications from a lineup (We1ls 1984a). The relative-judgment con-
ceptualization states that an eyewitness tends to select a person from a lineup who 
most resembles the eyewitness's memory of the culprit relative to the other lineup 
members. Although the relative-judgment decision process permits eyewitnesses 
to do a reasonable job ofidentifying the culprit from a culprit-present lineup, when 
eyewitnesses view a culprit-absent lineup there will likely be one lineup member 
who looks more like the culprit than the others. 
An alternative explanation of the errors witnesses make with culprit-absent 
lineups is that eyewitnesses tend to have lax criteria of resemblance; under culprit-
absent circumstances, innocent lineup members easily meet these undemanding 
criteria (Ebbesen & Flowe 2002). Experimental data have not yet favored one 
of these interpretations over the other. Recent mathematical modeling of lineup 
data by Clark may help to refine our understanding of the ro1es of both re1ative 
judgments and criterion setting (Clark 2002). 
Instructions 
A variable shown repeatedly to have considerable impact on eyewitness identifi-
cations from lineups is the pre-lineup instruction given to eyewitnesses. Malpass 
& Devine ( l 981) were the first to demonstrate that the ratio of accurate to inaccu-
rate identifications is strongly affected by whether or not eyewitnesses have been 
instructed (warned) prior to viewing the lineup that the culprit might or might 
not be in the lineup. A meta-analysis of the eyewitness identification literature on 
pre-lineup instructions reveals that the loss of accurate identifications from such 
instructions is minima] whereas the reduction of mistaken identifications is con-
siderable (Steblay 1997). Steblay's meta-analysis showed that the presence of the 
"might or might not be present" instruction (compared to no instruction) reduced 
mistaken identification rates in culprit-absent lineups by 41.6% whereas accurate 
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identification rates in culprit-present lineups were reduced by only 1.9%. Based 
on this compelling research, the U.S. Department of Justice included this type of 
instruction in its first set of national guidelines for law enforcement on the collec-
tion of eyewitness evidence (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence 
1999). 
Lineup Content 
When police have a suspect and decide to conduct a lineup, nonsuspect (filler) 
members of the lineup must be chosen. The imp01tance of the selection of fillers 
as a system variable was demonstrated early, and it remains one of the primary 
active issues in the eyewitness identification literature. Ideally, lineup fillers would 
be chosen so that an innocent suspect is not mistakenly identified merely from 
"standing out," and so that a culprit does not escape identification merely from 
blending in. The first experimental demonstration of the importance offiller selec-
tion showed what can happen when this idea is not achieved. When fillers did not 
at all resemble the culprit, eyewitnesses tended to mistakenly identify an innocent 
suspect who resembled the culprit; when the suspect was the culprit, however, 
the manipulation of fillers had little effect on the rate of accurate identifications 
(Lindsay & Wells 1980). 
Although the issue of lineup fillers seems simple at first glance, it is in fact 
complex. In the early demonstrations, researchers used their knowledge of the 
culprit's identity to select fillers. In actual cases, of course, the identity of the 
culprit is not known. Using the suspect as a proxy for the culprit will have different 
effects on rates of accurate and mistaken identification depending on whether the 
suspect is the culprit or an innocent person. Accordingly, selecting fillers who 
are highly similar to the suspect can help protect the innocent suspect in a culprit-
absent lineup, but can also reduce accurate identifications in a culprit-present lineup 
(Luus & Wells 1991 ). Another line of research has shown that using the suspect 
as the reference point to select fillers can create a "backfire effect" in which an 
innocent suspect, being the origin or central tendency of the lineup, actually has 
an increased chance of being identified as the culprit (Clark & Tunnicliff 200 I, 
Navan 1992, Wogalter et al. 1992). 
An alternative to the strategy of selecting fillers based on their resemblance to 
the suspect is to select fillers based on their fit to the verbal description the eyewit-
ness had given of the culprit. This fit-to-description strategy has several practical 
advantages (see Wells et al. 1994) and has worked well in some experiments (Juslin 
et al. I 996, Wells et al. I 993). However, biases against the innocent suspect can 
remain with the fit-to-description method when the description is especially sparse 
or when the innocent suspect happens to show a high resemblance to the culprit 
(Clark & Tunnicliff 2001, Lindsay et al. 1994). In actual cases, high resemblance 
between the innocent suspect and the culprit can occur by chance or it can occur 
whenever the innocent person became a suspect because she or he resembled a 
composite or a security video image of the culprit. 
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Lineup Presentation Method 
Many alternatives to the traditional 1ineup have been proposed and tested, and 
future research will likely focus on solving the lineup system variable problems. 
The first proposed alternative to the traditional lineup was the blank lineup control 
method (Wells 1984a). A blank lineup is one that contains only fillers (no suspect). 
The eyewitness is first shown the blank lineup under the belief that this is the only 
lineup to be shown. The identification of someone from a blank lineup is known to 
be an error (because the I ineup mem hers are all fl l lers ), and witnesses who make an 
identification from a blank lineup can thereby be discarded. Witnesses who do not 
make an identification from the blank lineup can then be shown the actual lineup 
(which contains a suspect). Data indicate that eyewitnesses who do not make an 
identification from the blank lineup are much more reliable on the second (actual) 
lineup than are those who were not screened with the blank lineup method. In 
effect, the blank lineup method is analogous to the use of a control condition in 
a within-subjects design and could be used in actual cases. In general, however, 
crime investigators have not liked the idea of the blank lineup control method on 
grounds that it "tricks" the eyewitness and could sever the eyewitness's trust in 
investigators. 
Another proposed alternative to the traditional lineup procedure, and the best 
known of these alternatives, is the sequential lineup (Lindsay & Wells 1985). Un-
like the traditional lineup in which the lineup members are shown to the eyewitness 
simultaneously, the sequential lineup shows the eyewitness only one lineup mem-
ber at a time and requires the eyewitness to make a decision ("Is this person the 
culprit or not?") prior to viewing the next lineup member. The most powerful ver-
sion of the sequential procedure is one in which the eyewitness does not know how 
many lineup members are to be viewed. ln theory, the sequential lineup procedure 
prevents eyewitnesses from selecting the person who looks most like the culprit 
relative to the other lineup members, a process called relative-judgment decision 
(see above) (Wells 1984a). To the extent that relative judgments are operating, 
eyewitnesses will have difficulty with culprit-absent lineups because by definition 
someone in the lineup resembles the culprit more closely than the other lineup 
members do. Unlike the simultaneous lineup, the sequential lineup prevents eye-
witnesses from making a relative-judgment decision because at any point in the 
sequence a lineup member who has not yet been viewed may turn out to resemble 
the culprit more than any person viewed thus far. Eyewitnesses must compare each 
member of the sequential lineup to their memory of the culprit and thus make a 
more "absolute judgment" about identity. A recent meta-analysis of 25 studies 
comparing simultaneous and sequential lineups showed that the sequential lineup 
reduced the chances of mistaken identifications in culprit-absent lineups by nearly 
one half (Steblay et al. 200 l ). Unfortunately, the sequential technique was also as-
sociated with a reduction in accurate identification rates in culprit-present lineups. 
Although this reduction was not as great as that in mistaken identifications, it was 
nevertheless statistically reliable. The pattern of these results has led Ebbesen & 
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Flowe (2002) to speculate that the sequential lineup raises the criteria for making 
a positive identification rather than changing the process from relative to absolute 
judgments. 
Another alternative to the traditional lineup is the elimination lineup, a proce-
dure in which the witness's task is to eliminate al] but one lineup member and then 
make a separate decision as to whether that person is the culprit or not (Pozzulo 
& Lindsay 1999). Although the elimination lineup does not seem to work well 
with adults, it seems to eliminate some of the problems young children have with 
lineups. 
Behavioral Influence: The Need for Double-Blind Testing 
One of the ways that the justice system itself can influence eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence is through the behaviors of the person who administers the lineup 
(Wells 1993). Commonly, the person who administers a lineup is the case de-
tective who, of course, knows which member of the lineup is the suspect and 
which members are fillers. The need for double-blind testing is well established 
in the behavioral sciences (Rosenthal 1976) but is largely unknown or unheeded 
in criminal investigation procedures and forensic science (Risinger et al. 2002). 
Lineup administrators could inadvertently communicate their knowledge about 
which lineup member is the suspect and which members are merely fillers to the 
eyewitness through various verbal and nonverbal means. Phillips et al. (1999) ma-
nipulated lineup administrators' assumptions about the identity of the culprit and 
found that this manipulation affected the choices that eyewitnesses made from the 
lineup, especially when a sequential lineup procedure was used. In addition to 
influencing eyewitnesses' choice of particular lineup members, the person admin-
istering the lineup can cause other problems. Wells & Bradfield ( 1998, 1999) found 
that post-identification suggestions to eyewitnesses from lineup administrators led 
mistaken eyewitnesses to develop high levels of false certainty that they had made 
an accurate identification. The problem of influence from the lineup administrator 
is easily fixed by having lineups administered by someone who does not know 
which lineup member is the suspect and which ones are fillers (We1ls et al. 1998). 
Base Rates as System Variables 
Base rates can be considered system variables in some cases. The important base 
rate in eyewitness identification is the base rate for the culprit being present versus 
absent in a lineup. Most mistaken identifications occur when the culprit is not in 
the lineup. Although the relation between the culprit-absent versus culprit-present 
base rate and the chances of mistaken identification has been established and 
modeled mathematically (Wells & Lindsay 1980, Wells & Turtle 1986), the case 
was only recently made for treating this base rate as a system variable (Wells 
& Olson 2002). Previously, this base rate was treated as a fixed (albeit largely 
unknown) variable in actual cases. In fact, however, no laws or rules determine 
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when a suspect is placed in a lineup and, therefore, this base rate varies as a 
function of the decisions crime investigators make when conducting a lineup. 
Consider, for instance, two police departments, a lax-criterion department and 
a strict-criterion department. In the lax-criterion department, investigators will 
place a suspect in a lineup for the slightest ofreasons (e.g., a mere hunch) whereas 
the strict-criterion department requires certain evidence against a person (e.g., 
possession of stolen goods) before placing that person in a lineup. These two 
departments will, over the long run, have different base rates for culprit-present 
and culprit-absent lineups. Suppose, for example, that over a run of 1000 lineups 
the lax-criterion department shows 500 culprit-absent lineups and 500 culprit-
present lineups whereas the strict-criterion department shows only 100 culprit-
absent lineups and 900 culprit-present lineups. Given equivalent eyewitnesses in 
both of these departments, mistaken identifications of suspects will be nine times 
as likely in the Jax-criterion department than in the strict-criterion department. 
(These surprising differences in the chances that an identification will be mistaken 
are simple derivations from Bayes' theorem.) Although the justice system has not 
yet done so, it could control the culprit-present versus culprit-absent base rate by 
requiring "probable cause" before placing someone in a lineup (Wells & Olson 
2002). The base rate for culprit-present and culprit-absent lineups might be the 
most powerful system variable affecting the chances of mistaken identification. 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
In spite of the successful application of the eyewitness identification literature, 
significant work has yet to be done. The eyewitness identification literature has 
been driven much less by theoretical frameworks than by practical perspectives. 
Two problems are related to this state of affairs. One is that the premium on appli-
cation and forensic relevance reduces the interplay and sharing of ideas between 
eyewitness identification researchers and their counterparts in basic areas of psy-
chology, especially cognitive and social psychology. In addition, the experimental 
eyewitness identification literature is likely never to be complete enough to cover 
every possible situation that arises in actual cases; hence, better theory is needed 
to generalize this body of literature and to fill in gaps regarding what is likely to 
happen under various conditions. 
A second concern is that while laboratory data on eyewitness identification 
are extensive, some key forms of real-world data are lacking. Certain estimable 
rates of eyewitness identification behavior and lineup conditions from actual cases 
could assist the design and interpretation of laboratory work. For instance, there 
have been no empirical estimates of the base rate for culprit-present versus culprit-
absent lineups in actual cases. Although it is difficult to establish the ground truth 
(actual guilt or innocence) needed for precise estimates of this base rate in actual 
cases, methods exist for estimating upper limits (see Wells & Olson 2002). In 
addition, although the identification of a suspect from a lineup usually cannot be 
definitively classified as an accurate or mistaken identification in an actual case, the 
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identification of a filler is a known error in actual cases and the rate at which these 
known errors occur can be informative. Two estimates of the fil1er identification 
rates in actual cases have been published. Wright & McDaid ( I 996) reported a rate 
of about 20% and Behnnan & Davey (2001) reported a rate of24%. One problem 
in collecting fi11er identification data from real cases is that police records often 
do not distinguish between eyewitnesses who make identifications of a filler and 
those who make no identification, which can result in a serious underestimation 
of the rate offiller identifications (Tollestrup et al. 1994). Another problem is that 
filler identification records from actual cases often lack an indication of the level of 
eyewitness certainty. These problems can be avoided by scripting data coHection 
with police departments. 
Actual case data of these types (e.g., base rates, filler identification rates, eye-
witness certainty on known errors) can supplement the laboratory literature on 
eyewitness identification in two important ways. First, actual case data can be 
compared to laboratory data to see if the general rates of certain behaviors (e.g., 
nonidentification responses) are similar. Second, the rates for certain conditions 
in actual cases (e.g., rates of culprit-present versus culprit-absent lineups) are crit-
ical for Bayesian estimations of posterior probabilities that cannot themselves be 
derived from experiments. 
Eyewitness identification research is likely to continue to focus on system vari-
ables for the foreseeable future because of the way system variables can be mapped 
onto the problem of improving eyewitness identification accuracy in actual cases. 
At the same time, estimator variables might be re-emerging with new promise for 
postdiction for three reasons. First, conditions are being found in which eyewitness 
certainty might be more closely related to eyewitness identification accuracy than 
once thought, especially when external influences on eyewitness certainty are min-
imized. Second, new postdiction variables, such as decision time, are emerging. 
Third, Bayesian analyses are being used to show that some eyewitness responses 
to lineups, such as filler identifications, have postdiction value in exonerations. 
Each of these represent potentially superior estimator variables because they can 
be more precisely measured in actual cases than can some of the more traditional 
estimator variables (such as stress or arousal). In any case, there is little evidence 
that eyewitness identification research is veering away from its applied orientation, 
especially in the face of recent successes in _affecting legal policies and practices 
(Wells 200 I, Wells et al. 2000). 
The Annual Review of Psychology is on line at http://psych.annualrevicws.org 
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